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Life is calling. How far will you go? 





As solitary as writing a dissertation can feel sometimes, it is an intensely 
collaborative enterprise. Thank you to Gretchen Murphy and Phil Barrish, an amazing 
pair of co-directors. It was during the classes I took with each of them in Spring 2007 that 
the idea for this project coalesced, and in Gretchen and Phil I found two enthusiastic and 
encouraging supporters. Both of them have shaped the project in significant ways. My 
conversations with Phil about humanitarianisms, past and present, and about our own, 
personal senses of complicity in systems larger than ourselves lent a sense of intellectual 
urgency to my work, something I know a lot of graduate students can feel is missing from 
their labors. Gretchen pushed me to historicize and to anticipate objections, and the 
questions she raised at every stage of my project were useful in getting me to think 
through and justify my approach. Her remark at an early stage of the prospectus that I had 
revised away my voice and my passion made me realize that those things belong in 
academic writing. Gretchen and Phil allowed the project to be mine. Their involvement, 
from start to finish, has been an ideal balance of direction and standing back. I want to 
thank both of them particularly for being so responsive and involved over e-mail that I 
never really felt as though I were finishing my dissertation from a distance. I realize that 
this isn‟t always, or even often, the case among students dissertating from afar, and I feel 
incredibly lucky to have been working with such a wonderful team.  
Many thanks are also due to Jeff Walker and Martin Kevorkian, who offered 
helpful readings of my chapters along the way. Even though late-nineteenth century 
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literature is a far cry from classical rhetoric, Jeff could not have been more congenial 
about joining my committee in the first place. Knowing that he would be reading my 
chapters kept me honest when using the word “rhetoric,” which I tried to do as precisely 
and with as much care as possible. I took a class from Martin my first semester at UT, 
and another during my fourth. Though I did wander a little (from the twentieth century 
back to the sixteenth and forward to the nineteenth), those two classes, in many ways, 
made me decide that nineteenth-century American literature was where it was at. The 
conversations in our “Re-authorizing the American Renaissance” course were among the 
most stimulating I had in graduate school, for which Martin deserves much of the credit. 
Kim Alidio taught me a lot about Filipino history, and our conversations about 
development work and pragmatism helped turn what was a hunch into a major 
component of my project. Thank you as well to Sarah Robbins, whose work, though she 
doesn‟t bill it this way, concerns humanitarians of all stripes. Her enthusiasm for my 
project and willingness to come aboard at such a late date gave me a much-needed 
injection of energy at a crucial stage.  
I am very grateful for the support I received from the Office of Graduate Studies 
in the form of a Continuing Fellowship and from the English Department for support to 
complement the Continuing. Wayne Lesser is a terrific advocate for his graduate 
students, working hard to procure funding for us and to make sure we make the most of 
our brief (now it feels brief!) time at UT.  
At a time when I felt especially isolated, having just moved to Dallas and having 
no intellectual community to speak of, Jill Anderson and I collaborated on some mutual 
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chapter reading that was of incredible benefit to me. Her comments on my work were 
smart and encouraging, but more than that, it was the act of sharing work and talking 
about ideas with another person that helped me adjust to being a scholar without a ready-
made academic community. To Tim Turner and Alberto Varon, thank you so much for 
your friendship these many years. A year ahead of me, Tim has helped me through every 
stage of my graduate career, from the QE to the job market. Whatever hurdle it is, Tim 
braves it first, and then he kindly shares what he‟s learned with me. Alberto inspires me 
with his ambition and his direction. Kate Rowe and Mike Anderson have been invaluable 
friends. Their home has been a haven for me since grad school began. 
My sister, Erin Hamilton, started graduate school at UT (in sociology) a year 
before I did. She has been a running, swimming, biking, and weight-lifting partner; we‟ve 
discussed the ups and downs of our graduate careers around the track at Gregory and over 
many a bottle of wine at dinner. Thank you, Erin, for your advice and perspective—and 
for making me Italian cream cake every year on my birthday.  My parents, Donna and 
John Hamilton, have never once asked either of their daughters why they found it 
necessary to spend six-plus years getting a Ph.D. Instead, they have been incredibly 
supportive, both in spirit and in practice, showing an interest in and curiosity about our 
work. My mother cheerfully read Wharton‟s Summer when I raved about it; my dad read 
Rorty‟s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Over the past year, on more than one 
occasion, they have set aside other projects to proofread and edit my work. Major kudos 
are due anyone who makes it through my entire Howells chapter when they don‟t have to. 
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Thanks go to them both for understanding that academic prose cannot be New York Times 
prose—and so many other things, as well.  
Finally, Jim Warren has been my biggest cheerleader. Jim showed genuine 
curiosity about and interest in my project even before we started dating (and before the 
prospectus was written), which made me feel like my inquiry was worthwhile and 
meaningful—something it‟s possible to lose sight of. A brilliant writing teacher, Jim 
reminds me to frame my critical interventions rhetorically, to pay attention to the “they 
say.” He also reminds me that every piece of writing needs to have a “so what?” and a 
“who cares?” Puzzling out the answers to those questions together has been a tremendous 






The Last Great Adventure 
 
In “American Callings: Humanitarian Selfhood in American Literature from 
Reconstruction to the American Century,” I argue that humanitarian practice can serve as 
heuristic wherein the agent arrives at a new self-understanding by way of wrestling with 
the questions raised by pursuing the call of service across cultural boundaries. My 
argument concerns late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century American literature, texts 
my graduate training exposed me to, but the genesis of the project is extracurricular and 
personal, emerging from the two years I spent as a Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) in Togo 
(2001-03). “American Callings” is not a genealogy culminating with the example of the 
Peace Corps narrative. Nevertheless, the Peace Corps—its stated mission, the self-
reflection and writing that service in it generates, and my own experience in the 
organization—shadows this dissertation. For better or worse, it has been the inevitable 
lens through which I have read and related to the texts under examination here, even as I 
work to situate them in their historical contexts and to illuminate their specific concerns.  
The Introduction that follows explains my argument in more detail, describes the 
various critical interventions I am making, delimits the parameters of my project, and 
discusses my terminology. With this Preface I hope to do something different. I want to 
make the implicit explicit, to reveal, by way of a glance at Peace Corps writing and 
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promotional materials, the provenance of the perspective that animates “American 
Callings” as a whole.  
* 
Almost every year for the last two decades or so, the U.S. Peace Corps has 
published volumes of narratives written by Volunteers about their experiences serving 
abroad. To Touch The World: The Peace Corps Experience (Jan. 1995). At Home in the 
World: The Peace Corps Story (Apr. 1996). Peace Corps: The Great Adventure, 
Volunteer Stories of Life Overseas (Sept. 1997). A Life Inspired: Tales of Peace Corps 
Service (Jan. 2006). The titles of these anthologies reflect some the ideas and values 
central to the Peace Corps ethos: cross-cultural connection, cosmopolitanism, 
humanitarianism imagined as both an adventure and a secular calling. The existence of 
the collections shows how central first-hand stories are to recruiting new Volunteers to 
the Peace Corps, for stories of self-becoming draw people into its ranks. The Peace Corps 
promises potential Volunteers the adventure of discovering not only a new land, but also, 
a new self.  
Moritz Thomsen, who was among the first generation of Volunteers, describes the 
transformation he underwent during his service in Ecuador in his memoir Living Poor 
(1969). His language carries resonance of the sublime, of transcendence: 
since arriving I seemed to exist simply as a vessel into which a million new 
impressions were pouring; that old, boring personality that I knew as myself had 
disappeared. Of course, I had experienced this same thing before—in motor cars 
driving at a hundred miles an hour; in bombers over German cities during the war, 
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when your personality disappeared and you turned into something called pure 
terror; and also a few times in my younger years when I had been in love. But I 
had never been so transformed for such a sustained period of time. (54-5) 
Thomsen distinguishes the transformation his time in Ecuador brought about from other 
flashes of transcendence by emphasizing its duration. The Peace Corps, for him, offered 
the opportunity for sustained change, an “old, boring personality” giving way to 
something new and vital. Living Poor has become a staple of Peace Corps literature, one 
of the books (along with George Packer‟s 1984 memoir The Village of Waiting) that gets 
promoted in official and unofficial channels alike as a must-read for Volunteers and 
potential Volunteers.  
Were prospective Volunteers not already primed to expect and desire the kind of 
transformation Thomsen depicts, the Peace Corps itself works to shape their expectations. 
In a volume furnished to all new Volunteers, the Peace Corps links the desire to be 
transformed to success as a development worker: “If being an agent of change is 
important to you, then you should remember that the most effective messengers of 
change are those who understand what it means and who are themselves willing to go 
through it” (United States Adjustments 49). The same volume also observes that  
most Volunteers hope for what we might call the Peace Corps experience. That is, 
you seek a profound encounter with a foreign culture, a series of experiences that 
change forever the way you think about the world, your own country, and 
yourself. You expect—and very much want—to be challenged, to have your 
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patience and your mettle tested, to be pulled, pushed or otherwise forced into new 
ways of thinking and behaving. You want, in a word, to grow. (Adjustments 50) 
The second-person voice of this passage makes transformation imperative: “you seek,” 
“you expect,” “you want.” The Peace Corps doesn‟t stop short of telling new Volunteers 
that they should want their experience to be nothing less than a conversion.  
Because the organization knows that there are Americans out there who do want 
to “be pulled, pushed, or otherwise forced into new ways of thinking and behaving,” 
evidence from people who can speak to such transformation is a crucial piece of P.R. 
Pithy quotes attesting that transformation can be had in the Peace Corps stud the 
organization‟s promotional material. Former Secretary of Health and Human Services 
Donna Shalala (RPCV Iran, 1962-64) writes, “Years later, looking back at my Peace 
Corps service, I realized that a wise mullah, an insensitive Dean, and students struggling 
to preserve a traditional society in a modern age had changed me forever. I had become a 
citizen of the world” (United States Great Adventure 20). The subtitle of a 1989 brochure 
directed at African Americans holds out “A Chance to Discover Yourself While 
Discovering the World.” Over and over it appears, the insistence, spoken by Volunteers 
and echoed by the Peace Corps back to the public, that “this experience has changed my 
life” (McGuire 36).  
 It may seem that I am casting a jaundiced eye on the way this desire for 
transformation gets expressed, published, and repurposed as promotional material. And I 
am, a little. I find it unsettling that one of the most intoxicating allures of humanitarian 
service in the Peace Corps is what it offers the Volunteer. (To this point, you will notice, 
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there has been no discussion of humanitarian practice at all.) At the same time, my 
experience has taught me that it is naïve to think that two years of service by a (more 
often than not) relatively unskilled recent college graduate yield anything more 
significant. This is not to say that the Peace Corps has no value, or that it has value only 
for the Volunteer. To judge the organization by what it doesn‟t do—namely, come up 
with and implement systemic, as opposed to piecemeal, changes that will benefit the 
peoples of the third world—is to miss the incredible impact it does have. Above all, the 
Peace Corps brings into contact people from different worlds who otherwise never would 
have met.
1
 Perspectives shift and lives change course, if only slightly. Perhaps, in the 
aggregate, the little changes Volunteers experience add up to something significant: 
cultural dislocation that results in a new, more flexible understanding of the relationship 
between self and society. 
The experience of living as the only American in a foreign place puts the self 
under threat. Thomsen writes on numerous occasions about his need to retreat to his 
house in order to “re-form” himself, as though Ecuador were eating away at his very 
identity. In its manual on cross-cultural adjustment, the Peace Corps warns Volunteers of 
the way cultural immersion can call the self into question:  
                                                 
1
 There are some exceptional examples of the way this has benefited certain individuals 
in the developing world. Alejandro Toledo (b. 1946), a Peruvian who grew up poor in a 
campesino family of sixteen children, attracted the notice of Peace Corps Volunteers serving in 
Chimbote, where he grew up. After returning to the States those Volunteers helped Toledo attain 
a scholarship to the University of San Francisco. Toledo later went on to earn his Master‟s and his 
Ph.D. from Stanford. In 2001, he became the first indigenous president of Perú. To its credit, 
nowhere does the Peace Corps trumpet this Cinderella story. 
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On a more existential level, if you can‟t communicate your views and explain 
yourself, how can anyone know you? And if you can‟t understand others, how can 
you know them? Not knowing anyone and not being known by anyone, you feel 
isolated and profoundly alone. Indeed, you feel isolated from yourself and lonely 
for that person you know yourself to be but can no longer express. . . . No wonder 
you form such close friendships in such a short time with your fellow Trainees; 
they reassure you that you exist. (Adjustments 10) 
The adventurous aspect of the Peace Corps—encountering a new and different world—
also poses significant challenges to one‟s conception of what it means to be a self. The 
Peace Corps warns Volunteers, “Overseas, until you know the norms, you can never be 
sure where the culture stops and Alfredo begins” (Adjustments 41). While that is a decent 
enough warning about getting to know people in the host country—“perhaps what seems 
to me to be brusqueness is really just the way they are here in the Andean highlands”—it 
is terrifying if and when Volunteers turn the observation back on themselves. What if not 
only is there no Alfredo apart from culture, but no Kathryn, either? By suggesting to 
Volunteers that they become attuned to the connections between culture and behavior, the 
Peace Corps posits that understanding cultural norms can be a way of understanding the 
self. But this understanding calls into question the very idea of selfhood by getting 
Volunteers to wonder, “who am I, if I am only what my culture has made me?”  
The disquieting experience I am describing here is at the heart of what is valuable 
about Peace Corps service. Scary as it is, such an experience of cultural unmooring can 
be a revelation. The Peace Corps claims to help Volunteers develop “an awareness of 
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your own cultural assumptions and values, acceptance of the reality of your own cultural 
conditioning, and acceptance of the reality of the cultural conditioning of others” 
(Adjustments 36). In other words, it encourages Volunteers to notice what Kenneth Burke 
has termed their “terministic screens,” ways of looking at the world that direct attention 
“into some channels rather than others” (“Terministic Screens” 45).  In so doing the 
Peace Corps promotes a relativistic view of the world that refuses to accept a single 
vocabulary or set of terms as final. This lesson resonates with the philosophy of 
pragmatism as it was elaborated by William James and expanded by Richard Rorty. One 
RPCV puts it this way: 
For most . . . their Peace Corps years marked a seminal life experience. It was the 
moment when each of them spun out from a known center of the earth and 
touched another. They lived at the touchpoints, emersed [sic] in the struggle to 
understand language and custom, how things worked, what it all meant; all the 
while witnessing their own behavior and the  values they took for granted reflected 
back to them as curiosities. . . . The returned Volunteers know—in some deep 
place in their consciousness—that there is another center, another definition of 
life, another way. (Kennedy 11) 
Living at the touchpoints, as this author puts it, can be a way of putting into practice the 
political program Rorty‟s pragmatism endorses: “extend[ing] our sense of „we‟ to people 
whom we have previously thought of as „they‟” (Contingency 192). This is because 
becoming aware of the historical and cultural contingency of one‟s own values, and 
indeed, one‟s own self, helps to increase solidarity among peoples. It helps make the 
xvi 
 
salience of difference recede. I suspect that one of the biggest differences the Peace 
Corps has made to American society has been to systematize a way for 200,000 
individuals (and counting) to live out an awareness of contingency.    
 This kind of awareness could be attained without humanitarian practice. But in 
the story I am telling, it is a conviction that one has responsibilities to other people that 
extend beyond the boundaries of class, ethnicity, race, and nation motivates the 
individual to “live at the touchpoints” in the first place. Once there, the humanitarian self 
is shaped by more than cultural difference. How the humanitarian dynamic can be a tool 




American Callings: Humanitarian Selfhood in American Literature  
from Reconstruction  to the American Century 
 
Kathryn Hamilton Warren, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2010 
 
Supervisors: Phillip Barrish and Gretchen Murphy 
 
In “American Callings” I argue that late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century 
American literature dealing with cross-cultural humanitarianism contains a strand that 
sought to rectify the potentially oppressive shortcomings of humanitarian practice. The 
authors whose work I examine—novelists William Dean Howells and Albion Tourgée, 
reformer Jane Addams, humorist George Ade, and memoirists Mary Fee and George 
Freer—grappled in their writing with two reciprocal questions. First, they meditated on 
how humanitarianism shapes, changes, and constitutes the self. Second, they theorized 
how increased self-awareness and self-criticism might help the humanitarian actor avoid 
the pitfalls of humanitarian practice that critics, in their time and ours, have seized upon. 
 “American Callings” thus challenges three critiques that have been instrumental 
to American literary studies for decades: critiques of sentimental humanitarianism‟s 
complicity in projects of cultural domination, realism‟s investment in the status quo, and 
reform‟s role in maintaining social discipline through surveillance. The dissertation 
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disputes the prevalent assertion that literature dealing with cross-cultural 
humanitarianism constitutes a sentimental, imperialistic, and ultimately violent discourse. 
I accomplish this by looking to instances of what Gregory Eiselein (1996) has called 
“eccentric” reform, efforts articulated from within a culture but in opposition to certain 
aspects of it. Drawing on narratives of what I call “humanitarian selfhood” in three 
historical contexts—industrializing urban centers in the North, the South during 
Reconstruction, and the Philippines during the U.S. occupation—“American Callings” 
traces an “eccentric” literary genealogy, one that offers up the humanitarian dynamic as a 
heuristic wherein the humanitarian agent arrives at a new kind of self-understanding by 
way of wrestling with the questions raised by service to others. The literature written by 
and about these humanitarians, I suggest, then provides an opportunity for readers to be 
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American Selfhood  
In Sources of the Self (1989), philosopher Charles Taylor asserts that “we are 
selves only in that certain issues matter for us. What I am as a self, my identity, is 
essentially defined by the way things have significance for me” (34). In “American 
Callings: Humanitarian Selfhood in American Literature from Reconstruction to the 
American Century,” I focus on selfhood explored and crystallized along an axis of 
obligation: the duty one human being has to another. Humanitarianism is a central issue 
of importance to the writers in this dissertation, a concern through which they refine their 
identities. Though “the self” and “identity” are closely related terms, I want to insist on a 
distinction that Taylor does not recognize in the above quotation, which collapses the two 
(“what I am as a self, my identity”). Selfhood, in the terms of this dissertation, refers to a 
process of becoming. I do not mean to suggest that selves are fluid whereas identities are 
static. Both can be in flux. Nevertheless, “identity” suggests a description of the self that 
is ready to go public. Meditations on the self and the appropriate state of the self in the 
humanitarian endeavor are, at their earliest stage, private. This is not to say that selves are 
formed independent of public questions. To the contrary, selves come into being 
relationally, through engagement with the ideas, assertions, and questions posed by other 
selves. More than that, selves are shaped and determined by social, historical, and 
economic forces. Still, “the self” is not shared. Identity, on the other hand, is a term with 
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public connotations. Unlike “the self,” identities can be made available to more than one 
person. “Identity” can be usefully thought of as the self made public, put into circulation.  
The example of the Peace Corps writing I introduced in the Preface illustrates the 
relationship between private meditations on selfhood and publicly available descriptions 
of identity. Taylor posits that for the modern individual, the search for the self “involves 
articulation”; discovering the meaning of one‟s life and self goes hand in hand with 
invention and creation (18). Volunteer narratives indicate the important role literary 
writing plays in articulating a certain kind of liberal American identity. Narratives of 
humanitarian selfhood written by Volunteers provide a template through which the public 
(most notably, potential recruits) can gain access to explorations of what it means to be a 
PCV, someone who goes abroad on an adventure driven (much of the time) by moral 
purpose. This writing therefore has the potential to shape public understandings of the 
humanitarian self—its challenges and contradictions, the contours of its development. 
When humanitarian selfhood enters the public sphere, it becomes available as a shared 
identity.  
At the same time, the very preponderance of writing by PCVs (from published 
vignettes like those in promotional volumes to the unpublished letters PCVs send home) 
points to a different dynamic. In line with Taylor‟s claim that the search for self involves 
articulation, there appears to be a compulsion among these humanitarians to reflect on 
their experiences through writing. Volunteers put into words what their experience has 
taught them, and what it has made them, regardless of whether that writing ever reaches a 
wider audience. This is the case for the authors in my dissertation as well: novelists 
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William Dean Howells and Albion Tourgée, reformer Jane Addams, humorist George 
Ade, and memoirists Mary Fee and George Freer. In very different ways, these 
individuals used their writing to come to grips with—to articulate—a kind of American 
selfhood developed and refined within the secular humanitarian dynamic. In some cases, 
that exploration of humanitarian selfhood circulated widely; Jane Addams‟s 
autobiographies, for instance, shaped public understandings of a certain strand of liberal 
American identity. But Mary Fee‟s and George Freer‟s memoirs, in contrast, were not 
widely read, so it becomes difficult to assert that their individual articulations of selfhood 
had any impact on public understandings of an American humanitarian identity. 
“American Callings” brings together narratives of humanitarian selfhood with disparate 
public impact. I am not trying to make a causal argument connecting self-writing and 
public identity. Rather, I am trying to better understand the drive toward self-definition 
through articulation that Taylor describes. 
 Taylor describes Sources of the Self as an exploration of the modern identity, a 
claim that he does not qualify. What he explores, however, is a very specific, western, 
privileged identity. In “American Callings” I too explore a specific, limited strand of 
American identity: the identity of liberal, cosmopolitan American citizens in a position to 
be able to extend humanitarian aid to someone else. I am interested in how these 
Americans negotiate their privilege, often drawing on their own resources and position in 
order to work for the betterment of another group or person; I am interested in the way 
humanitarian practice leads these Americans to reflect on their own social positions, the 
meaning and the origin of their own privilege. “American Callings” looks to the late 
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nineteenth century for early instances of this phenomenon. The late nineteenth century is 
a rich place for this exploration for several reasons, having to do both with the kind of 
literature being written during the period and with the relationship between that historical 
moment and our own. Literature of the late nineteenth century (not only realism but other 
genres as well) took up questions of progressive social change and justice across racial 
and ethnic lines as a problem of chief concern. It was, moreover, committed to depiction 
of ordinary lives and the interiority of ordinary people. In many ways that earlier cultural 
moment provides a striking parallel to the present; one might even think of the century 
between Reconstruction and the early twenty-first century “as constituting a long 
historical moment” in the history of white American liberalism, as Phillip Barrish has 
suggested (White Liberal Identity 5). Racial conflict, the complications brought about by 
immigration, and U.S. imperial incursions abroad were all challenges American citizens 
were aware of and concerned with. The Civil War and the abolition movement had left 
African Americans technically free while the nation was still plagued by racial injustice 
and the ills associated with rapid economic transformation. At the same time, 
industrialization and an influx of immigrants contributed to poverty and labor unrest in 
American cities. Then, in 1898, the U.S. government, under President McKinley‟s 
direction, took military action in Cuba and the Philippines, thereby donning the mantle of 
empire and incurring responsibilities to distant peoples. Each of these national events—
Reconstruction, industrialization, and the exercise of empire—took individual Americans 
out of their comfort zones as they acted on what they understood to be their duties to 
people of different classes, races, regions, and nations. As Americans followed that 
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calling they too experienced—and often wrote about—an inward journey that the 
outward enabled. As it does today, humanitarian practice then provided a setting not only 
for meditation on the perplexities of reform, but the perplexities of the self as well.  
My analysis of selfhood in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century literature 
follows from Taylor‟s claim that, with the secularization of modern society, altruism has 
become an ethical ideal that structures people‟s lives, an axis upon which certain 
individuals create, define, and understand themselves in relation to others (22).
2
 I work 
also from the problematic supposition that “the West is an „anthropological culture,‟ in 
which self-image is constructed within the history of an ethnographic encounter with 
other cultures” (Siebers, “Ethics” 41). Such a statement inevitably sets off all sorts of 
alarms. The implication here could be that the white, humanitarian agent uses the ethnic 
other as a surface upon which to construct her own selfhood. This is an interpretation 
consistent with the trenchant analyses of Toni Morrison, Priscilla Wald, and Saidiya 
Hartman. Morrison, Wald, and Hartman explore self-making in nineteenth-century 
American literature in different ways and with different foci. Where Wald‟s work looks 
at stories of self-becoming told by the marginalized alongside more official stories in 
order to explore what she calls “the limits and boundaries of We the People,” Morrison 
and Hartman direct their attention more explicitly to African-American selfhood 
                                                 
2
 It is not entirely accurate to say that my analysis “follows from” Taylor‟s claim, because 
it is only in the last stages of this project that I discovered Sources of the Self (thanks to June 
Howard‟s article “What Is Sentimentality?” and to Gretchen Murphy bringing Howard‟s 
reference to Taylor to my attention). It would be more accurate to say, therefore, that my own 
sense of how humanitarianism can be an arena for self-articulation concurs with Taylor‟s claim. 
In reading his book now, I realize just how much the intellectual and philosophical history he 
outlines makes up the sub-strata of my own work. I expect to engage with Taylor‟s work more 
fully in later incarnations of this project. 
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alongside the role blacks have played, both bodily and metaphorically, in shaping white 
American selfhood (Wald 304).
3
 Mindful of the lessons of Morrison and Hartman in 
particular, I have sought throughout my own study to keep in view the question of 
whether the kind of self-making my authors underwent followed the colonialist model in 
which the humanitarian agent empathizes with, and thereby usurps, the identity of the 
ethnic other he or she is there to serve. My authors‟ engagement with this difficult issue 
is uneven. George Ade ridicules the colonialist mode of creating new subjects through 
mimicry, and Jane Addams was more able than most to foreground reciprocity in her 
theories of humanitarianism, whereas William Dean Howells, by his own admission, 
could never quite make his theory of using literature to promote identification among 
peoples fit his practice. Yet it is just this sort of effort that my dissertation gets at, the 
pursuit, as Richard Rorty puts it, of “continual refreshment and re-creation of the self, 
through interaction with selves as unlike itself as possible” (“Human Rights” 132). More 
than navel-gazing, and distinguishable from colonialist control of the other, the self-
reflection this dissertation traces, I argue, gave its authors a purchase on the problem of 
humanitarian practice. Indeed, the acute self-awareness brought about by the 
humanitarian dynamic became a method by which agents could attempt to rectify the 
potentially oppressive shortcomings of that same dynamic. If we, as socially-conscious 
                                                 
3
 See Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination 
(1993); Priscilla Wald, Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative Form (1995); 
and Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-
Century America (1997). In a different vein, Joseph Slaughter addresses self-making through 
world literature. His book Human Rights, Inc. (2007) looks at the way the Bildungsroman is 
interwoven with the development of human rights. So although he deals with the self, he is more 
closely connected to the conversation about the connections between narratives and empathy that 
I describe below. 
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academics today, are to fully understand and realize the promise of the multifaceted 
culture of humanitarianism that I believe we have inherited from the turn of the twentieth 
century, it is crucial to grapple with the strand of humanitarian selfhood negotiated by the 
authors I discuss in these pages.  
 
“Humanitarianism” as a Term of Analysis 
“American Callings” focuses on “humanitarianism” and not “benevolence,” 
“philanthropy,” “charity,” or “reform,” because of the specific meanings and associations 
that adhere to “humanitarianism” and not to the other terms. Humanitarianism, a word 
that, according to the OED, came into use in the nineteenth century, has more specific 
connotations than a word such as “benevolence.” The OED defines “humanitarian” in 
part as philanthropy writ-large: “Having regard to the interests of humanity or mankind at 
large; relating to, advocating, or practising humanity or humane action; broadly 
philanthropic.” The difference in scope matters to my project. Humanitarians, as I will 
describe them, sought to improve the lot of their fellow human beings on the grounds of 
their common humanity. A second reason I‟ve chosen the term “humanitarianism” over 
the others has to do with engagement. Where “charity” and “philanthropy” both suggest 
financial assistance, the latter on a broader scale than the former (one thinks of a church 
lady tithing her income versus Leland Stanford founding Stanford University), the term 
“humanitarian” signals more than monetary donations. Third, “humanitarianism” has a 
global connotation that none of the other terms possesses. This is not only because 
humanitarianism is defined as an interest in “mankind at large,” but also because of the 
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way the term has come to be used today. Organizations are “humanitarian” if they 
provide assistance to development projects in the third world, and aid is “humanitarian” if 
it intervenes in times of crisis without asking recompense. Humanitarianism is active; it is 
global.  
A cursory look at two uses of the term during the nineteenth century forecasts 
some of the themes “American Callings” engages. Take, for instance, the short-lived 
journal The Humanitarian (1892-1901), edited by American feminist Victoria Woodhull. 
Established in order “to discuss all subjects appertaining to the well-being of humanity,” 
the journal makes clear its vision of humanitarianism: a government (not a democracy) 
that, knowing what is best for its citizens, imposes its will upon them (3). Two parts 
eugenics to one part reform—the journal declares that “a humanitarian Government 
would stigmatize the marriages of the unfit as crimes”—The Humanitarian inhabits one 
frightening pole of the impulse to which it asserts its allegiance (5). This is 
humanitarianism as imposition, wherein one party, knowing what is best, shapes another 
to its will—the exact criticism that gets made of humanitarian efforts in the nineteenth 
century and beyond. Woodhull‟s journal, therefore, reminds us of the potential moral 
blindness that lurks on the edges of the humanitarian impulse. Perhaps nowhere has the 
destructive nature of that impulse been more evident than in the violence and suffering 
caused by purportedly “humanitarian” U.S. government interventions in dozens of places 
in the developing world, the invasion of the Philippines being the most salient example in 
the time period under my purview. Having lived through that event, policy-makers and 
public servants in the early twentieth century debated what constituted “humanitarian 
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diplomacy,” many of them invoking the term “humanitarian” in order to advocate that the 
U.S. join the League of Nations.
4
  
A second aspect of the way the term “humanitarianism” was used at the turn of 
the twentieth century brings us to its religious connotations, which pose an interesting 
problem when tracing part of the history of a secular humanitarianism. 
“Humanitarianism,” and even “cosmopolitanism,” are terms that often appeared linked 
with Christian conviction, as the following quotation from an article in Harper‟s titled 
“The Need of the World” illustrates:  
kindness seeks forever to extend the limits of understanding and sympathy; it is 
not narrow or secular; it is never puffed up because of its exclusions; it seeks ever 
to broaden the boundaries of those it can include and serve and understand. It is 
not national, but cosmopolitan; not imperial, but humanitarian; not class-
conscious, but aware of the brotherhood of man, the doctrine which Jesus lived 
and died to emphasize. (Willcox par. 4) 
But the earliest uses of the term that the OED cites mark a transition from a specifically 
Christian world view to one centered on humanity: a humanitarian is “One who affirms 
the humanity (but denies the divinity) of Christ” (this based on usages from 1819).  By 
1844, uses have shifted: “One who professes the „Religion of Humanity‟, holding that 
mankind‟s duty is chiefly or wholly comprised in the advancement of the welfare of the 
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 Even after the United States declined to join, political scientists and historians appealed 
to the public and to legislators that the U.S. should at the very least cooperate with the 
organization. These appeals were often made on “humanitarian” grounds, defining the term as 




human race: applied to various schools of thought and practice.” Humanitarianism has 
changed from theology to action. Louise Collier Willcox, writing in Harper‟s in 1911, 
does endorse a specifically Christian brand of humanitarianism, whereas the figures I will 
look at explicitly chose not to. Even her passage quoted above, however, seems to mark a 
transition from a doctrinal to a social application of Christianity. In that respect Willcox 
echoes earlier statements of humanitarianism, such as the appeals both Howells and 
Addams make to the example of Christ as a secular firebrand for social justice.  
Nevertheless, the tradition of secular humanitarianism I am tracing is indebted to 
Protestantism, both as a matter of form and of literary-cultural tradition. I am deliberately 
pointing to the Protestant influence on secular humanitarianism and not to a religious 
influence more generally for several reasons, foremost among them being the difference 
between a Protestant, as opposed to Catholic, emphasis on conscience and motive. Where 
Catholicism finds justification through works, Protestantism emphasizes faith. Of course, 
the figures in my dissertation were all working (in some way) for their fellow humans, 
whether that meant the hands-on work of practice or the work of writing and thinking. 
The Social Gospel, to be sure, emphasized working in the world over converting 
unbelievers. But the preoccupation with the appropriate state of the self among those 
enlisting in humanitarian labor reveals a complex of feelings that is more indebted to the 
Protestant focus on individual conscience than it is to the Catholic emphasis on good 
works. Protestantism still bore strong traces of a hard-line Calvinist emphasis on 
predestination, the idea that one is chosen by God, not man, for salvation; the mark of the 
select is on the interior. Second, the humanitarian theorists and practitioners in my study 
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were all either Protestant, came from Protestant backgrounds, or were affiliated with 
faiths more akin to Protestantism than to Catholicism. And third, the Protestant ethos has 
had an indelible effect on American narratives of global prominence and obligation.
5
  
In sum, “American Callings” analyzes narratives written both by and about 
humanitarians. The texts I discuss are stories of individuals who cross boundaries of 
class, race, ethnicity, and nationality in order to exercise what they see as their duty to 
other people. One could argue that writing fiction that critically explores 
humanitarianism, as Howells and Ade both did, is in and of itself a humanitarian act. 
Though I find this claim to be persuasive, the argument I am making does not depend on 
hard and fast distinctions between who counts as a humanitarian and who does not. It 
depends, instead, on the way humanitarianism and selfhood intersect: the importance of 
one in shaping the other. This is a dynamic that exists in realist novels, romances, satires, 
and autobiographies alike.  
 
American Humanitarianism: Critique and Recuperation  
“American Callings” takes part in a movement in American literary studies over 
the past fifteen years or so that has sought to find a middle ground between what Gregory 
Eiselein has dubbed the “social control” approach to thinking about the intersection 
between literature and progressive change and the “humanist method” (11). Scholars who 
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 See Emily Rosenberg‟s Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and 
Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (1982) and Lori Ginzberg‟s “Global Goals, Local Acts: Grass-
Roots Activism in Imperial Narratives” (2001) for discussions of the relationship between 
Protestant conversion and American ideologies of progress and civilization. 
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take the former approach, which is influenced by Foucauldian historiography and is 
“pessimistic about the possibilities for ameliorative social change,” argue that reforms 
constitute “sinister advancements in social control apparatuses” (Eiselein 176). The latter 
approach, however, is mistakenly naïve (not to mention outdated) in taking 
humanitarianism and its practitioners at face value, celebrating any effort at reform 
without critically examining it. The movement to find a balance between critique and 
celebration has arisen in response to the dominance of the so-called “social control” 
approach in literary studies as a whole, a method of reading that draws not only from the 
work of Foucault but also from Marxism and poststructuralism. Evincing frustration with 
the dominance of this approach to literature within the profession, Lisa Ruddick has 
compared the moves current critical theorists make to what Buddhists call “the 
summoning of the near enemy” (par. 24). As she explains, “any virtue has a bad cousin, a 
failing that closely resembles the virtue and can be mistaken for it. . . . What current 
critical theory often does, though, is to collapse the difference, making the good thing 
look bad by calling it by the name of its near enemy” (par. 24, 26). So in critical theory, 
for example,  
the near enemy of conscience is a punitive self-surveillance; the near enemy of 
any ideal of human individuality or expressiveness is „the Kantian subject,‟ which 
has negative connotations; the near enemy of the heart is the human heart as 
envisioned by a Victorian sentimental ideology; the near enemy of the feeling of 
shared humanity is a bourgeois humanism that says we are all exactly the same; 
the near enemy of a belief in independent rational thought is the specter of the 
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Cartesian subject, disembodied and severed from all historical context; and so on. 
(par. 28) 
Ruddick‟s metaphor is an apt one, and it gets at what I find troubling about some of the 
most extreme examples of the “social control” approach to literature. Above all, hers is a 
call for moderation, and her warning should be heeded on both ends of the spectrum: it is 
equally important not to overcorrect and make the bad thing (imperialism, say) look 
good. I hope in this dissertation to strike an appropriate balance between the two 
extremes. 
 Ruddick‟s assessment of the state of the profession, while valuable, is a diatribe, 
and like all diatribes, it lacks subtlety and comprehensiveness. I should also note that she 
draws her examples mostly from critical theory. Literary criticism, while certainly 
influenced by theory, is not coterminous with it. All this to say that the “social control” 
approach to literature has yielded important insights that cannot be dismissed as mere 
soul-sapping. The prevailing tendency in the field of American realism (a category that 
does not neatly match all the texts I examine, to be sure, but one whose time period 
parallels the period I examine) has been to question the kind of “philosophical optimism” 
that views empathy as the first step to change, instead drawing our attention to the 
structural limits of a relationship predicated upon the kind of pity that literature can elicit 
(Howard, Form and History 119). Critics such as June Howard and Amy Kaplan, whose 
books Form and History in American Literary Naturalism and The Social Construction of 
American Realism appeared three years apart (1985 and 1988, respectively) and share 
much in common, endorse the view that literary form is ideological in that it allows 
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subjects to make sense and order of a disorderly world.  For Kaplan, realism‟s apparent 
inclusiveness is “a strategy for imagining and managing the threats of social change” 
(Social Construction 10). By collecting various worlds in New York City in one coherent 
narrative, Kaplan argues, William Dean Howells, for instance, “fixes” the city and its 
contradictions through aesthetics and form (44). Both Howard and Kaplan suspect that 
realism‟s claims to greater inclusiveness and representation are not “a way of imagining 
the world” that seeks to revolutionize its structures, but rather to normalize them 
(Howard, Form and History ix).
6
 Where Kaplan and Howard take on realism and 
naturalism as their objects of study, historians who look at reform and gender have 
arrived at similar conclusions, emphasizing the failure of women‟s reform work to 




  Though no single book has emerged to challenge the “social control” approach to 
literature, overtly signaling a departure from readings like Kaplan‟s and Howard‟s, a 
spate of recent monographs in American literary studies that can be described as 
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 Other examples of work in this mode include Mark Seltzer‟s Henry James and the Art 
of Power (1984) and Walter Benn Michaels‟s The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism 
(1988). 
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 For instance, in “Discourses of Reform in Nineteenth-Century Philanthropic Literature” 
(1993), Deborah Carlin finds fault with women writers because, she argues, they endorse only 
surface solutions. Jill Conway‟s conclusions about nineteenth-century reformers, while also 
critical, are distinct; a historian, she argues that by embracing values deemed “feminine” (like 
empathy, compassion, and care-giving), nineteenth-century reformers limited the radicalism of 




recuperations of humanitarianism and/or reform suggests that a shift is underway.
8
 I share 
with these recent authors many of the same animating impulses, and I add to their 
conversation by addressing different authors, texts, and time periods. More significantly, 
“American Callings” brings the problem of self-making in the United States to bear on 
the intersection between literature and humanitarian practice. It raises the stakes for 
examinations of humanitarianism‟s intersection with literature by showing how literary 
representations of humanitarianism help shape a certain kind of American identity.  
Where literary critics have usefully problematized representations of reform, 
postcolonial critics in a variety of disciplines have voiced their suspicion of the 
intentions, methods, and outcomes of humanitarian practice itself.
9
 Many have cited 
paternalism and infantilization as two inevitabilities of humanitarianism, emphasizing the 
way humanitarianism robs its beneficiaries of agency.
10
 Barbara Harlow strikes a 
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 Gregory Eiselein‟s Literature and Humanitarian Reform in the Civil War Era (1996), 
Susan Ryan‟s The Grammar of Good Intentions: Race and the Antebellum Culture of 
Benevolence (2003), William Morgan‟s Questionable Charity: Gender, Humanitarianism, and 
Complicity in U.S. Literary Realism (2004), and Paul Petrie‟s Conscience and Purpose: Fiction 
and Social Consciousness in Howells, Jewett, Chesnutt, and Cather (2005) all investigate the 
ambiguity of the humanitarian impulse—though with different inflections, objects of study, and 
vocabularies. In Utopia and Cosmopolis: Globalization in the Era of American Literary Realism 
(1998), Thomas Peyser extends that investigation to an even larger scale, arguing that realist 
novels explore the possibilities of global interconnection and obligation. By contrast, in 
Reforming the World: Social Activism and the Problem of Fiction in Nineteenth-Century America 
(2008), María Carla Sánchez doesn‟t so much as nod to the idea that one could be critical of 
reform work—perhaps an indication that in at least some cases a non-critical optimism 
(reminiscient of an earlier period in American Studies) has replaced suspicion as the dominant 
mode of thinking about reform and its relation to literature. 
9
 A closely related, but distinct, conversation has grown up around a critique of 
humanitarian aid. In a recent New Yorker article, Philip Gourevitch shows how humanitarian aid 
organizations and workers, who operate outside state laws, have not been held accountable for the 
way their interventions sometimes lead to escalation of the crises they are there to redress.   
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 See Prem Kumar Rajaram‟s “Humanitarianism and Representations of the Refugee” 
(2002) for an analysis of the way Western NGOs exert control over representations of suffering 
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common chord when she argues that humanitarian intervention bears similarities to 
imperialism in its disregard for national sovereignty.
11
 Others have made similar claims 
about “development,” which one might call an economic application of humanitarian 
principles, because it is predicated on a hierarchical view of the world that judges other 
cultures according to their proximity to a Western standard and style of living.
12
 
Economists too have criticized humanitarian aid and development. William Easterly, for 
instance, inveighs against the harm “the West” has done in its efforts to help “the Rest” in 
his book The White Man‟s Burden (2006). By way of Rudyard Kipling‟s famous poem, 
Easterly links present-day humanitarian aid to a nefarious tradition of Western aid 
imbued not only with an arguably humanitarian enjoinder to “fill full the mouth of 
Famine / And bid the sickness cease” but also with imperialist aims (qtd. in Easterly 3).  
Many of these critics support human rights as a tough-minded alternative to 
humanitarianism. Human rights, they argue, allow for agency on the part of the person 
whose rights have been abrogated (it is their right, not their privilege, not to live in abject 
poverty). These rights have a basis in the law and in citizenship; the exercise of human 
rights does not depend on the munificence of some outside actor. Humanitarianism, in 
contrast, depends on sentiment and morality, the alert attention of an outsider. 
                                                                                                                                                 
subjects, thus infantilizing them and taking away their voice. Anthropologist Miriam Ticktin has 
written about the way humanitarianism promotes and depends upon a limited version of what it 
means to be human in “Where Ethics and Politics Meet: The Violence of Humanitarianism in 
France” (2006). 
11
 “From the „Civilizing Mission‟ to „Humanitarian Interventionism‟: Postmodernism, 
Writing, and Human Rights” (1996). For a version of that argument articulated in a popular 
forum, see Anatol Lieven‟s article “Humanitarian Action Can Mask an Imperial Agenda,” in the 
Financial Times (2007). 
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 Though she does not endorse this argument herself, see Cheryl McEwan, 
Postcolonialism and Development (2009), for an excellent distillation of this position. 
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Humanitarianism strikes many of its critics as apolitical because it has been understood to 
promote feeling over (instead of alongside) action. A moment in American literary 
history emblematic of this affective posture is Harriet Beecher Stowe‟s declaration, in 
Uncle Tom‟s Cabin (1852), that the one thing every individual can do to help abolish 
slavery is to “feel right”—“the man or woman who feels strongly, healthily and justly, on 
the great interests of humanity, is a constant benefactor to the human race” (Stowe 624; 
emphases in original).
13
 In its most simplistic form, the exercise of humanitarianism 
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 Like reform and humanitarianism, sentimentality has met with its fair share of critics 
and champions, going back at least as far to the realists, who sought to enlarge the circle of 
human solidarity without relying on the bathos that characterized many of the progressive efforts 
of mid- and early-nineteenth-century fiction (I thank Phil Barrish for reminding me of this point). 
Sentimentality‟s more recent critical history might be said to begin with Ann Douglas‟s 
denunciation of it in The Feminization of American Culture (1977) and Jane Tompkins‟s 
recuperation of the same in Sensational Designs (1985), two critical moves that laid out the stakes 
of the debate for many years to come.  
Tompkins grounds her argument in response to the New Critics, whose methods for 
discussing and assessing literature she challenges. Hers is not an endorsement of sentimentalism 
per se. More than that, it is an endorsement of a new and different way of reading that would put 
sentimental writers back into the conversation about what American literature means and the 
work that it does. Even so, some of the moves Tompkins makes when she defends writers like 
Stowe parallel some of the moves I make here in defending humanitarianism, below. In the most 
general sense, Tompkins argues that literary critics should not disregard the “theory of power” 
that novels like Uncle Tom‟s Cabin embody, one in which “the very possibility of social action is 
made dependent on the action taking place in individual hearts” (128, emphasis in original). So 
too do I defend humanitarianism on the grounds that humane feeling can serve as a complement 
to more cerebral, human-rights-based action. 
Lauren Berlant‟s trilogy on sentimentality in American culture (The Anatomy of National 
Fantasy (1991), The Female Complaint (2008), and The Queen of America Goes to Washington 
City (1997)) is the most salient example of recent, incisive work being done on this topic. Berlant 
explores the way sentimentality and affect work to inscribe personhood and citizenship in the 
nineteenth through the twenty-first centuries. Like many of the critics of reform cited above, 
Berlant finds compassion, sentiment, and feeling to be complicit in the political work of silencing 
dissent and forestalling radical change: 
Compassionate liberalism is, at best, a kind of sandpaper on the surface of the racist 
monument whose structural and economic solidity endures: in the intimate sphere of 
femininity a kind of soft supremacy rooted in compassion and coercive identification 
wants to dissolve all that structure through the work of good intentionality, while busily 
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relies upon the agency of the humanitarian practitioner while the recipient of aid is in a 
passive position of gratitude.
14
  
 In contrast to those who endorse human rights work as an alternative to 
humanitarian practice, I want to suggest that we—as a society and as a culture—need not 
replace one with the other. Human rights discourse is not a sturdier, more politically 
efficacious outgrowth of humanitarianism. Rather, the two discourses work on different 
registers and have different effects. Humanitarian and human rights discourses and 
practices do share certain goals with roots in Enlightenment thought, namely, justice for 
individuals regardless of place of birth or station and the mitigation of suffering. It is, in 
part, how the two discourses go about pursuing these goals that distinguishes them: the 
grammar of human rights is cerebral, an exercise of obligation arising “from legal-
bureaucratic duties,” whereas humanitarianism is emotional and affective (Wilson and 
Brown 8). One could argue, further, that human rights attends to structural change 
(mostly legal and political structures) whereas humanitarianism works within existing 
structures, contributing to incremental changes in the way human beings think and feel.  
One must be careful not to glorify action and the intellect in thinking through this 
contrast. If one can easily envision a quiescent humanitarianism, more attentive to right 
                                                                                                                                                 
exoticizing and diminishing the inconvenient and the noncompliant. (The Female 
Complaint 6) 
Other important interventions in the debate over sentimentality include Karen Sánchez-Eppler‟s 
essay “Bodily Bonds: The Intersecting Rhetorics of Feminism and Abolition” and Laura Wexler‟s 
“Tender Violence: Literary Eavesdropping, Domestic Fiction, and Educational Reform,” which 
both appeared in the volume The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender, and Sentimentality in 
Nineteenth-Century America, edited by Shirley Samuels (1992). 
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 See Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown‟s introduction to Humanitarianism 
and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy (2009) for a description of the human rights v. 
humanitarianism contrast, especially pp. 5-9.  
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feeling than right action, so too can one envision the harm an unfeeling devotion to 
human rights as an abstract principle might wreak. As a strategy for promoting human 
equality and mitigating suffering, changing laws without changing sentiments has 
numerous weak spots. This is what Albion Tourgée, the personage in “American 
Callings” most akin to today‟s human rights activist, discovered in his pursuit of racial 
justice in Reconstruction North Carolina. Laws take only when societies are ready for 
them, and humanitarianism‟s ethos of care and mutual responsibility can help lay the 
groundwork for laws promoting social justice. Human rights discourse is valuable 
because it codifies the obligations states have to their citizens and the obligations the 
human community has to its members, obligations that transcend national boundaries. As 
such, it provides a framework for action, for what must be done. It does not, however, 
address how one should be. This is the terrain of humanitarianism, which is more an 
ethos than a politics. Humanitarianism tackles morality in a way that human rights 
discourse does not. It describes an orientation, an attitude, a way of thinking about one‟s 
relation to and obligation toward others. It can be the emotional and cognitive motor for 
action in the arena of human rights. It serves as an emotional complement to human 
rights work, which would be clinical and legalistic without it.  
 When I say that “American Callings” seeks to recuperate humanitarianism, I do 
not mean that I believe humanitarianism should replace human rights discourse. Nor do I 
intend to endorse every facet of humanitarianism, a term that describes a heterogeneous 
cluster of practices. What I am suggesting, instead, is that if we are to understand the 
impact the practice of humanitarianism since Reconstruction has had on American 
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conceptions of identity and selfhood, we need to be willing to engage with 
humanitarianism from a perspective that is critical, to be sure, but not in the dismissive 
sense that a knee-jerk reaction to humanitarian practices as de facto neocolonial or 
paternalistic would be. We need to be critical in the best sense: willing to openly 
acknowledge what doesn‟t work, and build on what does. 
 
Reaching Further Afield: Sentimental Education, Cosmopolitanism, and 
Pragmatism 
In his essay “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality” (1993), Rorty 
speaks to the question of what value humanitarianism holds for us. He suggests that 
objections to humanitarianism are  
due mainly to a semiconscious realization that, if we hand our hopes for moral 
progress over to sentiment, we are in effect handing them over to condescension. 
For we shall be relying on those who have the power to change things. . . . We 
shall have to accept the fact that the fate of the women of Bosnia depends on 
whether TV journalists manage to do for them what Harriet Beecher Stowe did 
for black slaves. (129) 
Rorty accepts that fact. He is fine with “relying on those who have the power to change 
things,” but because he recognizes how others might not be, he follows this passage with 
a defense of the role of sentiment and literature. Rorty‟s invocation of Stowe here works 
on two levels. First, it metonymically gestures to a central sticking point for those 
advocates of human rights as opposed to humanitarianism: the vexed relationship 
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between humanitarianism and sentimentality that I discussed above. But it also gestures 
to something that, for Rorty at least, is a solution. Rorty argues that, as much as it may 
tax our patience and offend our sense of justice, our best hope for getting powerful people 
to cease oppressing others lies in sentiment, not reason. The most effective answer to the 
question, “Why should I care about a stranger, a person who is no kin to me, a person 
whose habits I find disgusting?” has never been, “Because kinship and custom are 
morally irrelevant, irrelevant to the obligations imposed by the recognition of 
membership in the same species” (133). The kind of answer that gets people to change 
their minds, their feelings, their responses—and therefore to act differently—is, Rorty 
argues, “the sort of long, sentimental story which begins „Because this is what it is like to 
be in her situation‟” (133). Rorty, in this essay and in many of his other works, argues 
that story-telling is essential to moral progress.
15
 He calls the kind of moral education one 
receives through reading “sentimental education”: “That sort of education sufficiently 
acquaints people of different kinds with one another so that they are less tempted to think 
of those different from themselves as only quasi-human. The goal of this manipulation of 
sentiment is to expand the reference of the terms „our kind of people‟ and „people like 
us‟” (123).  
At the most abstract level, my dissertation engages the question that Rorty 
addresses in much of his work: what scope of identification is possible among human 
beings, and how do we encourage the kind of identification that would lead to increased 
empathy and solidarity and to moral progress? Upon what kinds of claims do calls to tend 
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to one‟s neighbor, near or far, rely? Though I do not (explicitly at least) venture a 
response to those questions, I am greatly invested in the conversation they have led to 
among philosophers, literary critics, historians, and anthropologists. The questions have 
inspired me. I would temper Rorty‟s endorsement of sentimental education with an 
insistence that work toward moral progress must proceed in a multi-pronged fashion, by 
changing laws and building alliances as well as altering perspectives. But Rorty‟s 
emphasis on reading as a means to achieve a more just society—even if only a limited 
means—is relevant to my project, and to the profession in general, because it is a 
compelling argument for why the humanities matter.  This is a pressing issue today, a 
time when secondary education is becoming ever more pre-professionalized and an 




Recently, questions regarding the relationship between empathy, identification, 
and global justice have been refracted through two related conversations: one, with roots 
in eighteenth-century moral philosophy, about narrative empathy (the connection 
between literary fiction and ethics); the other, with roots back to the ancient world, about 
the concept of cosmopolitanism and its possibilities. There is considerable overlap 
between these two conversations, for certain philosophers (e.g., Rorty, Anthony Appiah, 
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and Nussbaum) see the former as a means of arriving at the latter. Still, it is worth 
discussing, however briefly, each conversation on its own terms. 
The idea that the narrative imagination can generate empathy that leads people to 
identify with and feel responsible for distant others dates at least back to eighteenth-
century moral philosophers such as Adam Smith and David Hume. Smith explores this 
phenomenon in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), a text that had a significant 
influence on nineteenth-century British writers such as George Eliot and Charles 
Dickens, who used literature to generate empathy in their reading audiences in the hopes 
that such imaginative identification would lead to real political change. Eliot and 
Dickens, in turn, influenced the development of American literary realism, a tradition that 
attempted to “widen the circle of we” (to borrow a phrase from David Hollinger) even as 
its practitioners staged the problematics of such an intention (and even if present-day 
critics have argued that realism does just the opposite, as we have seen).
17
 Today, critics 
work through the implications of Smith‟s thesis in two closely related ways. Though they 
do not lack an historical sense, some critics approach the subject of empathy and 
literature in a somewhat formal and structural way, looking at how literature generates 
the effect of empathy.
18
 Others more pointedly take up the question of the relationship 
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 See the introductions of Frank Christianson‟s Philanthropy in British and American 
Fiction: Dickens, Hawthorne, Eliot, and Howells (2007) and Amanda Claybaugh‟s The Novel of 
Purpose: Literature and Social Reform in the Anglo-American World (2007) for overviews of the 
literary-philosophical connections I am outlining here. Julie Ellison traces this genealogy more 
expansively in Cato‟s Tears and the Making of Anglo-American Emotion (1999). 
18
 See Karl Morison, “I Am You”: The Hermeneutics of Empathy in Western Literature, 
Theology, and Art (1988); Tobin Siebers, Morals and Stories (1992); and Suzanne Keen, 
Empathy and the Novel (2007). Susan Sontag‟s book Regarding the Pain of Others (2003) also 
belongs in this category, even though Sontag deals first and foremost with photography, not 
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between literature and human rights, thus concentrating on the way that a discourse of 
human rights grew up alongside the novel.
19
 Critics who take part in this general 
conversation are interested in the way stories may or may not help readers to imagine the 
suffering of others and to take action in order to alleviate it.  
Though certainly not all of the critics I cited invoke this term, for many, the 
hoped-for outcome of narrative empathy is cosmopolitanism: an identification across 
national boundaries that “endorses reflective distance from one‟s cultural affiliations, a 
broad understanding of other cultures and customs, and a belief in universal humanity” 
(Anderson 267).
20
 Recently, philosophers, literary critics, historians, and anthropologists 
have advanced a functional version of cosmopolitanism that rescinds flattening ideas of 
the universal and parochial versions of the particular alike.
21 
“Rooted cosmopolitanism” 
                                                                                                                                                 
literature, as narrative. A new development in literary studies (called, for short, “neuro lit crit”) 
pursues this question from a scientific angle, bringing the insights of cognitive science, theory of 
mind, and evolutionary biology to bear on the practice of reading. (See Patricia Cohen‟s New 
York Times article for an overview of the development.) 
Elaine Scarry‟s seminal The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World 
(1985) takes up this question as well, though she is profoundly skeptical that representations of 
pain and suffering will ever lead to action. Like critics of humanitarianism, Scarry is hesitant to 
endorse a mode of intervention that is entirely contingent upon the reader‟s decision to act (or 
not). 
19
 See Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (2007); and Joseph Slaughter, 
Human Rights, Inc. (2007) and “Humanitarian Reading” (2009). 
20
 See Amanda Anderson‟s essay “Cosmopolitanism, Universalism, and the Divided 
Legacies of Modernity” (1998) for an excellent discussion and genealogy of the term.                              
21
 In philosophy, see the work of Martha Nussbaum, particularly “Patriotism and 
Cosmopolitanism” (1996) as well as that of Anthony Appiah, discussed below. In literary studies, 
see  Bruce Robbins‟s Feeling Global (1999) and Tom Lutz‟s Cosmopolitan Vistas (2004). In 
history, see David Hollinger‟s essay “How Wide the Circle of the „We‟? American Intellectuals 
and the Problem of the Ethnos Since World War II” (1993) and Postethnic America (1996) in 
addition to Jonathan Hansen‟s The Lost Promise of Patriotism (2003), which redefines patriotism 
in light of the events of September 11, 2001, as cosmopolitanism. In anthropology, see James 
Clifford‟s essay “Traveling Cultures” (1992). Many of these thinkers—Appiah, Robbins, and 
Clifford, as well as Rorty—contributed to Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the 
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sees density of local affiliations as the necessary starting point for broader connections 
(Appiah, Ethics 213). In this rendering, cosmopolitanism becomes more of a goal than an 
identity. The goal is to be able to feel and act upon one‟s responsibilities to every other 
human being. One conviction that recent exponents of cosmopolitanism share is a 
pragmatic realization that one‟s duty to another on the grounds of shared humanity is not 
as compelling as a duty one has to another person as an American, as a member of the 
local neighborhood association, or as a mother. Both intimate and local affiliations 
matter. Where universalist neo-Kantians like Jürgen Habermas work out 
cosmopolitanism as a sense of obligation, the scholars whose conversation I join theorize 
an arguably more complex and nuanced version of the identification, one that begins with 
the local and works from there to the universal. Though the method by which this 
identification might occur remains to be fully theorized, many have pointed to literature 
as one way of promoting familiarity among distant peoples. As Kenneth Burke observes,  
the very „global‟ conditions which call for the identification of all men with one 
another have at the same time increased the range of human conflict, the 
incentives to division. It would require sustained rhetorical effort, backed by the 
imagery of a richly humane and spontaneous poetry, to make us fully sympathize 
with people in circumstances greatly different from our own. (Rhetoric of Motives 
34)  
                                                                                                                                                 
Nation (1998), Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins‟s edited volume, an excellent resource for a 
variety of critical perspectives on cosmopolitanism. 
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Anthony Appiah is one philosopher who brings together the insights of critics working 
through the implications of narrative empathy and the political hopes of those invested in 
cosmopolitanism. Appiah endorses what he calls “cosmopolitan reading” (a practice that 
Burke‟s and Rorty‟s theories support as well, though neither of them uses that phrase), 
casting imaginative encounters in rhetorical terms by drawing attention to their 
conversational quality: 
Conversation, as I‟ve said, is hardly guaranteed to lead to agreement about what 
to think and feel. Yet we go wrong if we think the point of conversation is to 
persuade, and imagine it proceeding as a debate, in which points are scored for the 
Proposition and the Opposition. . . . Conversations across boundaries of identity—
whether national, religious, or something else—begin with the sort of imaginative 
engagement you get when you read a novel or watch a movie or attend to a work 
of art that speaks from some place other than your own. So I‟m using the word 
“conversation” not only for literal talk but also as a metaphor for engagement 
with the experience and the ideas of others. And I stress the role of the 
imagination here because the encounters, properly conducted, are valuable in 
themselves. Conversation doesn‟t have to lead to consensus about anything, 
especially not values; it‟s enough that it helps people get used to one another. 
(Cosmopolitanism 84-85) 
Here Appiah reimagines the possible settings, and outcomes, of human exchanges. 
Though the purpose of this passage is not to elevate sentiment over reason, as Rorty does 
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in his work, Appiah does suspect that reason alone (here represented by the traditional 
parameters of a debate) cannot change the way people relate to one another.
22
 
One might imagine the place the conversations about narrative empathy and 
cosmopolitanism overlap as the terrain of American pragmatism. William James 
conceived of pragmatism as a method of knowledge production that could help reconcile 
the competing epistemologies of science and religion, empiricism and idealism. Truth for 
James was instrumental, not absolute. New truths emerge as thinking subjects graft new 
ideas onto old ones, thus expanding their understanding of the world. No one, James 
believed, throws out old truths and replaces them with new ones entirely. Change was 
incremental for James, as it was for the humanitarians in “American Callings.” 
Pragmatism thus helps me to describe the attitude, posture, and method many of the 
authors in my dissertation espoused and helped to create, one that eschews 
epistemological philosophy and certainty in favor of a results-oriented practice. It is 
helpful in illuminating the philosophical implications of the texts I analyze. Written under 
and animated by its spirit, “American Callings” adds to the story of pragmatism in the 
United States
23
 by finding it in places we haven‟t looked for it before: in Tourgée‟s 
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 Appiah returns to this idea over and over in his work. For explorations of cosmopolitan 
reading, see his essay of the same title, “Cosmopolitan Reading” (2001); “Citizens of the World” 
(2003); The Ethics of Identity (2005), especially the chapter on rooted cosmopolitanism; and 
Cosmopolitanism (2006). 
23
 Two major studies of American pragmatism are Cornel West‟s The American Evasion 
of Philosophy (1989) and Louis Menand‟s The Metaphysical Club (2001). West and Menand 
investigate pragmatism in a top-down method, looking at the intellectual giants who founded and 
shaped the philosophy. For West, these figures are: Emerson, Charles Peirce, William James, 
John Dewey, Sidney Hook, C. Wright Mills, W. E. B. Du Bois, Rienhold Niebuhr, Lionel 
Trilling, W. V. Quine, and Richard Rorty. Menand‟s book is, as he puts it, “a story of ideas in 
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approach to interregional dialogue, George Ade‟s satires, and the self-writing of ordinary 
people, from the Thomasites in the Philippines to Peace Corps Volunteers.
24
 This is 
pragmatism from the ground up. The story I tell in these pages shares with pragmatism a 
focus on the moral life of the individual, voluntarism, cultural relativism, and 
gradualism.
25
 When Peace Corps Volunteers write about the way that service abroad has 
made them aware of the contingency of their own vocabularies, to borrow a phrase from 
Rorty, they are reflecting on the way cross-cultural humanitarian practice has changed 
their ideas about the self and its relationship to culture in a way that makes room for 
diversity. They are, that is to say, adding their voices to a dialogue about the appropriate 
state of the self in the humanitarian endeavor that reaches back at least to the late 
nineteenth century, a dialogue that runs parallel to pragmatism in the development of a 
certain liberal strand of American identity that persists today. 
 
Organization 
“American Callings” deals with the problem of selfhood and humanitarianism in 
three distinct historical arenas, each arena characterized by a challenge facing the United 
States at the turn of the twentieth century that still besets us today. The three historical 
                                                                                                                                                 
America,” and as such it covers a lot more ground (and people), but his focus is likewise on major 
figures.  
24
 Jane Addams is the person in my dissertation who has been most consistently linked 
with pragmatism, perhaps, if unfairly, more because of her affiliation with John Dewey than 
because of her own methods. There have also been a handful of very recent studies reading 
Howells‟s novels through the lens of pragmatism. See, in particular, Patrick Dooley‟s A 
Community of Inquiry: Conversations between Classical American Philosophy and Literary 
Realism (2008). 
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arenas— Reconstruction, industrialization, and empire—tackle the question of how to 
pursue humanitarian change across racial, ethnic, class, and national lines. Though of 
course these three arenas encompass a variety of very specific, historically contingent 
challenges, I feel this scope is justified because there are also ample continuities through 
all three settings. Specifically, all of the figures I look at, from the fictional characters to 
the historical human beings, face the challenge of communicating and connecting with 
people unlike them in order to pursue a project of humanitarian change. This is the largest 
issue all the chapters address, but each intervenes in more local discussions as well. 
In Chapter One, “Howells‟s Humanitarian Striver,” I redirect the conversation 
surrounding William Dean Howells‟s exploration of selfhood through humanitarianism 
by identifying and analyzing a character type in his fiction heretofore slighted: the 
humanitarian striver. In contrast to Howells‟s ironists, who absolve themselves from duty 
to others because they believe change unattainable, and to the ideologues, who 
confidently pursue what to them is a clear path to justice, the strivers work toward the 
social good even though they also partake of the ironists‟ skepticism and self-doubt. 
Through readings of these three humanitarian types in The Minister‟s Charge (1886), 
Annie Kilburn (1888), and A Hazard of New Fortunes (1890), I counter the claim that the 
ironists are the moral voice of Howells‟s novels and argue for the centrality of the striver. 
By elucidating the striver‟s consciousness within the specific, contingent worlds of his 
novels, I argue, Howells usefully complicated the theories of his Christian socialist 
contemporaries. Working from William Morgan‟s thesis that late-nineteenth-century 
literature has played an important role in shaping today‟s “liberal-humanitarian ethos,” 
30 
 
Chapter One helps us understand that ethos by outlining the contradictions and challenges 
of humanitarian selfhood, thus setting the stage for subsequent chapters (9). 
Chapter Two, “Albion Tourgée‟s A Fool‟s Errand as Rhetorical 
Humanitarianism,” foregrounds Tourgée‟s use of persuasion in his 1879 novel in order to 
illuminate the way a despairing belief in the necessity of force to implement change 
intersected with his commitment to rational exchange. While a popular discourse of 
reunion tried to paper over the wounds of the Civil War, Tourgée, I argue, believed the 
nation could move forward only after recognizing, not denying, the rifts within. 
Therefore, he used his novel to examine the cultural gulf separating North and South and 
to outline a way forward. Arguing that structural change only works when accompanied 
by a change in perspective, and that a change in perspective can happen only through 
empathetic understanding, Tourgée aimed A Fool‟s Errand at recalcitrant white 
southerners in an attempt to alter their racist beliefs by first persuading them that he 
understood (even if he did not agree with) their point of view. Tourgée put his theories 
into practice by writing a romance, thus harnessing pathos, glory, and heroism to the 
cause of racial justice. 
Chapter Three, “Sentiment, Science, and the Self in Jane Addams‟s 
Humanitarianism,” challenges currently prevalent readings of late-nineteenth-century 
reform, readings that unmask reform‟s colonizing effects, by demonstrating how Addams 
anticipated—and countered—those very critiques in her memoir and essays. Writing 
during what Laura Wexler has called “sentimentalization‟s afterglow,” Addams, I argue, 
straddled two eras of reform by uniting sentiment and science in her writing (19). She 
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deployed the scientific discourse surrounding neurasthenia to promote Hull House, the 
settlement she co-founded, and distinguished her understanding of humanitarianism‟s 
impact on the self from the sentimental view by insisting upon truly reciprocal 
humanitarian encounters and the mutual transformations they yield. At the same time, 
Addams one-upped scientific reformers by maintaining the importance of “the human 
impulse” to organized reform efforts, arguing, in effect, that sentiment is scientific. 
Drawing on Darwinian discourse, Addams argued that settlements should be recognized 
as a humanitarian technology that could generate the mutations—flexibility, humility, 
cosmopolitanism—that would propel the evolution of a more democratic society. 
Coming full circle with the final chapter, I trace the literary-historical arc 
connecting the teachers who were part of the U.S.‟s colonial apparatus in the Philippines 
to Peace Corps Volunteers. Chapter Four, “Humanitarianism Goes Abroad,” analyzes 
George Ade‟s satirical “Stories of Benevolent Assimilation” (1899) in conjunction with 
the memoirs of two teachers, William Freer and Mary Fee. The chapter demonstrates 
how turn-of-the-century fiction and autobiography centered on the Philippines theorized 
the practice of cross-cultural humanitarianism and prefigured the identity of the 
humanitarian adventurer. Where Ade‟s sketches trace that identity in relief, the memoirs 
introduce a developmental template for humanitarian-adventurer narratives. My analyses 
reveal a shift in self-writing generated in an international context, a move from affirming 
the self by changing foreign others to seeking self-transformation through cross-cultural 
humanitarianism. In conclusion, I reflect on the evolution of the humanitarian-adventurer 
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identity through the lens of American pragmatism, a philosophy whose development 
coincided with the U.S.‟s emergence as a world power.  
 
Limitations 
The story I tell is a partial one. There are nineteenth-century writers (Elizabeth 
Stuart Phelps, for instance) whose writing and thought would help flesh out my narrative 
but who are not part of this study.  Temporally, I would like to go back earlier and look at 
humanitarianism before the Civil War, especially in the writing of Emerson and Thoreau. 
Geographically, it would be fascinating to pursue more of the transnational connections I 
begin to explore, looking at more instances of Americans abroad during the period and 
thinking more about the influence of European fiction and philosophy on people like 
Howells and Addams.  
 The story I tell is partial, also, because it is a story of privilege. I do not 
undertake a wholesale examination of humanitarianism from all angles. Instead, I am 
interested in analyzing what kind of insight is generated through the uncomfortable 
situation of a person in a position of privilege reaching out to extend aid to someone in 
need. Even within that significant limitation, I miss part of the picture in neglecting to 
consider the way people of education and privilege who were not racial or cultural 
outsiders worked on behalf of their own communities, as W. E. B. Du Bois and Anna 
Julia Cooper both did. All of these limitations are also opportunities to think more 
thoroughly, and differently, about the issues “American Callings” raises. They are 
openings for further study.  
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As it stands, “American Callings” allows us to learn from Howells, Addams, 
Tourgée, Ade, and the Thomasites. This is not to say that they can provide answers to the 
stubborn issues that are with us still, nor that theirs are the only voices that matter, for 
they are not. Still, these turn-of-the-century individuals offer us something of value: an 
assessment of humanitarian practice at an increasingly global, transnational historical 
moment that can teach us about how it is we have come to be the society we are. Perhaps 
looking for the openings and possibilities in the story we think we know about the 





Howells’s Humanitarian Striver 
 
If the humanitarian impulse has mostly disappeared from Christmas fiction, I think it has 
never so generally characterized all fiction. One may refuse to recognize this impulse; 
one may deny that it is in any greater degree shaping life than ever before, but no one 
who has the current of literature under his eye can fail to note it there. People are thinking 
and feeling generously, if not living justly, in our time; it is a day of anxiety to be saved 
from the curse that is on selfishness, of eager question how others shall be helped, of bold 
denial that the conditions in which we would fain have rested are sacred or immutable. 
(Howells, Criticism and Fiction 183)  
 
 Even if the “humanitarian impulse” did not in fact “characterize […] all fiction” 
in the 1890s, when William Dean Howells wrote the above passage for the “Editor‟s 
Study,” it most certainly characterized his. More specifically, three of the novels he wrote 
between 1886 and 1890—The Minister‟s Charge (1886), Annie Kilburn (1888), and A 
Hazard of New Fortunes (1890), widely recognized as representing the height of 
Howells‟s use of realism to engage social problems—investigate the gap Howells 
identifies here between “thinking and feeling generously” on the one hand and “living 
justly” on the other. Ever the realist, in both his fiction and his life, Howells recognized 
that no matter how compelling or convincing he found the humane visions of Utopian 
thinkers like Edward Bellamy or radical Christians like Leo Tolstoy, he would have 
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trouble living up to the ideals so much of him wanted to emulate. Yet the struggle to do 
so haunted him. When the Reverend David Sewell, of The Minister‟s Charge, says, “the 
world seems so put together that I believe we ought to think twice before doing a good 
action,” and when the narrator of Annie Kilburn tells us that the protagonist “began to see 
that one ought to have a conscience about doing good,” Howells introduces a new 
problem—his own, in fact—into realist fiction: not the right relationship among or 
between social classes, or even the relationship between representation and reform, but 
the question of how best to inhabit the role of the humanitarian actor—what the role 
consists of, the complications of it (Minister‟s Charge 25, Annie Kilburn 745). For 
Howells, this question was intimately related to the enterprise of self-construction 
because the striving and struggle brought about by the effort of humanitarianism leads to 
a dynamism lacking in more static, complacent ways of living in the world. By raising 
the issue of how to be a humanitarian, Howells points us away from the institutions and 
movements that would guide reform in the late nineteenth-century inward, toward the 
individual conscience. Such a movement from the institution to the individual as a site of 
change has its parallel in a movement in representations of selfhood: from the clear ethics 
and “discrete mental states” of sentimental works like Uncle Tom‟s Cabin to realism‟s 
more nuanced depiction of the self and, therefore, its arguably more ambiguous 
engagement with ethics (Gordon Taylor 5). Drawing on Gordon Taylor‟s work in The 
Passages of Thought (1969), Thomas Peyser describes this shift as one “from the moral 
quality of easily distinguished thoughts to the process by which thought itself is 
produced” (“Other Selves” 20). Reading Howells‟s 1886-1890 novels through Taylor‟s 
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insight allows us to notice Howells‟s complex engagement with the question and process 
of self-definition through the dynamics of humanitarian action.   
 Despite the fact that Howells represents a range of humanitarian personalities, as 
this chapter will show, most criticism has emphasized those I describe below in more 
detail as “ironists.” Though critics have indeed recognized that other humanitarian types 
exist, most of them, following Henry Nash Smith, dismiss their importance by noting that 
the most strident advocates for social justice—Lindau the socialist and Conrad Dryfoos 
the Christian socialist of Hazard and the Reverend Julius Peck of Annie Kilburn—die in 
the novels, their ideals unrealized. Smith argues that, not knowing what to do with these 
believers, Howells kills them off, an interpretation that does not give Howells much 
credit for craft and also overlooks the other types of humanitarian characters left 
standing.
26
 In a more recent analysis, Phillip Barrish describes Howells‟s elucidation of a 
“realist disposition” among the characters I call ironists—a cosmopolitan, ironic view of 
the world that, among other things, realizes “the impossibility of people of different 
classes truly understanding one another‟s lives” (American Literary Realism 31). Those 
in possession of a realist disposition “insist upon their own privileged access to hard, 
irreducible realities”—for instance, the impossibility of realizing social justice, the 
challenges of cross-class understanding, or the difficulty of truly helping another human 
being (Barrish, American Literary Realism 8). Barrish‟s nomenclature suggests that the 
characters with these qualities represent realism‟s ethos as a whole, which is why I depart 
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 See Henry Nash Smith, “Fiction and the American Ideology: The Genesis of Howells‟ 
Early Realism,” p. 51. William Morgan echoes Nash‟s interpretation of these characters‟ demise 
in his chapter on Howells in Questionable Charity, pp. 41-2.  
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from it to use the term “ironist” instead of “realist”; as I will go on to argue, the ironists 
represent only one dimension of Howells‟s exploration of selfhood.  Though the ironists 
may applaud the humanitarian impulse that Howells argued characterized fiction in the 
1890s, they, by and large, are in “bold denial” not of the immutability of the conditions 
that hold people back, as Howells was when he wrote the column, but of their mutability. 
William Morgan implicitly concurs with Barrish‟s emphasis on the ironists when he 
contrasts realism‟s steadfast embrace of failure with pragmatism‟s optimism:  
realism‟s emphasis on failure, error, and helplessness differentiates it from the 
optimism about a contingent understanding of democratic ethics implicit to most 
forms of pragmatism. . . . literary realism refrains from endorsing even contingent 
answers to the problems of how to translate worn-out universal ideals into a new 
antifoundational epistemology for selfhood. (11) 
In contrast to what Morgan calls Howells‟s “antifoundational openness,” Peyser argues 
that it is because of Howells‟s discomfort with the fragmented, modern self that he turns 
to realism, using it as a tool to help him to rein in and define the self, to give it a clear 
foundation (Morgan 54).
27
 For Howells, “consciousness becomes a largely self-regulating 
system” built around the dictates of the ought (Peyser 25). In sum, though a number of 
critics are interested in the way moral consciousness plays a part in Howells‟s efforts to 
construct and refine the self, they disagree on how that happens. 
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 In “Those Other Selves: Consciousness in the 1890 Publications of Howells and the 
James Brothers,” Peyser finds Howells‟s understanding of selfhood to be considerably less 
radical than Henry and William James‟s. Whereas the Jameses are comfortable with the idea of a 
fragmented, moment-to-moment experience of the self and stress being over doing as the defining 
experience of consciousness, Howells, Peyser asserts, sought to solidify the self and emphasized 
action over contemplation.   
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What has heretofore been missing in discussions of Howells‟s engagement with 
selfhood along a humanitarian axis is a detailed examination of what that humanitarian 
self looks like: how Howells dramatizes the contradictions, challenges, and problems 
facing the humanitarian actor. In counterpoint to critics who emphasize the ironists above 
other characters, this chapter will demonstrate that when Howells employed realism to 
explore the issue of humanitarian action, both he and his characters were often more 
optimistic, meliorist, and willing to fight the good fight than the dominance of the ironist 
figures in the criticism would suggest. The ironists are not the locus of Howells‟s 
engagement with the complexity of humanitarian selfhood; indeed, Howells uses a range 
of characters to think through humanitarian action and the influence it has on forming the 
self. If Morgan and Barrish neglect the import of Howells‟s more earnest, striving 
characters, Peyser, on the other hand, may go too far in the other direction when he 
asserts that Howells conceived of his purpose as forcing the self “into the conventional, 
the habitual, moral mold” (“Other Selves” 35).  
As a salutary complement to these approaches, I will argue that a skeptical view 
of the world and of one‟s best intentions is a necessary component of Howells‟s 
humanitarian actor, for a skeptical inclination checks the overwrought earnestness and 
hubris that can hamstring humanitarian action and inhibit the growth of the self. We need 
to do more to consider the psychological dimensions of literary realism, particularly in 
the case of Howells, for whom writing served the purpose of working through conflicted 
and nuanced feelings about his place in the struggles for social justice that characterized 
his historical moment. Like Morgan, I am convinced that “U.S. literary realism plays an 
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unheroic yet important role in transmitting a liberal-humanitarian ethos for citizenship 
from the Age of Enlightenment to the twentieth century” (9). That is one reason why it is 
important not to shortchange our understanding of that “liberal-humanitarian ethos,” 
either by neglecting the complexity of Howells‟s struggle to inhabit that “moral mold” or 
by focusing on the world-weary resignation of the ironists. Both keep us from noticing 
and engaging with a strong, and complex, current in Howells‟s life and work: the belief 
that an individual could, and should, contribute to building a more just, humane society. 
Picking up on the two strands of criticism explained above, this chapter will go further 
and into more detail about how exactly the humanitarian imperative helps to define the 
contours of the self in Howells‟s fiction. I will show that by portraying a range of 
humanitarian characters, from those utterly convinced that they have found the just path 
to those too jaded to believe one exists, the fiction of Howells‟s 1886-1890 period dwells 
in a productive space between the ideal and the real, the goal and the status quo, the 
humanitarian perfectionist and the flawed man. With the humanitarian striver, most fully 
exemplified by his character Annie Kilburn, Howells explores what it means to be a 
humanitarian actor. Through an elucidation of the several types of humanitarian in 
Howells‟s novels and a close focus on the striver, I will show that there is more to 
Howells‟s engagement with humanitarianism than ironic detachment while also 
contributing to an ongoing conversation about humanitarianism, its pitfalls and its 
promises.  
 This chapter, then, embodies the impetus of “American Callings” as a whole, 
namely, the will to recognize, recover, and find value in the always-already-compromised 
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figure of the humanitarian. More locally, it will build on Peyser‟s insights about 
Howells‟s embrace of action over contemplation, thus serving as a corrective to criticism 
that has privileged a detached, ironic attitude toward humanitarian change in Howells‟s 
fiction. I will begin by describing the political, religious, and philosophical influences on 
Howells during the turbulent period of 1886-1890, during which he wrote the three 
novels that are the focus of this chapter. I will then go on to explain what realist fiction 
offered Howells that made him choose it, not romance, as a potent means to contribute to 
the conversation about humanitarianism among the thinkers he so admired. Then, for the 
bulk of the chapter, I will identify and explore three humanitarian types in The Minister‟s 
Charge, Annie Kilburn, and A Hazard of New Fortunes: the ideologues, those who 
confidently believe in a clear (usually Christian socialist) path to humanitarian change; 
the ironists, those who believe change is necessary but are resigned to the reality that it is 
unattainable; and the strivers, who, with their earnest desire to engage in humanitarian 
action—to do something, to act, to care, even despite their awareness that their efforts 
might not be enough—fall in between these two poles. My exploration of these types will 
proceed from the recognition that they are not as clear-cut as my taxonomy suggests; a 
striver can be an ideologue; an ironist can strive. As Basil March, the organizing 
consciousness of Hazard, observes to his wife, Isabel, “There‟s the making of several 
characters in each of us; we are each several characters, and sometimes this character has 
the lead in us, and sometimes that” (486). Still, the taxonomy is a way to highlight 
disparate humanitarianisms in Howells, thereby bringing attention to them. Doing so 
helps to complicate the notion that selfhood for Howells is a self-disciplining process 
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undertaken by the will in response to a humanitarian imperative, as Peyser asserts, while 
at the same time giving overdue attention to selves who are not ironists through and 
through. Though I investigate three types of what I call the humanitarian self, my focus 
will be on the strivers, the most overlooked type, most fully represented in Annie Kilburn.  
 
Humanitarian Influences and Goals 
 Howells‟s humanitarian impulses grew out of a number of religious influences, 
including his grandfather‟s Quaker faith, his parents‟ Swedenborgian convictions, and the 
Methodism of his extended family. Most of Howells‟s biographers seem to agree that 
while as an adult he never subscribed fully to any religious faith, he maintained a strong 
tug toward religious thought, a fascination with the ideals of Christianity and the Christ 
figure. Always, Howells eschewed any kind of moral creed. His interest in Christianity 
proceeded from a practical, of-this-world concern for the well-being of others, not out of 
any belief in redemption, salvation, or the afterlife. During the 1886-1890 period, a 
cluster of events awakened Howells‟s latent religiosity, forcing him to apply his 
humanitarian convictions to the world around him. In Haymarket Square, Chicago, in 
May 1886, a peaceful strike for the eight-hour work day turned violent, attracting the 
country‟s attention and its outrage. Someone in the crowd detonated a bomb that killed 
eight of the police officers who were trying to break up the strike. Though Howells 
decried the strikers‟ use of violence, he sympathized with their plight, so much so that in 
November, 1887, he—alone among major American authors—published a letter in the 
New York Tribune seeking clemency for the so-called anarchists. It was denied. That 
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same year, in July, Howells reviewed Tolstoy‟s Que Faire? in the “Editor‟s Study,” 
thereby announcing his allegiance to the radical Christian socialism of the great Russian 
writer. Also during this period, Howells‟s daughter Winifred was at the height of her 
suffering from an undiagnosed ailment. She died in 1889.   
 The public crisis of the anarchists‟ execution and the private crisis of Winifred‟s 
death after years of suffering coincided with a fertile period of writing and intense 
religious and political searching for Howells. In an 1898 interview, Howells recalled 
some of the content of that searching:  
It was ten years ago . . . that I first became interested in the creed of Socialism. I 
was in Buffalo when Laurence Gronlund lectured there before the Fortnightly 
Club. Through this address I was led to read his book, “The Cooperative 
Commonwealth,” and Kirkup‟s article in the Encyclopedia Britannica. After I 
read the “Fabian Essays”; I was greatly influenced also by a number of William 
Morris‟s tracts. The greatest influence, however, came to me through reading 
Tolstoi. (qtd. in Cady 81) 
Like Tolstoy, Howells was interested in socialism not just as a material, economic 
philosophy, but as a spiritual one as well. During 1889-90, a year the author spent in 
Boston, he was affiliated with a mission of the Episcopal church called the Church of the 
Carpenter, led by the Reverend William Dwight Porter Bliss.
28
 The mission emphasized, 
as many of Howells‟s ideologue characters did and would, emulating the life of Christ 
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 See Clara and Rudolf Kirk‟s article “Howells and the Church of the Carpenter” for the 
most complete description of Howells‟s involvement with the group. 
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over adhering to any strict creed. As Richard Ely, a contributor to the Christian socialist 
journal The Dawn, explained in his book The Social Aspects of Christianity (1889), 
Christian socialists like the communicants of the Church of the Carpenter “must come 
into real, living contact, into a sort of oneness with people before we can give to them 
and receive from them needed help” (qtd. in Kirk 196). This strand of thought gets borne 
out by Tolstoy‟s writing and life and by Howells‟s ideologue characters, though not by 
Howells himself. Instead, he wrote. Clara and Rudolf Kirk observe that his  
association with both organizations [the Nationalists and the Christian Socialists] 
helped Howells turn words into deeds, which for him took the form of social-
religious novels and essays expressing his belief in the possible amelioration of 
civic evils by simply accepting Christianity—as Bliss invited his hearers to do—
as “a life, not a creed, not a philosophy; a battle, not a dream.” (204)  
Turning words into more words was the deed Howells was most suited to perform. 
Writing realist novels became Howells‟s contribution to the battle of living out a 
Christian perspective.  
By depicting the contradictions and struggles of individuals who sought to take 
part in the battle Bliss identified to his parishioners, Howells contributed to the 
conversation in which Gronlund, Bellamy, Morris, Bliss, and Tolstoy were all engaged. 
To their sermons, essays, and advocacy work Howells added his unique exploration of 
the principles they extolled: humanitarianism in the particular, theory through fiction. 
Writing novels about humanitarian action is a distinctly verbal kind of deed—writing 
about doing rather than doing. Howells, however, added life and texture to the words of 
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his fellow philosophical and religious travelers, adapting their prescriptions to specific, 
contingent, particular settings. Realism, Howells wrote, “behooves us to know and 
understand” “human nature and the social fabric” so that “we may deal justly with 
ourselves and with one another” (Criticism and Fiction 94-5).
29
 Howells believed that 
fiction can “widen the bounds of sympathy,” helping readers to connect with, empathize 
with, and understand people unlike themselves (Criticism and Fiction 15). Paul Petrie 
observes that Howells espoused a “social-ethical aesthetic” driven by the belief that “the 
chief end of literature is to perform a public role of cultural mediation, enlarging the 
sphere of social understanding and sympathy by employing fiction as a tool for 
communication across the cultural boundaries dividing classes, regions, and ethnicities in 
the late-nineteenth-century United States” (x). As I will show, Howells‟s actual practice 
does not live up to this ideal. Nevertheless, recognizing that communicating across 
cultural boundaries was Howells‟s goal, even if it was unmet, is crucial to understanding 
his humanitarian striving. Howells wrote novels to put his own theories into action. He 
believed that “men are more like than unlike one another: let us make them know one 
another better, that they may be all humbled and strengthened with a sense of their 
fraternity” (Criticism and Fiction 188). This is a goal that Conrad Dryfoos, of Hazard, 
endorses when he encourages Basil March to contribute columns on New York life to 
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 Scholars of nineteenth-century humanitarianism and philanthropy have concurred with 
Howells‟s assertion of realism‟s relation to reform: “both realism and reformist writing sought to 
make visible what had been invisible and to draw attention to what had gone unseen,” writes 
Amanda Claybaugh, while Frank Christianson observes that “literary realism came into being as a 
response to ongoing but newly pressing dilemmas regarding the relationship between sociality 
and morality and the function of literary representation in imagining a society based on evolving 
and unstable class relationships” (43, 32). 
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Every Other Week, the magazine that serves as the novel‟s figurative linchpin. Conrad 
says to Basil, “If you can make the comfortable people understand how the 
uncomfortable people live, it will be a very good thing, Mr. March. Sometimes it seems 
to me that the only trouble is that we don‟t know one another well enough; and that the 
first thing is to do this” (147).  
With his fervent belief that fiction can open up new realms of experience, 
Howells anticipates and endorses both Anthony Appiah‟s notion of cosmopolitan reading 
and Richard Rorty‟s idea of sentimental education, two closely-related approaches to 
“widening the circle of we,” in David Hollinger‟s phrase, that I introduced in the 
Introduction.
30
 Appiah promotes reading literature as a way of relating to and 
understanding other kinds of humans as they respond in particular ways to particular 
circumstances. He believes that because it dwells in the contingent, literature can help us 
find common ground, not at the level of principle or essence, but through our response to 
specific circumstances. This is possible, Appiah says, because humans share an ability to 
respond to narrative logic, to stories. Both Appiah and Rorty see literature as capable of 
promoting empathetic identification, which in itself promotes solidarity and community 
across lines of class, race, ethnicity, and nation.  
There is a significant distinction to be made, however, between the kind of 
empathetic work Howells‟s novels accomplish and what Appiah, Rorty, and Howells 
himself would have novels do. To be sure, Howells encourages identification with his 
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characters. In his own critical theory, he endorses identification across class lines so that 
human kind‟s “sense of their fraternity” might be strengthened (Criticism and Fiction 
188). In practice, however, the kind of character that Howells encourages identification 
with is, more often than not, the white, liberal protagonist: the humanitarian actor. 
Though he may have wanted to, Howells does not widen the “circle of we” by depicting 
protagonists who come from the working class, the urban center, or an immigrant 
community; his rare attempts to do so, as Henry Wonham and Melanie Dawson have 
shown, are of limited success, especially as compared to his in-depth exploration of the 
white, liberal consciousness.
31
 What Howells accomplishes, instead, is an exploration of 
the humanitarian self, the actor who, because he or she seeks to identify with the Other, 
takes steps to turn sentiment into action. Howells‟s humanitarians are those who, more 
likely than not, have already been subject to the kind of sentimental education that Rorty 
outlines. That initial act of identification, however, happens off the page, before the story. 
Howells picks up where characters take sentiment and turn it into action, or try to.  
Howells‟s 1886-1890 novels were not the only, or even the most obvious, of 
Howells‟s responses to Christian socialist thought. Beginning in 1892, Howells published 
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 In “Writing Realism, Policing Consciousness: Howells and the Black Body,” Henry B. 
Wonham applies Toni Morrison‟s insights about the Africanist presence in American fiction to 
Howells‟s realism through an analysis of An Imperative Duty and shows, convincingly, that while 
Howells may include black or ethnic characters in his novels, the purpose is not to explore their 
consciousness but to use the inscrutability of those Others‟ subjectivities as a canvas on which to 
explore white, liberal identity. While she recognizes that “during the 1886-1892 time frame . . . 
Howells‟ fiction is most invested in the possibility of cross-class evocations of empathy,”  
Melanie Dawson, in “Searching for „Common Ground‟: Class, Sympathy, and Perspective in 
Howells‟ Social Fiction,” concludes that Howells is ultimately unsuccessful at depicting the 
consciousness of any mind outside the middle class (92). She focuses on The Minister‟s Charge 
and Howells‟s attempt to narrate from the point of view of Lemuel Barker.  
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a sequence of fictional letters written by a traveler from a place called Altruria. The 
letters, published in the magazine The Cosmopolitan, describe a series of encounters and 
conversations between Aristides Homos, the traveler, and Mr. Twelvemough, the 
American author who befriends him. The traveler, who hails from a world where society 
is just, equal, and well-ordered, reacts with astonishment at the way things are done in the 
United States, and the Americans react with astonishment at this odd traveler who does 
unaccountable things, like shake hands with porters or ask how the working man spends 
his leisure time (what leisure time?). In these sketches, arguably Howells‟s most pointed 
literary effort to deal with the problem of social justice, the Altrurian innocently exposes 
the malignant core of the American economic and social systems. The Altrurian letters 
are social commentary, not realism. The traveler explains how things are in his Utopia, 
Altruria, and allows the reader no room for dissent. Though the Americans question him, 
it becomes obvious to the reader that Homos‟s take is more just, and more reasonable, 
than theirs. As far as using literature to explore social systems goes, it‟s a bit of a cheat to 
lay out a program for idealistic change without any hint that it doesn‟t work in practice. 
To the contrary: Altruria, as Homos describes it, emerges as an acceptable and workable 
ideal.  
Howells himself recognized these letters to be distinct from his realist fiction, 
calling them a romance. And though he spent much of his career decrying the romance, 
he also wrote, “Of the finer kinds of romance, as distinguished from the novel, I would 
even encourage the writing”—one can only assume that he considered his Altrurian 
letters to be of this “finer kind”—“though it is one of the hard conditions of romance that 
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its personages starting with a parti pris can rarely be characters with a living growth, but 
are apt to be types, limited to the expression of one principle, simple, elemental, lacking 
the God-given complexity of motive which we find in all the human beings we know” 
(Criticism and Fiction 115). It is the distinction Howells notes here—the fact that in 
romance, the characters lack “God-given complexity of motive”—that makes realist 
fiction suited to a purpose distinct from what theory, including theory communicated 
through the romance, can explore. The Altrurian letters allowed Howells to theorize, and 
fantasize, about a new set of social arrangements that could bring about a more just and 
egalitarian world. Realism, on the other hand, helped him deal with a different problem, 
for unlike romance, realism allows for humanitarian convictions and inclinations to be 
played out (not always successfully) in the context of the quotidian. The humanitarian 
strivers in Howells‟s fiction were precisely those characters “with a living growth” that 
could chafe against, and work beyond, the ironists‟ skepticism and the ideologues‟ 
certainty. 
If Howells was ever strident, it was in his defense and championing of realism, 
which he believed enlisted itself in the cause of justice by dwelling in the thorny, 
complicated, contradictory world of people‟s lives. Using fiction to explore how 
characters meet with difficulty as they struggle to apply the lessons of Christian socialist 
theory and exercise their humanitarian impulses was a fitting choice for Howells‟s anti-
doctrinal temperament. As his biographer Edwin Cady notes, Howells never became, “in 
the ordinary churchly sense,” a Christian: 
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Theologically, metaphysically, intellectually, even perhaps spiritually, he 
remained an agnostic. He could commit himself, could give himself away, only 
sporadically and impermanently. That gave him certain advantages both in life 
and art. It kept him from saintly arrogance, the fanatic pride of formal humility 
and absolute knowledge. It kept him focused on persons and their troubles, kept 
him tolerant and humane. It also probably denied him great rewards of personal 
consolation and the creative potency of assured faith. As a realist he was deprived 
of the romantic‟s faith in the sublimity of his ego, and as an agnostic deprived of 
the believer‟s faith in the support of the cosmos. (9) 
As this passage suggests, Howells‟s openness, his rejection of a creed, and the instability 
of his beliefs—he is at one moment an ideologue, the next a striver, and then an ironist, 
before see-sawing back again—all find a home in realist fiction. There, the narrative 
structure at once illuminates distinct humanitarian types before complicating the 
distinctions among them. To quote Cady again, “Howells‟ ideal was the fiction which 
could impower [sic] the reader‟s imagination to lie intelligently in a world of keenly 
delicate perceptions, of fine-spun and therefore richly complex experiences” (128). 
Realism gave Howells a set of tools, a purchase on the problem of humanitarian action, 
that the socialist and Christian socialist thinkers whose ideas so influenced him lacked. In 
the next section I will introduce and explore the first of the humanitarian types in 
Howells‟s fiction: the ideologue. Of all of the instantiations of the humanitarian selves in 
Howells‟s fiction, the ideologue is perhaps the most cartoonish and the most romantic; 
though ideologues garner the respect and admiration of other humanitarian actors in 
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Howells‟s fiction, they are also the flattest and most static of Howells‟s characters. Like 
the ethnic or working class subject in Howells‟s fiction, the ideologues exist to help the 
more thoughtful, introspective humanitarian selves come into recognition of their goals, 
abilities, and limits.  
 
Ideologues 
 The ideologues in Howells‟s 1886-1890 novels are those characters who 
confidently espouse and preach an economically redistributive world view, as well as 
those who subscribe to and seek to implement theories of social betterment. Unlike the 
ironists and the strivers, an exploration of whom follows this section, the ideologues lack 
the kind of rumination and introspection that leads to self-doubt. They are, thus, some of 
the least complex characters in Howells‟s fiction. Their purpose is to serve as catalysts. 
Their example prompts other characters to reflect on their actions and reexamine their 
beliefs so that the ideologues become a spur to self-development and self-creation.  
Tolstoy is the ideologues‟ common root. It is through characters like Lindau, the 
socialist of Hazard, and Peck, the Christian-socialist minister in Annie Kilburn, that we 
see Howells using fiction to work through his complicated response to Tolstoy, a 
response that can profitably be described as the confrontation between literalism and 
irony. In his April, 1886, review of Que Faire?, Howells wrote that Tolstoy is “fully a 
believer in Christianity; too fully, perhaps, for those who believe it ought to be believed, 
but not that it ought to be practiced. He supposes that Jesus Christ, being divinely sent to 
make God known to man, was serious when He preached meekness, submission, poverty, 
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forgiveness, charity, and self-denial” (“Editor‟s Study” 1886 808). Howells thus 
underscores the gap between the literal application of theology—Jesus meant what he 
said—and the lackadaisical application of Christian teaching that he believed many 
American Christians of his time made do with. For Howells, it was indisputable that 
Tolstoy, not those who were Christians in name alone, was the true inheritor of the life 
and example of Christ: “Work, equality, brotherhood, are his ideals; and whatever may be 
said in ridicule or argument, it cannot be denied that the life he is living is in literal 
fulfillment of the teachings of Jesus Christ” (“Editor‟s Study” 1887 317). Tolstoy‟s 
literalism “must of course strike Christians who kill, and litigate, and divorce, and truckle 
to rank, and hate, and heap up riches, as very odd; but none of the sort who take Christ in 
the ironical way can help being startled by the attitude of this literalist, and suffering 
perhaps some pangs of disagreeable self-question” (“Editor‟s Study” 1886 808). Part of 
Howells, the part that reached out in hope and optimism, responded to the literalism of 
Tolstoy‟s example. But another part stepped back, doubtful and afraid. Moved, even 
convinced, by Tolstoy, Howells did not follow his (literal) example.
32
 Instead, he 
struggled with the “pangs of disagreeable self-question” that Tolstoy‟s writing and life 
awoke in him, and he used fiction to probe the intersections of literalism and irony, 
complacency and striving. Tolstoy‟s example became an irritant, a nagging voice that led 
Howells to new depths of self-understanding, which he plumbed through his fiction. 
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 It is important to note (and I thank Phil Barrish for reminding me of this) that Howells 
questioned even Tolstoy‟s “literal” application of his social theories, for Tolstoy‟s wife and agent 
still made sure that royalties were collected on Tolstoy‟s novels even as the author himself 
embraced poverty. See the recent film The Last Station (2009) for a sympathetic rendering of 
Sophia Tolstoy‟s fight to see that Tolstoy not turn his profits over to the Russian people. 
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 If Tolstoy‟s example served as a spur to Howells, so too do Howells‟s ideologue 
characters provide an example to the strivers and ironists who interact with them. A 
Hazard of New Fortunes, Howells‟s most cosmopolitan novel, features a menagerie of 
ideologue characters from all walks of life. The most vocal, if the least articulate, is 
Lindau, an old friend of Basil March‟s whom the protagonist encounters anew in a New 
York restaurant. Lindau is a German immigrant who used to teach the young Basil his 
native language; now he has become a socialist who lives among the poor not out of 
necessity, but in an attempt to realize his ideals. He is a fervid anti-capitalist, but one 
whose speeches against the injustice of a society where “no man that vorks vith his 
handts among you hass the liperty to bursue his habbiness” are rendered in a thick dialect 
that makes them come across more as ravings than as astute political observations (318). 
Still, his choices align him with the example of Tolstoy. He tells Basil that he lives his 
life so as not to forget the existence of poverty:  
You must zee it all the dtime—zee it, hear it, smell it, dtaste it—or you forget it. 
That is what I gome here for. I was begoming a ploated aristograt. I thought I was 
nodt like these beople down here, when I gome down once to look aroundt; I 
thought I must be somethings else, and zo I zaid I better take myself in time, and I 
gome here among my brothers—the beccars and the thiefs! (190)  
Lindau takes the active step of the literalist: making sure the poor are always with him. In 
this goal he is joined by Conrad Dryfoos, who works among the poor on the Lower East 
Side of Manhattan and is sympathetic with the workers whose strike winds up claiming 
both his life and Lindau‟s. Conrad, a “humanitarian dreamer,” is the son of Jacob 
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Dryfoos, the natural gas tycoon whose new fortune funds Every Other Week (Hazard 
324). Conrad follows not in his father‟s capitalist footsteps, but in Tolstoy‟s, Lindau‟s, 
and Christ‟s. In a conversation with Conrad about a dispute between Lindau and Dryfoos, 
senior, Basil realizes that the young man sides with the socialist:  
“Why, bless my soul!” cried March. “Do you agree with Lindau?”  
“I agree with the Lord Jesus Christ,” said the young man, solemnly, and a 
strange light, of exaltation, of fanaticism, came into his wide blue eyes. “And I 
believe he meant the kingdom of heaven upon this earth, as well as in the skies.” 
(350) 
Here again we see the contrast between the literal and the ironic. Conrad refuses the 
complacency that believes justice will be served in the afterlife; he insists on it in the 
present. His contribution to alleviating inequity is to work among the power of the Lower 
East Side. Like Lindau, he also insists on dwelling amid them. As his mother translates 
Conrad‟s convictions: “You got to give your time, and your knowledge, and your love—I 
don‟t know what all—you got to give yourself, if you expect to help „em. That‟s what 
Coonrod says” (232). 
 The Minister‟s Charge, the earliest among the triad of novels I look at in this 
chapter, does not have the same kind of fully-developed ideologue characters that Hazard 
does, but we catch a glimpse of Tolstoyian influence in David Sewell, the minister whose 
sermon on “complicity” marks the moral climax of the novel. Sewell is something like 
Tolstoy, and Conrad, in his emphasis on human relations on this earth, deed over creed; 
the narrator tells us that “he was rather faithfuller and busier in these than he might have 
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been if he had not laid so much stress upon duties of all sorts, and so little upon beliefs” 
(5). But self-doubt and irony nag at Sewell, making him more ironist than ideologue. It is 
in another minister that the ideologue type finds its fullest expression: the Revered Julius 
Peck, of Annie Kilburn. Howells grants Peck eloquence (and a forum for that eloquence) 
that forces readers to contend with his ideas in a way that they are not asked to contend 
with Lindau‟s. Peck is the fictional character who most fully subscribes to every aspect of 
ideologue behavior: living with the poor, literally applying Christ‟s teachings, and 
struggling for justice in this world. He is to Annie what Tolstoy was to Howells. 
Reasoning away Annie‟s well-intended desire to do some good for the poor from her 
position as a wealthy woman, Peck tells her that “sympathy—common feeling—the sense 
of fraternity—can spring only from like experiences, like hopes, like fears. And money 
cannot buy these” (684). With his rueful dismissal of humanitarian charity as it is 
commonly practiced among New England‟s upper classes, Peck demands more of his 
congregants, as his sermon on equality, liberty, patriotism, and charity makes evident: 
. . . equality is the perfect work, the evolution of liberty. Patriotism has been the 
virtue which has secured an image of brotherhood, rude and imperfect, to large 
numbers of men within certain limits, but nationality must perish before the 
universal ideal of fraternity is realised. Charity is the holiest of the agencies which 
have hitherto wrought to redeem the  race from savagery and despair; but there is 
something holier yet than charity, something higher, something purer and further 
from selfishness, something into which charity shall willingly grow and cease, 
and that is justice. Not the justice of our Christless codes, with their penalties, but 
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the instinct of righteous shame which, however dumbly, however obscurely, stirs 
in every honest man‟s heart when his superfluity is confronted with another‟s 
destitution, and which is destined to increase in power till it becomes the social as 
well as the individual conscience. Then, in the truly Christian state, there shall be 
no more asking and no more giving, no more gratitude and no more merit, no 
more charity, but only and evermore justice; all shall share alike, and want and 
luxury and killing toil and heartless indolence shall all cease together. (804) 
Looking forward to the day when “there shall be no more asking and no more giving,” 
Peck casts his sight beyond humanitarianism to imagine a world that doesn‟t need it at 
all, imagining, in other words, a world much like the Altruria that Howells would depict a 
few years later in the pages of The Cosmopolitan. Rather than flatter Annie‟s do-gooder 
instincts, Peck argues that humanitarianism thrives on inequality; it can only exist when 
one person has more than another. As he tells Annie,  
it is difficult to help others when we cease to need help ourselves. . . . as he 
prospers he withdraws from them and loses their point of view. Then when he 
offers help, it is not as a brother of those who need it, but a patron, an agent of the 
false state of things in which want is possible; and his help is not an impulse of 
the love that ought to bind us all together, but a compromise proposed by 
iniquitous social conditions, a peace-offering to his own guilty consciousness of 
his share in the wrong. (755)  
Peck serves as something of an ethical super-ego in Annie Kilburn by refusing to applaud 
Annie‟s efforts to put her humanitarian impulses into practice. He is the stern voice that 
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reminds her, and Howells along with her, that a society that requires the humanitarian self 
is already broken.  
 A secondary character in Annie Kilburn, the bourgeois business-owner Mr. 
Gerrish, says of Peck, “He is not a practical man—not a man of the world” (698). Gerrish 
is one of the avowed Christians whom Howells might describe as truckling to rank and 
heaping up riches (per his review of Que Faire?).  Gerrish‟s take on Peck, therefore, is 
meant to be taken ironically, as a meaningful misunderstanding of Peck‟s application of 
Christian thought. In Howells‟s eyes (and likely in Tolstoy‟s, too, one imagines), Peck is 
very much a man of the world because he applies Christian theology to this world, not the 
next. Gerrish‟s description of Peck exposes his ignorance of what Peck is all about while 
at the same time introducing an element of doubt about Peck‟s path: perhaps his 
implementation of Christian socialist ideology is not as effective—not as practical—as it 
might be. Like Tolstoy, who famously neglected his wife and children in his mission to 
live out his humanitarian vision, Peck neglects his young daughter, Idella. His theory 
doesn‟t do much in the novel, except—and this is significant—that it has an effect on 
those around him, those who listen. It has an effect on Annie.  
 Characters like Peck, Lindau, and Conrad Dryfoos are flat and static because they 
do not possess the kind of consciousness that interested Howells the most. Instead, they 
serve as tools in the development of that kind of consciousness. Peyser suggests that 
Howells looked to social pressure for restraints upon “the vagueness of consciousness” 
and that he had a “belief in the healthiness of self-accusation” in the development of a 
self (“Other Selves” 28). I would amend this observation only slightly to say that it is not 
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social pressure, per se, that exercises a restraining or a reflective influence on Howells‟s 
most complex selves, but rather, a current of social thought that goes against dominant 
social mores: Christian socialist thought, as represented by the ideologue characters. The 
example those characters set promotes self-accusation among the strivers, thus leading to 
a version of humanitarian selfhood more nuanced than that of the ideologues. Picking up 
on Henry Wonham‟s point that Howells‟s representation of blackness “was motivated by 
an impulse to explore what Howells himself might call „white thinking and white 
feeling,‟” I would like to suggest that his representation of the ideologue serves an 
analogous function (720).  
 The evolution of Margaret Vance, a minor character in Hazard, provides one 
example of the way Howells uses ideologues to shape the trajectory of the humanitarian 
self. Vance is a young, attractive, bright woman from a good family. The narrator of 
Hazard tells us that “she had a repute for good works which was out of proportion to the 
works, as it always is, but she was really active in that way, under the vague obligation, 
which we now all feel, to be helpful” (246). Like Conrad Dryfoos, Peck, and Lindau, 
Margaret Vance subscribes to the version of Christianity that Tolstoy endorsed, “the early 
ideals of Christian brotherhood” (246). Yet Vance is not a flat character in the way her 
fellow believers are; as the narrator notes above, her reputation exceeded her works. 
There is room for conflict here, the interesting inconsistency of a self who aspires to be 
one way but is, in fact, another. The narrator tells us that Vance “was like every one else, 
a congeries of contradictions and inconsistencies, but obedient to the general expectation 
of what a girl of her position must and must not finally be” (254). By the end of the 
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novel, though, Vance has joined an Episcopal sisterhood and has devoted herself to 
working amid the poor from whom Conrad Dryfoos was taken too soon. Vance is a 
character who behaves as an ideologue might, but Howells gives us a perspective on her 
motivation and decision-making that he does not provide for the ideologues I discuss 
above. When, for instance, Vance takes the seemingly innocuous step of paying a visit to 
the Dryfoos sisters, her action is granted ample analysis by the narrator: 
Margaret Vance tried to give herself some reason for going to call upon the 
Dryfooses, but she could find one better than the wish to do a kind thing. This 
seemed queerer and less and less sufficient as she examined it, and she even 
admitted a little curiosity as a harmless element in her motive, without being very 
well satisfied with it. She tried to add a slight sense of social duty, and then she 
decided to have no motive at all, but simply to pay her visit as she would to any 
other eligible strangers she saw fit to call upon. She perceived that she must be 
very careful not to let them see that any other impulse had governed her; she 
determined, if possible, to let them patronize her; to be very modest and sincere 
and diffident, and, above all, not to play a part. (255) 
Vance‟s consciousness, her self-justification and self-doubt about an action she regards as 
humane condescension and generosity, gets much more attention than Peck‟s, Lindau‟s, 
or Conrad Dryfoos‟s ever do. In this she is distinct from the ideologues. Howells lets us 
see that she is human, and dynamic. He allows us to see the kind of growth that is 
possible when someone like Vance, filled with the desire to do good, comes into contact 
with the example of an ideologue like Conrad Dryfoos. As a secondary character in 
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Hazard observes, Vance becomes a person who “wanted to talk more about social 
questions than about the psychical problems that young people usually debate so 
personally” (395). She becomes a person who changes her life radically in response to the 
examples she has encountered in it. She is, in other words, a striver, a type that Howells 
explores more fully in Annie Kilburn than he does in Hazard.  
As noted above, critics beginning with Henry Nash Smith have dismissed the 
importance of the ideologue type in Howells‟s novels by pointing out that most of the 
ideologues—Conrad Dryfoos, Lindau, and Peck—all meet an untimely demise. Morgan 
notes that “the men of absolute humanitarian principle in Howells‟s economic novels” 
“are killed or maimed without advancing their ideals,” finding in these renderings a 
critique of the Christian martyr (41). For Howells, Morgan contends, “martyrs who die to 
demonstrate deep convictions are neither effective social reformers nor enlightening 
figures” (41). Concluding that Howells relegates his humanitarian ideologues to the 
dustbin of realism allows Morgan to seize upon the ironist (not the striver, a type he does 
not acknowledge) as the seat of realism‟s instantiation of humanitarian action. While it 
may be true that Dryfoos, Lindau, and Peck die “without advancing their ideals,” it is not 
so that they are not “enlightening figures.” These three characters offer a banner, an 
enlightening path forward whose pull characters like Margaret Vance and Annie Kilburn 
continuously feel. They may not stick around long enough to implement the changes they 
dreamed of, but others follow their lead.  





 Howells is most frequently equated with his ironist characters, the sensibility his 
novels promote most frequently associated with theirs. This is implicit in Barrish‟s 
explication of not just ironist but realist taste as “the impossibility of people of different 
classes truly understanding one another‟s lives, or the unavoidable contradictions lived by 
liberal/radical intellectuals”; this perspective is, in Barrish‟s view, “what Howells 
presents as the only genuinely tasteful stance one can take vis-à-vis painful and insoluble 
American difficulties” (31). Though critics quibble over whether David Sewell (or 
perhaps Basil March) is an analogue for Howells, most agree that the disposition Barrish 
describes dominates. Though the ironist characters do outnumber the ideologues and 
(especially) the strivers, I agree with John Cyril Barton when he suggests, in 
contradistinction to Wai-Chee Dimock‟s claim that Sewell is the moral voice of realism 
and of Howells, that we over-simplify Howells‟s novels if we fail to recognize that there 
is no one voice of realism (or, in this case, humanitarianism), but many. My use of the 
term “ironist,” as opposed to “realist,” as a name for the skeptical characters is meant to 
underscore this conviction. There are many voices in Howells‟s novels that together 
provide “a collective—but unincorporated—discourse on social complicity” (Barton 
183). Still, the ironists are the most common humanitarian figures in Howells‟s novels, 
and for that reason their particular brand of engagement and complacency demands close 
attention.  
 Of the three novels I look at here, The Minister‟s Charge is most fully imbued 
with the humanitarian ironist perspective. The charge of the title is Lemuel Barker, a 
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Massachusetts country boy who aspires to be more. Sewell, the minister, and his wife 
encounter Lemuel and his family on their country vacation, and Sewell, against his better 
judgment, makes encouraging noises about Lemuel‟s poetry. Weeks later he regrets 
doing so when the boy, who, in Sewell‟s eyes, has no hope of making a literary career, 
shows up at Sewell‟s doorstep, looking for help getting a footing in Boston. The novel is 
a chronicle of Sewell‟s (and several other characters‟) frustrated attempts to help Lemuel, 
and of Lemuel‟s stubborn efforts to help himself. Ultimately, the novel drives home the 
grim idea that however necessary understanding and identification are to humanitarian 
action, they are also close to impossible across classes.  
As noted above, Melanie Dawson argues convincingly that The Minister‟s 
Charge, Howells‟s most complete attempt to give as full a rendering of the point of view 
of a working class person as he does to those of his middle-class characters, bumps up 
against “the impenetrability of the lower-class mind or the difficulty of representing it” 
(195). Not only can Howells not fully and sympathetically portray Lemuel‟s point of 
view, but also, at the level of narrative, Lemuel himself has trouble communicating or 
understanding what is said to him. Or at least, this is how it comes across to Sewell, who 
“had begun to doubt whether Barker understood anything”; after talking to him, “Sewell 
felt as if he had been preaching to a dead wall” (14, 15). Dispirited and bewildered by his 
failure to get anything across to Lemuel, Sewell says to his wife, “I couldn‟t find any 
common ground where we could stand together. We were as unlike as if we were of two 
different species. . . . Every one of us dwells in an impenetrable solitude! We understand 
each other a little if our circumstances are similar, but if they are different all our words 
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leave us dumb and unintelligible” (26-7). Lemuel is “dumb and unintelligible” even when 
he interacts with other working-class characters. When he is falsely accused of stealing a 
young woman‟s purse, it takes him a long time to pipe up to defend himself, so much so 
that the police captain asks him why he just stood there “like a dumb animal” (46). As a 
minor character remarks late in the novel, “Barker‟s not very conversational” (261). 
Apart from any one character, the novel as a whole evinces a strongly ironist perspective 
on cross-class communication.  
 In this way the novel accomplishes what Dimock, in “The Economy of Pain: 
Capitalism, Humanitarianism, and the Realistic Novel,” has argued is one hallmark of 
realist texts: limiting liability and responsibility. Responding in part to historian Thomas 
Haskell‟s provocative suggestion that capitalism provides the cognitive framework 
necessary for humanitarianism to flourish,
33
 she writes that “the realistic novel, operating 
as an economy of pain, turns out to honor the dictates of both capitalism and 
humanitarianism. Even as it faithfully represents human sufferings, it just as faithfully 
prevents those sufferings from becoming liabilities” (86). If Sewell shows that the savvy 
response to human suffering (here represented by Lemuel‟s travails in Boston) is to own 
up to one‟s inability to remedy it, then the novel does indeed outline the limit of 
humanitarianism‟s claim on our actions and our sympathies. But I would qualify 
Dimock‟s assertion by saying that it is not a hallmark of realist texts to delimit liability 
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and responsibility—in fact, realist texts often flirt with the possibility of unlimited 
liability—but instead, the limitation of liability is a hallmark of ironist characters.  
 A binocular awareness of complicity in a harmful system (which parallels 
Dimock‟s faithful representation of human suffering) and an inability to alter one‟s 
behavior (preventing those sufferings from becoming liabilities) characterizes the ironist, 
who can be anguished, but is just as often quite cheerful about his or her open-eyed 
acceptance of humanitarian impotence. Evans, a minor character in The Minister‟s 
Charge and a friend of Sewell‟s, represents this binocularity when he comes to his 
minister friend with an idea for a sermon: the notion of complicity. He describes an 
outing he took to the theater to see a Restoration drama “where all the jokes turn upon the 
belief of the characters that their wives and husbands are the parents of illegitimate 
offspring” (161). Though watching a bawdy Restoration drama hardly is the same thing 
as winning one‟s bread off the labor of the disenfranchised, Evans‟s conclusion from the 
evening pushes him toward his articulation of what it means to be complicit:  
“All the people were nicely dressed, and they sat there before that nasty mess . . . 
and listened with as smooth self-satisfaction as if they were not responsible for it. 
But all at once it occurred to me that they were responsible, every one of them—
as responsible as the players, as the author himself.” 
  “Did you come out of the theater at that point?” asked Sewell. 
 “Oh, I was responsible too; but I seemed to be the only one ashamed of 
my share in the business.” (161) 
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Evans believes that shame of his “share in the business” distinguishes him from the other 
theatergoers. Though he sins just as his neighbors do (if aiding and abetting in the 
representation of crass humor is a sin), at least he does so with eyes wide open. Howells 
himself expressed a similar disposition in a letter to Edward Everett Hale, writing, “In the 
meantime Elinor and I live along like our neighbors; only we have a bad conscience. . . . 
The only proof I have that I might to do right [sic] is that I suffer for my selfishness, and 
perhaps this is enough” (qtd. in Cady 203).  
 That “perhaps” nagged at Howells, for in his more striving moments, he realized 
that the kind of ironic detachment that Sewell and Evans possess valorizes complacency. 
This is apparent in the response one of the secondary characters of Annie Kilburn, Ralph 
Putney, has to that novel‟s ideologue, Peck. As we have seen, Peck‟s eloquent and harsh 
sermons touch his listeners and make them see differently.
34
 Seeing differently, however, 
does not necessarily mean acting differently. When Putney, a recovering alcoholic loaded 
with irony, tells Annie about the effect one of Peck‟s sermons had on him, he 
communicates a peculiar kind of detachment from the implication of the minister‟s 
words. Putney says to Annie, 
He said it was a good deal more desirable to understand evil than to hate it, for 
then we could begin to cure it. Yes, Brother Peck let in a good deal of light on me. 
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 Gregory S. Jackson explores the influence the homiletic tradition had on literary 
realism in The Word and Its Witness (2009). He doesn‟t describe Howells‟s novels as homiletic, 
but the fact that Howells uses ministers (Peck and Sewell) and their sermonizing to get his readers 
to see differently, reconsidering their place in the world and their relationship to others, suggests 
to me that there is a connection there that remains to be fleshed out. Jackson is interested in the 
way “homiletic practices helped channel the reformist energies . . . into a national ethic of social 
intervention” (35); see in particular his chapter “Cultivating Spiritual Sight” for an analysis of the 
relationship between homiletics and the Social Gospel. 
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He rather insinuated that I must be possessed by the very evils I hated, and that 
was the reason I was so violent about them. I had always supposed that I hated 
other people‟s cruelty  because I was merciful, and their meanness because I was 
magnanimous, and their intolerance because I was generous, and their conceit 
because I was modest . . . but after listening to Brother Peck a while I came to the 
conclusion that I hated these things in others because I was cruel myself. . . . But 
he didn‟t reform me, I‟m thankful to say, any more than he did you. I‟ve gone on 
just the same, and I suppose I hate more infernal scoundrels and loathe more 
infernal idiots to-day than ever; but I perceive that I‟m no part of the power that 
makes for righteousness as long as I work that racket; and now I sin with light and 
knowledge, anyway. (728) 
Here Putney sounds like an echo of Augustine St. Clare, Stowe‟s humane slaveholder 
whose opposition to the system coupled with a reluctance to do anything to change it 
encapsulates the essence of the ironist. What Barrish writes about Basil March could 
apply equally well to Ralph Putney in the above passage: “Howells‟s late 1880s and 
1890s novels have the effect, we might say, of increasing our imaginative ability to see 
why someone such as Basil March could come to have a keen sense that „unfamiliar sorts 
of people‟ are suffering but still end up not trying to do much of anything about it” 
(American Literary Realism 45). More often than not, the ironists use open-eyed 
complacency as a buffer. Ralph hears Peck‟s message, and his response is to “sin with 
light and knowledge, anyway.” Ironist characters distinguish themselves from others not 
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by their behavior, but through their self-knowledge and their knowledge of the hard 
realities of the world.  
 While awareness of one‟s own impotent complacency is perhaps the most honest 
tool Howells‟s ironist characters use to keep humanitarian action at a remove, it is not the 
only one. Basil and Isabel March, the married couple whose search for housing in New 
York City comprises the first hundred or so pages of A Hazard of New Fortunes, are also 
pros at talking themselves out of taking a principled stance, taking steps to make a real 
change, or sharing the suffering of the poor, as Lindau does. In the scene quoted below, 
they talk themselves out of the guilt that rises up in them as they drive through the streets 
of the Lower East Side, which are filled with “a poverty as hopeless as any in the world” 
(65): 
“Oh, it‟s very easy to have humane sentiments, and to satirize ourselves for 
wanting eight rooms and a bath in a good neighborhood, when we see how these 
wretched creatures live,” said his wife. “But if we shared all we have with them, 
and then settled down among them, what good would it do?” 
“Not the least in the world. It might help us for the moment, but it 
wouldn‟t keep the wolf from their doors for a week; and then they would go on 
just as before, only they wouldn‟t be on such good terms with the wolf. The only 
way for them is to keep up an unbroken intimacy with the wolf; then they can 
manage him somehow.” (66) 
The Marches use reason (rather disingenuously) to convince themselves that doing 
nothing to alleviate the suffering they witness is a kind of humanitarianism in and of 
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itself, the right thing to do. They can be humanitarians by doing nothing, so that the 
denizens of the alleys and byways Jacob Riis once photographed can “keep up an 
unbroken intimacy with the wolf.” In fact, doing nothing is their duty. This passage 
serves as evidence for Dimock‟s overall argument in “The Economy of Pain”: the realist 
novel operates according to an economy of pain that is at peace with the truth that some 
pain is necessary; it‟s just a matter of who feels it. When Isabel remarks to her husband, 
“I don‟t believe there‟s any real suffering—not real suffering—among those people; that 
is, it would be suffering from our point of view, but they‟ve been used to it all their lives, 
and they don‟t feel their discomfort so much,” she draws on an apologist trope common 
in the nineteenth century, arguing that the poor (and, in other cases, blacks, or Irish, or 
Filipinos) do not experience pain the way civilized, middle-class people do (69, emphases 
in original). Let them be the ones to cope with poverty and want, disease and hunger. 
Because the poor are accustomed to such circumstances and we are not, they do not feel 
the pain those circumstances bring about, whereas we would—so goes Isabel‟s argument. 
Ironists like the Marches, Ralph Putney, Sewell, and Evans use their keen 
humanitarian awareness to justify inaction. Their thoughts and actions buoy the economy 
of pain that Dimock describes. Though it is beyond the scope of the present project to 
argue that realism as a whole does not, in fact, make possible such an economy, I do want 
to assert that we need to avoid collapsing the distinction between ironist characters and 
Howells‟s novels, allowing the ironists to metonymically stand for the perspective of the 
fiction as a whole. In the next section I will introduce the strivers, individuals who work 
toward social justice even as they recognize multiple impediments to genuine change. 
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The striver is a hybrid of ironist and ideologue. Their self-awareness and skepticism 
might be drawn from the ironists‟ playbook, but their earnest devotion to action—to 
doing something to help—and their commitment to principle are qualities they share with 
the ideologues. An analysis of the strivers is indispensable to thinking through Howells‟s 
use of realism in the project of self-construction because it is they, more than the ironists 
or the ideologues, who are the dynamic selves in Howells‟s fiction, open not only to self-
reflection but to change as well.  
 
Strivers: The Example of Annie Kilburn  
 It should be evident at this point why so much of the criticism has focused on the 
ironist characters. They‟re everywhere, they‟re amusing, and they make us feel better 
about the disconnect between our own beliefs and behavior. Perhaps this was the moral 
space in which Howells most frequently dwelled. Even so, he was moved by the same 
notions that moved his ideologue characters, and, like his strivers, Howells never 
abandoned the struggle to create a more just, more humane world. Much like Eveleth 
Strange, the American woman Aristides Homos falls in love with, Howells often 
straddled that boundary between the ironist and the striver. Eveleth “denied nothing; but 
she had lost the faith to affirm anything. She no longer tried to do good from her heart, 
though she kept on doing charity . . . always with the ironical doubt that she was doing 
harm” (qtd. in Cady 201).  
If the ideologues are characterized by their confidence, and the ironists by their 
doubts, then it is this will to act, in spite of doubt, that characterizes the strivers. Annie 
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Kilburn, the striver par excellence, shares Eveleth Strange‟s insistence on doing 
something, anything, despite “the ironical doubt that she was doing harm.” Peyser 
observes that this emphasis on action distinguishes Howells‟s perspective on 
consciousness from that of the James brothers. In his review of William James‟s 
Principles of Psychology (1890), Howells quotes James at length on the “„dead beats,‟ 
whose life is one long contradiction between knowledge and action . . . [men whose] 
moral knowledge . . . never wholly resolves, never gets . . . its speech out of the 
subjunctive and into the imperative mood, never breaks the spell, never takes the helm 
into its own hands” (qtd. in “Editor‟s Study” 1891 315). Peyser explains that in his 
review of James‟s compendious volume, Howells focuses almost entirely on the chapter 
on habit. This may be because Howells saw habit as a major impediment keeping people 
from breaking out of the subjunctive and into the imperative. Perhaps Howells saw the 
ironist disposition as the only tasteful response to suffering, as Barrish contends, but it 
seems to me that he also had a strong inclination to do something rather than nothing and 
a strong inclination to admire those who chose a similar path. This is the striver in him. 
If we look beyond Howells‟s fiction to his other writing (columns, book reviews, 
and letters) and to the historic events, both public and personal, that shaped him between 
1886 and 1890, it becomes apparent that the easy equation between Howells and ironist 
characters like Basil March breaks down. As we have already seen, Howells devoted time 
and energy to reading about and engaging with the theories of many of his socialist and 
Christian socialist contemporaries, and he attended (even if he did not join) the Reverend 
Bliss‟s Church of the Carpenter from 1889-91. This is evidence that Howells shared with 
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his character Annie a strong, searching need to contribute to something greater than 
himself, to intervene in the world in a humanitarian fashion. Like Annie, he was moved, 
swayed, and oftentimes convinced by the ideological views of characters like Peck, 
Lindau, and Conrad Dryfoos, but, also like Annie, he could never quite make his 
behavior match his convictions. Instead, he took from the ideologues a commitment to 
fighting the good fight and blended that conviction with the ironists‟ skepticism. That 
blend yielded a heretofore underappreciated alliance between Howells and a more 
earnest, hopeful point of view.   
Howells‟s reviews of Tolstoy‟s writing and his reflections on his own writing 
during this period also confirm that while the comfortably resigned humanitarianism of 
the ironist—he who is aware of his sins but goes on sinning—may have been part of 
Howells‟s makeup, there is an overlooked element of Howells that demands further 
notice. For instance, in his review of Que Faire?, Howells wrote that Tolstoy “tells us, 
with that terrible, unsparing honesty of his, how he tried to do good among the poor in 
Moscow, and how he failed to do any good, because he proposed a physical instead of a 
moral relief, false instead of a real charity, while he grew more and more into conceit of 
himself as a fine fellow” (“Editor‟s Study” 1887 316). Here, Howells is interested in and 
respectful of Tolstoy‟s struggles—his striving to do good, his failure to do so, his tortured 
reflections on the process. Howells takes part in such striving as well. In a letter to 
Edward Everett Hale, Howells refers to Annie Kilburn, writing, “if you read it to the end 
you‟ll see that I solve nothing, except what was solved eighteen centuries ago. . . . as yet I 
haven‟t got to doing anything myself” (qtd. in Kirk 190). Chiding himself here, Howells 
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seems to channel his heroine. This is a Howells dissatisfied with inaction, longing to do 
something himself. The frustration with his own ineptitude that Howells evinces here 
finds its echo in Annie Kilburn‟s determined search to find a way to do good. Reading 
Tolstoy made Howells reject complacency. He wrote, 
I can never again see life in the way I saw it before I knew him. . . . [He] gave me 
heart to hope . . . that the world may yet be made over in the image of Him who 
died for it, when all Caesar‟s things shall finally be rendered unto Caesar, and 
men shall come into their own, into the right to labor and the right to enjoy the 
fruits of their labor, each one master of himself and servant to every other. He 
taught me to see life not as a chase of a forever impossible personal happiness, but 
as a field of endeavor towards the happiness of the whole human family; and I can 
never lose this vision. . . . (qtd. in Cady 8) 
Tolstoy gave Howells “heart to hope” for a better world and to strive to see that world 
realized.   
 The kind of self and self-development drawn out in Annie Kilburn is an 
exploration of the part of Howells that earnestly strove toward humanitarian goals, 
devoted to the abstract aim of helping others whose stubborn call the ironist characters 
repress with logic, guilt, and humor. Annie—not the ironists Putney or Morrell, or the 
ideologue, Peck—is the organizing consciousness of the novel; her trials, both personal 
and social, form its moral fabric. The novel is a flirtation with the idea of unlimited 
liability, in Dimock‟s terms. Where the realist novel, by and large, operates on an 
“economy of pain,” which keeps “moral responsibilities from becoming moral 
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liabilities,” Annie Kilburn is an exception (Dimock 72). The novel inhabits the point of 
view of a woman who so desires to be of use that she opens up her heart, and her 
resources, to the world around her, casting about for a specific way to put her abstract 
principles into practice. Referring to Annie Kilburn, then still in progress, Howells told 
his sister that the novel would “deal rather with humanity than with love” (qtd. in 
Christianson 175). I understand the contrast here to be between tackling the question of 
human beings‟ relationships with each other (along the axes of obligation and 
responsibility) and one human being‟s particular, romantic relationship with another. The 
working title of the book was The Upper and the Nether Millstone, which suggests 
Howells‟s interest in a focus on the relationship between classes. By changing it to the 
name of his protagonist, however, Howells shifts his focus to the exploration of one 
character‟s psyche. In the remainder of this chapter I will draw out the contours of that 
psyche, which Annie Kilburn explores with compassion, admiration, and trepidation, in 
order to amend previous interpretations of Howells‟s humanitarian theories.  
 Annie is a woman in her early thirties who, as the novel opens, is mourning her 
father‟s death. She had lived with him in Rome for the past twelve years, but she takes 
the occasion of his passing as incentive to return to her home, Hatboro‟, Massachusetts, a 
small mill-town where in decades previous her family had been prominent. It is a sense of 
responsibility to others that draws her back stateside, as she tells a compatriot in Rome: “I 
suppose I shall be almost a stranger when I get there. . . . But I have a longing; I feel that 
I must try to be of some use in the world—try to do some good—and in Hatboro‟ I think 
I shall know how” (645). Howells takes Annie‟s longing seriously, but that is not to say 
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that he abandons all criticism of her motivations, which can sometimes be self-
aggrandizing and naïve. Howells shows us that, rather than being motivated by a specific 
set of circumstances, Annie is, at the onset, moved by her desire to play a role, to be a 
certain kind of person. This is so much the case that she starts to look, cravenly, for 
suffering, and feels disappointed when she finds so little of it to alleviate. Howells has 
fun with this perverse desire of his protagonist‟s in the following exchange between 
Annie and Dr. Morrell, a Hatboro‟ figure who comes to be Annie‟s friend (and, much 
later, her husband): 
“I suppose you ought to go to a factory town like Fall River, if you really 
wanted to deal with overwork and squalor.” 
“I‟m beginning to think there‟s no such thing anywhere,” she said 
desperately.  
“. . . Well, then, there are more women than men in the shops, and they 
earn more. I suppose that‟s rather disappointing, too.” 
  “It is, rather.” 
 “But, on the other hand, the work only lasts eight months of the year, and 
that cuts wages down to an average of a dollar a day.” 
  “Ah!” cried Annie. “There‟s some hope in that!” (746) 
Howells plays up the irony of Annie hoping for the existence of poverty and misery only 
so that she can play a part in relieving it. In this passage, the selfishness and 
contradictions of Annie‟s humanitarian striving come to the fore while Peck‟s conviction 
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that humanitarianism depends on inequality hovers in the background, giving texture and 
piquancy to the exchange.  
 Annie develops beyond this somewhat self-centered approach to humanitarianism 
in a way that others of Howells‟ characters do not. Sibyl Vane, a minor character in The 
Minister‟s Charge, represents the striver gone wrong. At the same time that David Sewell 
attempts to come to grips with his responsibility toward Lemuel, Sibyl strives to play the 
role of humanitarian in a more ostentatious, performative fashion. We first learn of her 
efforts at a dinner table conversation during which the Sewell family chats with their 
friend Miss Vane, Sibyl‟s older sister, about Sibyl‟s latest humanitarian venture: bringing 
flowers to invalids in the hospital.
35
 More charity than a humanitarian effort that 
transforms the giver‟s life, such as Annie seeks, Sibyl‟s flower charity nevertheless 
represents her own efforts to, as her sister remarks, experience “the sensation of doing 
good—of seeing and hearing the results of her beneficence” (22). Not content to act for 
the sake of acting, she wants people to notice and to thank her for her good works. (Annie 
is not immune from such vanity, either; in one scene, she imagines Peck at her grave, 
“reading the lesson of her work to the multitude of grateful and loving poor who thronged 
to pay the last tribute to her memory” (839).) When Lemuel comes to work, briefly, for 
the Vanes, Sibyl fancies herself Lemuel‟s protector and savior, getting miffed when 
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 Here Howells is alluding to a practice common among middle-class women of 
philanthropic spirit. “Flower missions” were one of the avenues for involvement that charity 
organizations suggested to women desiring to be of use. As Deborah Carlin explains, “most often, 
the suggestions offered by philanthropic organizations and charities stressed the natural domestic 
talents women possessed that could be immediately employed to brighten, beautify, and 
magically transform the tenement into a home” (209). In Sibyl‟s case, it is a hospital room that 
she seeks to transform. 
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Lemuel fails to regard her in that way or show her what she thinks is the proper gratitude. 
After her efforts at ministering to Lemuel come to naught, Sibyl works herself into a rage 
that results in Lemuel‟s dismissal. Reflecting on the incident, Miss Vane remarks, 
“Whatever has happened, you may be perfectly sure that it has been partly a bit of stage-
play in Sibyl and partly a mischievous desire to use her power over him. I foresaw that 
she would soon be tired of reforming him” (135). Sibyl wants to play the role of 
ministering angel but is flummoxed by the details of the job. As for her flower charity, 
“she wasn‟t at all satisfied with the result. She said the patients were mostly disgusting 
old men that hadn‟t been shaved” (86).  
In one sense, Sibyl is a humanitarian striver because she wants to be able to put 
her energies to use on behalf of others. At the same time, her pursuits are portrayed as 
laughable, her quick discouragement that of a dilettante. The way characters wryly and 
knowingly respond to Sibyl‟s fling with humanitarianism has the effect of making even 
the narrator seem more ironist than striver. But Sibyl‟s character is not meant to highlight 
the follies of humanitarian striving as a whole. Rather, Howells uses her as a foil for 
characters whose striving is more nuanced, sustained, and less inspired by vanity. 
Wanting to do good in order to be known for doing good, Howells seems to say, is as 
reprehensible as avoiding one‟s duty entirely. To be sure, Annie has some Sibyl Vane in 
her. Her self-realization depends upon someone, somewhere, suffering—and yearning for 
her intervention. Annie “looked in vain for destitution” (746). However, with his 
portrayal of Annie, unlike his portrayal of Sibyl, Howells shows us that while such a 
search for suffering may on its face seem self-indulgent, it is born of a desire to be useful 
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and good—a desire admirable in and of itself—and that the perversity that makes 
humanitarian striving dependent upon injustice is a contradiction around which the 
complex identity of the humanitarian striver takes shape. 
 Annie Kilburn is remarkable for my purposes not only because it is Howells‟s 
most in-depth exploration of the humanitarian-striver type, but also because the portrait 
of Annie anticipates the figure of the humanitarian adventurer subsequent chapters in this 
dissertation explore: the person who uproots herself in order to do good in a place where 
she is, at first at least, a stranger. This similarity comes across first in the fact that Annie 
is an outsider. As the novel opens, Annie feels adrift in the wake of her father‟s death: “A 
pang of aimless, unlocalised homesickness passed through her; she realised that she was 
alone in the world” (666). Even though she hails from Hatboro‟ originally, she has spent 
most of her adult life in Rome. She is an expatriate, a woman who returned to 
Massachusetts only to summer, and was a guest even then. So it is striking that Annie is 
drawn to Hatboro‟—to her, as foreign as Europe must have been, once—in order to 
follow through on the dictates of her conscience. “I suppose I shall be almost a stranger 
when I get there,” she tells a woman in Rome, and indeed, when she arrives, “she found 
herself in a strange world” (645, 711). Howells emphasizes this strangeness and Annie‟s 
outsider status repeatedly. As she seeks to intervene kindly and responsibly in the lives of 
suffering others, her friends remind Annie that she must not overstep her bounds. “I think 
they would resent any outside aid,” Dr. Morrell informs her when Annie suggests joining 
the nurses in their efforts among the mill-hands. “Ah, I‟m always on the outside!” Annie 
declares in frustrated response (747). Annie feels the harshness of being a separate, 
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unconnected, strange self, and she thirsts for a way of cultivating—and understanding—
her relationship to other human beings. The humanitarian dynamic, wherein she would 
play the role of selfless benefactress, offers the security of such self-definition. It is 
through that dynamic that Annie seeks to understand, and develop, her sense of self.  
 Annie‟s desire to play the role of humanitarian stems, in large part, from what 
Howells depicts as a deep insecurity about her place in the world. Through a close 
reading of her character we can better understand Peyser‟s assertion that Howells looked 
to morality and ethics as a way of restraining—or, one might say, creating—the self. 
Annie doesn‟t know who she is, and so she compares herself to others. Every little 
encounter, every conversation, provides her with fodder for comparison: her first 
encounter with Mr. Peck and his daughter Idella; her visit with her old friends; her 
exchanges with the Boltons, her estate‟s care takers. Annie is a worrier and a ruminator. 
She dwells on conversations, thinking about them over and over, well past the point (one 
expects) the person who delivered the worrisome words even remembers them. Anything 
can make her feel uneasy, as Dr. Morrell‟s laughter in an early scene does: “she did not 
like him laughing. She questioned if it were not undignified. She felt that it might be 
disrespectful” (705). Annie also cares inordinately about what others think of her. After 
Mr. Peck visits for the first time, Annie “felt the need of showing Mrs. Bolton that, 
although she had been civil to him, she had no sympathy with his ideas” (686). She is a 
self on the make, looking for purpose through philanthropy of some sort. Yet she seeks 
approval through the eyes of others. Instead of deciding on her own who she is and how 
she can be most useful, she reacts to everyone around her. For instance, Annie commits 
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to Mr. Brandreth‟s Social Union scheme—a plan to raise money for a settlement-house-
like arrangement that would be funded by a play and a dinner that the working hands 
would not be invited to attend—when he asks for her help. Later, though, she feels 
shamed by her commitment when Peck tells her that he “could not join at all with those 
who were willing to lay the foundations of a Social Union in a social disunion” (682). 
Unlike the confident ideologues, Annie is bedeviled by doubts and is skeptical as to the 
efficacy of her own efforts. If the late-nineteenth-century transition from character to 
personality in American conceptions of selfhood is marked by a dependence on what 
others think of you, as Walter Susman contends, then Annie‟s preoccupation with the 
opinions of others puts her squarely in the personality camp.
36
 It also, however, makes 
her ripe for transformation. 
 Closely related to Annie‟s insecurity is her harsh judgment of others. She makes 
up for a lack of self-regard by critiquing those around her. A reed in the wind, she feels 
better when she can “regain . . . a little of her self-respect by ridiculing the people she had 
met” (677). The narrator tells us that in response to the society of South Hatboro‟, the 
new summering folk who are pretentious in their fetishization of “culture,” “she was very 
censorious of them, as we are of other people when we have reason to be discontented 
with ourselves” (715). It is this discontent, I contend, that incites Annie‟s censorious eye. 
Hardly anything escapes her judgment. Of Idella‟s name: “she abhorred those made-up 
names in which the New England country people sometimes indulge their fancy, and 
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 See Susman‟s essay “„Personality‟ and the Making of Twentieth-century Culture” in 
Culture as History (1984). 
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Idella struck her as a particularly repulsive invention” (679). Of Jack Wilmington, her 
friend Lyra‟s nephew: “Annie instantly took a dislike to him, his heavy jaw, long eyes, 
and low forehead almost hidden under a thick bang” (707-8). In some ways Annie 
possesses one of the traits Barrish identifies as belonging to realist distinction: good taste. 
But the way she aggressively asserts herself as different from those who do not share her 
aesthetic preferences, such as the inhabitants of South Hatboro‟, or even her friends the 
Putneys, whose dinner table she calls “pathetically old-fashioned,” betrays her deep-
seated insecurity (722). Of the South Hatboro‟ folk, she observes that “they were making 
a pretence of simplicity and unconventionality. . . . Everywhere Annie had found the 
affectation of intellectual interests, and the assumption that these were the highest 
interests of life” (715-6). Here we see the contrast between the genuine—presumably, 
Annie‟s real embodiment of intellect, simplicity, and unconventionality—and artifice, 
that which is “pretence” and “affectation.” Because she stands on unsteady ground, not 
really sure about her own talents or place in the world, Annie clamps a steely grip on 
taste as a defense. She admits as much after her first meeting with Peck, whose 
unconventional ideas about humanitarianism and duty shake her to the core: “She 
ridiculed Mr. Peck‟s appearance and manner, and laughed at his ideas to Mrs. Munger. 
She had not a good conscience in it, but the perverse impulse persisted in her. There 
seemed no other way in which she could assert herself against him” (688). A stranger in a 
strange land, the insecure Annie uses her barbed tongue to assert herself against those 
who threaten her. But her shrewd and catty judgments don‟t quite do the trick, so it is 
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through the humanitarian dynamic that Annie most forcefully attempts to assert—and 
realize—herself.  
 At times Howells‟s sympathy seems to be more with the ironist characters whose 
amused detachment plays off Annie‟s earnestness—Dr. Morrell‟s eyes “twinkled 
sympathetically” as he teased Annie about her search for suffering among the more or 
less prosperous mill hands—than with the striving protagonist (746). Still, he takes 
Annie‟s dilemma seriously, devoting time and careful attention to the motives and 
desires, no matter how selfish, that move Annie to do what the ironists do not: grapple 
with tough questions, make an effort, take action. Even if Annie‟s humanitarian striving 
does arise from insecurity, and even if it is accompanied by harsh judgment of others and 
a desire for there to be hardship somewhere out there, it also helps to illuminate a number 
of central questions of real concern to Howells. Because she cares, and because she seeks 
to act, Annie helps to excavate issues that the ironist characters‟ detachment allows them 
to glance over.  
 It is Annie, more than any of the other characters in the novel, who mulls over the 
nature of humanitarian action. In order to grow in her role as humanitarian actor, she first 
has to come to terms with the fact that it is indeed humanitarian action, and not some kind 
of ideal justice, that she is capable of bringing about. This in contrast to what Julius Peck 
strives for: a just world where humanitarianism is no longer necessary. To be sure, Peck‟s 
proclamations about justice prompt Annie to reflect on what, exactly, she is doing 
through her charitable activities. Much of her self-critique of humanitarian practice as she 
originally envisioned it comes from what she learns in her interactions with Peck, 
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particularly his response to the Social Union plan. About that scheme, Peck asks, “Have 
they tried to interest the working people themselves in it?” One criticism he ventures 
about the Social Union is that the well-to-do people are of limited imagination; they 
envision a “charity” that they themselves would want but have not sufficiently tried to 
understand or adopt the point of view of those they‟re trying to help. “These things are 
invented by well-to-do people who have no occupation, and think that others want 
pastimes as much as themselves,” Peck declares (680).  
Beyond his specific critique of the Social Union, the minister also makes clear 
that he believes humanitarianism is only necessary because injustice exists, as we have 
seen. He is after something different from humanitarianism; in his ideal world, there 
would be no need for humanitarianism—just humanity, humane behavior. Peck holds out 
a just society as the true goal, making Annie feel that her small efforts at being a 
humanitarian do not attack the root of the problem. (They don‟t.) The difference between 
humane behavior and humanitarian-ism is the role itself, a role that Annie strives, 
through most of the novel, to assume. The Peck/Annie contrast is one that gets played out 
in explorations of humanitarianism up to the present day. One could see the contrast 
between the two characters‟ responses to human suffering as a literary representation of 
the contrast between human rights and humanitarianism that I discussed in the 
Introduction.  
  Much of Annie‟s journey of productive self-definition in the novel is 
characterized by her coming to terms with the fact that she will do what she can, acting in 
response to what surrounds her rather than getting discouraged by the existence of an 
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ideal she is unable to attain. Humanitarian sentiment and action are abstract qualities to 
Annie, at least in the first half of the novel. She is trying to live out a role, to find objects 
for her munificence, rather than acting out of kindness in response to a specific situation. 
Applying Annie‟s situation to the philosophical conversation about reading in which 
Appiah and Rorty engage, Annie is dealing with humanitarianism at the level of essence 
and principle instead of living it in the present, in the context of a specific, contingent 
situation. As a result, she is at first better able to experience pity in the abstract than in the 
particular: 
She would have preferred not to see or know the objects of her charity, and 
because she preferred this she forced herself to face their distasteful misery. . . . 
They filled her gentlewoman‟s soul with loathing; but if she kept beyond the 
range of the powerful  corporeal odour that enveloped them, she could experience 
the luxury of pity for them. . . . She consoled herself as far as she could with the 
superstition that in meeting them she was fulfilling a duty sacred in proportion to 
the disgust she felt in the encounter. (746-7) 
Here Howells suggests that Annie‟s sense of duty is tinged with masochism: she feels she 
is doing good when she experiences loathing and is able to overcome it. Pity is a luxury 
for her. With this depiction of Annie, Howells raises the question of motivation: is an act 
that is undertaken out of a sense of duty, not out of true kindness and love, truly humane?  
 The same question comes up in The Minister‟s Charge, and it is handled there by 
the ironist Sewell. Toward the end of the novel, Jessie Carver, Lemuel‟s love interest, 
comes to Sewell seeking advice. Lemuel has become romantically involved with Statira 
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Dudley, a working class girl whose sweetness and simplicity initially attract Lemuel, 
putting him at ease, but whose naiveté and ignorance eventually bore him and turn his 
sweetheart into a burden. He is, however, beholden to Statira, so that when he meets 
Jessie, a smart and intellectually curious art student, he is stuck, unable to act on his 
feelings for her out of a debt to Statira. Jessie seeks out Sewell‟s help because his 
sermons have touched her in the past. This is a notable instance of an ironist, not an 
ideologue, inspiring someone to change. Jessie tells Lemuel that Sewell has, in effect, 
turned her into a striver: he “doesn‟t leave you feeling how bad you are, but makes you 
want to be better” (218)—and she hopes, therefore, he can affirm her sense that to recede 
and let Lemuel act on his obligation to Statira is the morally correct decision. Jessie is 
looking for an unchanging moral rule to apply to the situation, but Sewell refuses to give 
it to her. “You said that we ought to act unselfishly,” Jessie reminds the minister. “Yes,” 
he replies, “but you must beware of the refined selfishness which shrinks from self-
assertion because it is painful. You must make sure of your real motive; you must 
consider whether your sacrifice is not going to do more harm than good” (293). Here 
Sewell complicates the apparently self-evident principle of self-sacrifice by conflating a 
Christian emphasis on motive with a pragmatist emphasis on effects. In Sewell‟s 
philosophy, imagining the outcome of an act and considering the balance of general harm 
and good of that outcome are two important steps in clarifying one‟s motive. That is to 
say, if an act accomplishes more general harm than good, then it is likely that a desire for 
some private, individual good is the motive. Considering effects, then, can serve as a tool 
by which to judge motive. The scene between Sewell and Jessie illustrates a principle of 
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the kind of humanitarian selfhood present in all of Howells‟s types: it is contingent upon 
circumstance, not tied to a static set of laws. 
 Thus the unpredictable and the unforeseen, in addition to the ordinary channels of 
humanitarian service with which Annie struggles uncomfortably, also contribute to 
Annie‟s growth as a humanitarian striver. Where Annie truly seems to awaken to a 
different kind of humanitarian response is in her behavior toward Idella, Peck‟s neglected 
daughter. When Idella falls asleep in Annie‟s lap at the theatricals for the Social Union, 
and a working woman offers to relieve Annie of the burden, Annie replies, “„No, no; she 
isn‟t heavy; I like to hold her.‟ . . . Then something occurred to her, and she stared at 
amazement at herself” (767). Annie has realized that she loves Idella. This experience 
transforms the meaning of charity for Annie, taking it from a rather masochistic 
overcoming of loathing—as in conquering one‟s disgust of the “corporeal odour” of the 
poor—to caritas as a virtue, one born of love for one‟s self and one‟s kin that stretches 
outward into an altruistic desire to tend to mankind. From this point on out, Annie does 
not conceive of what she does for the girl as charity because it comes naturally. When she 
decides that she wants to raise Idella, or at least tend to her while Mr. Peck tends to his 
flock, she imagines framing her request to the girl‟s father as a favor to herself: “I believe 
I can make Mr. Peck see that it‟s a duty. I shall ask him to regard it as a charity to me—as 
a mercy” (790). Is Annie at her best when she‟s actually doing something for herself? 
Sarah Daugherty finds it to be the case that “Howells demonstrates that Annie‟s 
achievement of concrete good—her nurture of a real child—results more from self-
interested motives than selfless ones” (35). This reading connects with the larger question 
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of the nature of abstract and specific humanitarianism. At the same time, the fact that 
Annie finds her humanitarian calling met in part by a privatized, maternal role—she 
doesn‟t get to join the public discourse by giving sermons, like Sewell or Peck, or by 
writing novels, like Tolstoy or Howells himself—raises the uncomfortable possibility that 
for Howells, the female humanitarian striver best set her sights a little closer to home. 
 I would contend, however, that Howells does not limit his heroine by having her 
discover what it means to care deeply for one beloved child. Rather, he uses Annie‟s 
relationship with Idella and Peck to probe the intertwined issues of family and 
responsibility as they relate to humanitarian practice. In discussing his care of Idella, 
Peck tells Annie that he feels he oughtn‟t to lift his own child up beyond others. “Surely, 
we are bound to provide for those of our own household,” says Annie. “Who are those of 
our own household?” replies the minister. “All mankind are those of our own household. 
These are my mother and my brother and my sister” (796). Peck, in taking the teachings 
of Christianity literally, as Howells‟s ideologues are wont to do, mirrors Howells‟s 
complicated hero, Tolstoy. Though she is initially very much taken with Peck‟s austere 
breed of humanitarian action, Annie asks Dr. Morrell whether he believes that Peck is “a 
real philanthropist,”  
“because I can‟t understand his indifference to his child. It seems to me that real 
philanthropy would begin at home. But twice he has distinctly forgotten her 
existence, and he always seems bored with it. Or not quite that; but she seems no 
more to him than any other child.” 
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“There‟s something very curious about all that,” said the doctor. “In most 
things the greater includes the less, but in philanthropy it seems to exclude it. If a 
man‟s heart is open to the whole world, to all men, it‟s shut sometimes against the 
individual, even the nearest and dearest.” (816) 
Here, Howells uses Annie to investigate the shifting ground where humanity and love 
both dwell. It is she who brings the contradictions in Peck‟s behavior to Morrell‟s 
attention; her inquiries, rather than endorsing a narrow, privatized version of 
humanitarianism, expose the follies in the overly generalized, equalizing practice that 
Peck lives by.  This scene illustrates the thesis of the above section on the ideologues: 
Peck‟s example helps Annie to reflect and to grow. In addition to being a novel that deals 
“rather with humanity than with love,” Annie Kilburn is a novel that looks at the way 
humanity and love intersect (Howells qtd. in Christianson 175). To be an ideologue 
humanitarian, the novel suggests, is a kind of folly, not because it is smarter to maintain 
an ironic detachment, but because true change—both in oneself and in others—happens 
as a result of love: humanitarianism in the particular. This is a lesson, however, that 
Annie would not have learned had she not initially been a humanitarian striver, someone 
open to asking these questions and eager to figure them out. Her porosity to the world 
may make her insecure, but it also makes her incredibly flexible, moldable, and 
responsive to what is around her. Ideologues, so confident in their convictions, lack the 
necessary doubt and skepticism to grow as Annie does. 
 By the end of the novel Peck (and his idealism) are crushed by a train; he is killed 
just after resigning from his pastoral post and deciding to teach in a mill school. His 
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untimely death releases Annie from her impulsive commitment to follow him there and 
take care of Idella. Instead, Idella stays with her, a gesture of kindness on Annie‟s part 
not dictated by duty, but by love. Still moved by what Peck taught her, she finds a way to 
balance her ideals with the necessities before her. As she explains to Dr. Morrell,  
Oh, we must continue to do charity. . . . But don‟t you see how much more 
complicated it is? . . . It was easy enough to do charity when it used to seem the 
right and proper remedy for suffering; but now, when I can‟t make it appear a 
finality, but only something provisional, temporary—Don‟t you see? . . . We 
ought to be fairer to people, and then we needn‟t be so good to them. (818)  
But because the present necessity does dictate that “we must continue to do charity,” 
Annie does not abandon her goal to play the part of the humanitarian. Rather than take 
the place of humanitarian striving for Annie, motherhood helps her to understand the 
importance of that striving in a new light. In pragmatist fashion, Annie continues to 
pursue humanitarianism with her eyes wide open and her consciousness raised, all the 
while hoping that doing something, however provisional and temporary, is still 
significant in the now. Applying her sense of optimism and intuition to what she learned 
from Peck, Annie continues her work with the Social Union, her striving tempered by 
time, maturity, and confidence gained through experience. “She is really of use,” the 
narrator tells us, “for its [the Social Union‟s] working is by no means ideal, and with her 
wider knowledge she has suggested improvements and expedients for making both ends 
meet which were sometimes so reluctant to meet” (862-3). In the end, it is not Peck‟s 
austere idealism—or Tolstoy‟s, or Lindau‟s—that triumphs, nor does the detached 
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attitude of Dr. Morrell—or Putney, or Sewell, or the Marches—prevail. Annie finds a 
functional middle ground between idealism and complacency that allows her to 
contribute to her community and grow in wisdom at the same time. Margaret Vance, 
whose humanitarian strivings find a concrete outlet as Hazard goes on, arguably inhabits 
the same productive middle ground as Annie. But Howells devotes more narrative 
attention to Annie than to any other striver in his fiction. This has the effect of fostering 
an intimacy with Annie‟s strivings, a sense of proximity between reader and protagonist 
that tacitly promotes the psychological value of the paces Annie goes through. Of Annie, 
the narrator reflects, “No theory is so perfect as not to be subject to exceptions in the 
experiment, and in spite of her conviction of the truth of Mr. Peck‟s social philosophy, 
Annie is aware, through her simple and frank relations with the hands in a business 
matter, of mutual kindness which it does not account for” (862). Annie, at the end, sees 
beyond Peck‟s ascetic assessments of one‟s role in the world. His idealism lives on, to a 
degree, through Annie, but some of the ironists‟ pragmatism has worn on her as well.   
Howells takes seriously Annie‟s declaration that “within the last four or five 
months . . . I seem to have lost my old point of view; or, rather, I don‟t find it satisfactory 
any more” (817). Annie Kilburn is a humanitarian self who ponders her role, her choices, 
her mistakes, and her missteps. Not for nothing does Howells devote his novel to the 
story of a woman striving, through the structure of the humanitarian dynamic, to find 
herself. It is a story of self-realization that only a humanitarian striver—not an ideologue, 
who has the answers; or an ironist, who thinks there aren‟t any—could engage in. Though 
Howells‟s examination of this type is unique among his late 1880s, economic novels, it is 
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important to balance any readings of his take on humanitarianism from a more detached, 
ironic point of view with this story of self-realization: the tale of a woman who saw 
helping others as a path to becoming herself. This narrative found multiple expressions 




Albion Tourgée’s A Fool’s Errand as Rhetorical Humanitarianism 
 
. . . the moment [southerners] manifest a disposition to acquiesce cordially in the altered 
status of their former slaves, to treat them as freemen, and deal with them in justice and 
humanity, that moment will the Federal Government be free to leave them to manage 
their domestic affairs in their own way. It is to be hoped that they will learn to look at this 
matter aright, and lay aside the animosities toward the colored race, which now seem to 
have possession of their minds. This is their best policy from reasons of self-interest, as it 
is their duty from a humanitarian standpoint. 
The Philadelphia Inquirer, July 25, 1865 
 
“The life of the Fool proper is full of the poetry of faith,” Albion Tourgée declares 
in the “Letter to the Publishers” that opens his novel A Fool‟s Errand (1879) (5).
37
 “He 
differs from his fellow-mortals chiefly in this, that he sees or believes what they do not, 
and consequently undertakes what they never attempt” (5). In A Fool‟s Errand, a novel 
based on Tourgée‟s fourteen years in post-bellum North Carolina, the carpetbagger-cum-
author tells the story of an idealist Fool who thought he could change things from the 
perspective of a seasoned realist who failed in his attempts to do so, thus commenting 
knowingly (if affectionately) on the Fool‟s striving to see humanitarian justice done in 
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the Reconstruction-era South. Although A Fool‟s Errand is a memoir of sorts—Tourgée 
bases his protagonist‟s travails on his own experiences, and Comfort Servosse (said 
protagonist) is a stand-in for himself—it lacks the kind of introspection and focus on self-
development that characterizes Annie Kilburn and realist novels more generally. Of all 
the figures in “American Callings,” Tourgée is the one most closely aligned to human 
rights, as opposed to humanitarian, discourses.
38
 Like human rights activists in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries would do, Tourgée pursued change through legal, 
political, and bureaucratic channels. He organized Greensboro‟s first black school; edited 
and published a Radical Republican newspaper; represented North Carolina as a delegate 
to the 1868 State Constitutional Convention; and served a six-year term as a superior 
court justice, a position he used to fight the Ku Klux Klan. Later in his career he founded 
the National Citizen‟s Rights Association (a precursor of the NAACP), helped establish 
the first comprehensive anti-lynching law in the United States, and, most famously, was 
lead attorney for the plaintiff in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the first constitutional 
challenge to state-mandated segregation.
39
 
Tourgée‟s life and writing provide a model for how humanitarian impulses and 
insights can complement human rights work. Tourgée‟s biography fits the mold of the 
humanitarian adventurer that the Peace Corps Volunteer emblematizes: someone who 
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 I thank Phil Barrish for helping me articulate Tourgée‟s difference from the other 
humanitarians in these terms. This is not to say that the other humanitarians didn‟t do human 
rights work. Addams did as well. These distinctions exist on a continuum. 
 
39
 Mark Elliott‟s Color-Blind Justice: Albion Tourgée and the Quest for Racial Equality, 
from the Civil War to Plessy v. Ferguson (2006) is an excellent recent biography of Tourgée, the 
only one published since 1965, when Otto Olsen‟s groundbreaking work Carpetbagger‟s 
Crusade: The Life of Albion Winegar Tourgée appeared. 
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seeks an adventure driven by moral purpose in a culture different from his own. Historian 
C. Vann Woodward points out that, for a whole generation of northern men, the 
adventurous highpoint of their lives was their participation in the Civil War. Traumatic as 
they must have found it, some sought to prolong this encounter because, for one reason or 
another, the South got under their skin. About Tourgée, Woodward writes that he “simply 
could not put the South out of his mind” (xi). Tourgée was relentless in seeking out the 
discomfort, hardship, and intellectual puzzle the South presented such that “the encounter 
was renewed, tenaciously pursued, and obstinately prolonged” (Woodward xi). Tourgée 
was driven by the moral challenges of seeking reconciliation between the North and the 
South after the Civil War and fighting for the African Americans whose freedom was 
won, but whose rights were trammeled by the habits and strictures of a society stuck in its 
ways and opposed to change. At the same time, he seemed to crave the personal, 
emotional challenges presented to him by living in what, at the time, was like a different 
country.  
In his writing Tourgée does not focus on self-transformation the way many 
humanitarian adventurers do, but the work for racial justice he undertook was 
underwritten by an insight about the self. “We are selves,” Charles Taylor writes, “only 
in that certain issues matter for us” (34). One of the central convictions informing A 
Fool‟s Errand is Tourgée‟s belief that individual selves are created by environments and 
societies. In other words, the environment surrounding individuals structures what issues 
matter to them; it helps them establish a hierarchy of value that weighs state and nation, 
tradition and change. In the particular context of Reconstruction, a situation that posed a 
93 
 
humanitarian challenge to the nation as a whole,
40
 Tourgée realized that selves on both 
sides of the Mason-Dixon had to be altered in order for humanitarian action to occur and 
humanitarian change to take hold. This meant more than changing minds. It meant 
changing deeply held convictions and ways of looking at the world, patterns established 
over a lifetime. With his novel Tourgée describes an orientation to the world that relies 
on and has faith in the potential of discourse to alter perspectives, to change selves. This 
perspective insists on the centrality of dialogue to that project, not as a replacement for 
action, but as a precursor and/or a companion to it. Working with the knowledge that 
selves are contingent upon the societies and discourses that surround them, Tourgée, like 
Howells, meditates on how best to inhabit the role of the humanitarian actor, and 
persuasion is central to his conception. 
At the end of A Fool‟s Errand, after Servosse has failed to alter his southern 
neighbors‟ attitudes concerning racial justice and political participation, he receives a 
piece of conciliatory advice from a northern mentor: “I have often thought that St. Paul 
would have been more forbearing with his Jewish brethren if he had always kept in mind 
the miracle required for his own conversion” (388). By drawing a parallel between St. 
Paul, a converted Jew and Christianity‟s first evangelist, and Servosse, a carpetbagger 
and an evangelical proponent of radical Reconstruction, Tourgée‟s character Enos Martin 
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inextricable from bringing the North and South together. The ideal of a unified nation where 
blacks and whites were both guaranteed the rights of citizens drew on the ideal of shared 
humanity. By the end of Reconstruction, in 1877, those in power who previously had insisted 
upon racial justice were willing to compromise on that point, however. 
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counsels patience. He reminds Servosse that radical change must be accompanied by a 
radically new way of seeing things, an alteration in vision akin to the way the scales fell 
from Saul‟s eyes. Similarly, the passage from the Philadelphia Inquirer that opens this 
chapter asserts that southern self-rule should be restored only upon evidence that 
southerners were “look[ing] at this matter aright” by setting aside their “animosities 
toward the colored race.” Southerners too must adopt a new way of seeing. For both 
Tourgée in 1879 and an anonymous journalist in 1865, federal legislation alone would 
never be enough to effect the sweeping economic, social, and political changes that the 
Reconstruction they envisioned demanded. If new laws were to be followed, they had to 
be accompanied by a new perspective. Whether that change in perspective would be best 
brought about by logical demonstration, force, emotional appeals, or the passage of time 
was a vexed question, one which Tourgée took up with A Fool‟s Errand.  
However, where the writer for the Inquirer wrote in the immediate, hopeful wake 
of the Civil War, looking forward to changes on the horizon, Tourgée published his novel 
once having made the decision to leave the South after a fourteen-year stint fighting for 
racial justice in North Carolina. During that same period, despite the efforts of Tourgée 
and others like him, southern governments and citizens adopted measures—poll taxes, 
literacy requirements, grandfather clauses, and convict labor, to name a few—that 
successfully negated the promises of freedom and political participation for African 
Americans that the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 and the passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth, 
and fifteenth amendments were meant to guarantee. It was the Hayes-Tilden compromise 
of 1877, however, that sounded the official death-knell of Reconstruction by granting 
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victory to Republican Rutherford B. Hayes in the disputed presidential election on the 
condition that the federal troops remaining in Louisiana and South Carolina cease 
interfering in southern affairs. Tourgée, then, penned his tormented novel about where to 
go after the failure of Reconstruction at the same moment that political and literary 
overtures to North-South palliation gained steam. Alongside the political concessions 
cemented by the North‟s guarantee of military non-interference arose a sentimental 
culture of reconciliation that, as Amy Kaplan and Nina Silber have both argued, 
promoted a “willed amnesia” in the Gilded Age: novels featuring North-South marriages, 
short fiction inventing a bucolic past for the South, and local color writing that 
commodified the regional in service to the national (Kaplan, “Nation, Region, and 
Empire” 242).
41
   
Tourgée‟s was a voice of dissent in this period of vigorous national re-
imagination that sought to paper over the rancor of the past. Unlike those who would 
forge a national culture on a foundation of forgetting, Tourgée wrote so that readers 
would remember what he understood as the reality of Reconstruction—and act on it. 
More than an activist, Tourgée was an evangelist for his cause, and he wrote prolifically 
to attempt to persuade southerners and northerners alike to adopt his views on the politics 
of racial equality because he knew that legislation alone would not change behavior. All 
told, Tourgée published fifteen novels (mostly of historical fiction), eight books of 
criticism, and hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles. Persuasion—how to do it, 
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 See Nina Silber‟s The Romance of Reunion (1997) and Amy Kaplan‟s essay “Nation, 
Region, and Empire” in The Columbia History of the American Novel.  
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the difficulty of it—figured prominently as a problem and a promise in Tourgée‟s 
interrelated literary and legal careers.  
 Critics, however, have neglected a full assessment of the role persuasion plays in 
the prescriptions for change outlined in A Fool‟s Errand. Instead, they have focused on 
two other salient elements of Tourgée‟s proposed course of action: recourse to force and 
belief in the power of rational exchange. The central tension in the novel comes from the 
interaction between these elements, which are born from two of the narrator-Fool‟s 
conflicting convictions. First, the narrator suspects that it will take more than reason—a 
miracle, or perhaps, a miracle brought about by force—to change the minds of the 
conservative, power-wielding former slaveholders in the South, as Enos Martin reminds 
Servosse. At the same time, the Fool holds out hope that logical demonstration might 
bring those same southerners around to recognition of their duty toward the freedpeople, 
the “best policy from reasons of self-interest,” as the Philadelphia Inquirer would have it. 
Critics who read A Fool‟s Errand as an expression of Tourgée‟s theories of social change 
have tended to focus on one of these convictions without fully exploring how they 
overlap and influence one another. Alert to the Fool‟s desire for external (if not divine) 
intervention, one group reads A Fool‟s Errand as an endorsement of regional 
imperialism—a kind of humanitarianism by force, without dialogue or persuasion.
42
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 In “Reconstructing Reconstruction: Region and Nation in the Work of Albion 
Tourgée,” Peter Caccavari asserts that “the solution offered in A Fool‟s Errand is to destroy 
regionalism and replace it with nationalism by force, but by an informed force, one which 
understands the natures of both region and nation” (126).  Robert M. Myers, in “„Desirable 
Immigrants‟: The Assimilation of Transplanted Yankees in Page and Tourgée,” explores the 
parallel between foreign colonial endeavors and the North‟s relationship to the South. He finds 
that “Tourgée‟s novel recuperates the colonialist project” and that in the novel “the only hope for 
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Gretchen Short most thoroughly draws out the novel‟s imperialist tendencies in her 
reading of A Fool‟s Errand. Contrasting the novel‟s vision of a “democratic, pluralistic, 
and cooperative” society with its means of getting there, Short finds that both the content 
of Tourgée‟s response to the failure of Reconstruction and the literary form of that 
response result in “indoctrination and exclusion” (243). Though “overtly, A Fool‟s 
Errand endorses the persuasive possibilities of public education and open debate,” Short 
argues, the overwhelming thrust of the novel “is an appeal to imperial control (over 
education and Southern society in general) as a means of forcibly converting the South to 
the ideals of Radical Republicanism” (243).  
A second group makes the case that Tourgée was a “child of the Enlightenment” 
who trusted in the power of appeals to right reason to dismantle the prejudice of 
intransigent white southerners (Thomas, “Tragedies of Race” 771).
43
 Jeffrey W. Miller, 
                                                                                                                                                 
„a nation unified in sentiment and civilization‟ is national education imposed by the North” (73, 
70). However, it is Gretchen Short who takes on the issue of change by force most directly, in her 
essay comparing A Fool‟s Errand with Charles Chesnutt‟s The Marrow of Tradition (1901), as I 
explain. 
 Caccavari‟s, Myers‟s, and Short‟s arguments are consistent with an historical 
interpretation of Reconstruction at the beginning of a history of American attempts “to transform 
a defeated society through a sustained military occupation” that “foreshadow[s] significant parts 
of American foreign policy over the next century and a half,” from the Philippines to Japan, 
Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Ayers par. 3).   
 
43
 This assertion is rife in criticism on Tourgée, in essays dealing both with A Fool‟s 
Errand and other novels. In “Tragedies of Race, Training, Birth, and Communities of Competent 
Pudd‟nheads,” Brook Thomas draws out the implications of Tourgée‟s adherence to 
Enlightenment rationalism by comparing his 1890 novel Pactolus Prime to Pudd‟nhead Wilson 
(1894). Other critics have since followed Thomas‟s lead by extending his characterization of 
Tourgée as Enlightenment rationalist to A Fool‟s Errand. Peter Caccavari, in “A Trick of 
Meditation,” writes that in Fool‟s “Tourgée treats the division of the nation as an intellectual 
problem that to some extent can be solved by rational observation and explanation” (142); Jeffrey 
W. Miller, in “Redemption Through Violence: White Mobs and Black Citizenship in Albion 
Tourgée‟s A Fool‟s Errand,” writes that “Servosse continues to agitate in a calm and reasoned 
manner because he believes that his plain-spoken logic will win out over the somewhat hysterical 
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for instance, asserts that Fool‟s is a dialogue “that compares [Servosse‟s] cool, educated 
reason to the scattered ignorance of the South” (21). Those who observe the influence of 
Enlightenment rationalism on Tourgée‟s thought draw on evidence from the author‟s 
biography and his other novels to make their case.  Even so, the notion that Tourgée 
“believed that by embodying right reason in his fiction he could educate the public and 
eliminate prejudice” has seeped into the conversation surrounding Fool‟s to become an 
unchallenged and under-supported commonplace attended by little to no consideration of 
what “right reason” even meant for Tourgée (Thomas, “Tragedies of Race” 771).   
 We need to do more to understand the relationship between Tourgée‟s 
contradictory impulses toward force and reason. For Tourgée was torn. At once 
committed to rational dialogue and tempted by the surety of force, he also believed that 
humanitarian action has a rhetorical component: persuading others (in this case, former 
slaveholding southerners) of the necessity of change, converting them to a different way 
of seeing and being. Tourgée‟s humanitarianism is rhetorical, his rhetoric humanitarian, 
because the kind of dialogue he endorses begins by recognizing a shared humanity. This 
rhetorical approach to humanitarian change, I will show, in some senses generates 
Tourgée‟s opposing impulses even as it allows him to navigate them. Turning our 
attention to Tourgée‟s use of empathetic persuasion—the effort to alter the point of view 
                                                                                                                                                 
southern ideology of redemption. This subtext of enlightenment weaves throughout the book” 
(21); and, drawing on Tourgée‟s non-fiction, political writing, Bill Hardwig contrasts Tourgée‟s 
faith in “right reason” with what he argues is Charles Chesnutt‟s more sophisticated 
understanding of the relationship between justice, history, race, and prejudice in “Who Owns the 
Whip? Chesnutt, Tourgée, and Reconstruction Justice.” The picture that emerges from Hardwig‟s 
analysis in particular is one of Tourgée as a naïve believer in reason, which, as I argue in this 
essay, was not the case. 
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of one‟s antagonist by first understanding his or hers—provides a way to explore the 
interactions and overlaps between imperialist inclinations and a commitment to rational 
dialogue. Because Tourgée‟s use of empathetic persuasion has heretofore been given 
short shrift, I will devote most of this chapter to an analysis of the way in which Tourgée 
applies empathy in the novel. I will then analyze how the three avenues for change he 
explores (force, reason, and empathetic persuasion) interact. 
 
Empathy, Habit, and Entrenched Ideas 
Reviewers around the country described the anonymously-authored A Fool‟s 
Errand, a best-seller by the day‟s standards,
44
 as a call to action and an exposé of the 
violence of intimidation in the South. When Fords, Howard, & Hulbert printed a second 
edition in 1880, they included four pages of extracts from the reviews, introduced by the 
declaration that “the reception accorded to this anonymous book, both by press and 
public, has been so unusual, and the impression made by the work has been so marked, 
that these facts are worth recording” (1). Most of the praise came from the North, though 
reviewers were hopeful the novel would find an audience in the South as well. As the 
Jackson Citizen, of Michigan, declared, “If this book does not meet with a marvelous 
reception, and awaken profoundest comment North and South, then we will confess a 
total incapability to judge of what can play upon that most incomprehensible pipe, the 
                                                 
 
44
 Otto Olsen puts the number of copies sold at 150,000 (224); Monte Olenick at “close to 
200,000” (334); John Hope Franklin estimates “that the total sales may have finally reached 
200,000” (xxi); and Jeffrey Miller writes that Fool‟s “reached almost one million readers and 
probably accounted for informing more readers about Reconstruction than any other source, at 
least until Thomas Dixon came along” (18). 
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Public” (4). The publishers also included a nervous Raleigh Observer note: “It is a 
powerfully written work, and destined, we fear, to do as much harm in the world as Uncle 
Tom‟s Cabin, to which it is, indeed, a companion piece” (2).  
What kind of “harm in the world” were southern reviewers worried the novel 
would cause?; what sort of “profoundest comment” did northern reviewers anticipate? 
With its depiction of letters, newspapers, and face-to-face encounters, Fool‟s homes in on 
the debate in the 1860s and 70s over the fate of African Americans conducted between 
two pairings of people: Republicans in the South and Republicans in the North, on the 
one hand, and southern Republicans and southern Democrats, on the other. It is a book, in 
other words, that listens closely to a conversation among white people about the future of 
black people.
45
 This is not to say that Tourgée did not appreciate the importance of 
African-American agency. In fact, Tourgée‟s novel Bricks without Straw (1880), 
published just one year after Fool‟s, depicts extensively the black point of view in a way 
that Fool‟s does not, drawing a nuanced portrait of black characters and showing them to 
be powerful actors in their political destinies.
46
 While Peter Schmidt describes the change 
from Fool‟s to Bricks as a “crucial improvement” because in the second novel Tourgée 
“attempted to rethink the role black leaders and their community would play in his 
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 Caccavari observes that in Fool‟s “African Americans serve largely as a backdrop for 
the story which is primarily about how whites attempt to solve the political, cultural, and racial 
divisions of the nation” (“Trick of Meditation” 139). Eric Foner (and W. E. B. Du Bois before 
him) has shown this dynamic to be historically inaccurate: “rather than passive victims of the 
actions of others or simply a „problem‟ confronting white society, blacks were active agents in the 
making of Reconstruction” (xxii). Though Tourgée does portray a meeting of the Union League 
with both black and white Republicans in attendance, Fool‟s does not concern itself primarily 
with depicting this historical reality. 
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 For analyses of Bricks without Straw, see Peter Schmidt, pp. 58-63; Carolyn Karcher; 
and Brook Thomas, Civic Myths, pp. 158-63.  
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narrative,” I would submit that Tourgée‟s shift from white to black agency does not 
indicate a change of heart, but rather a change of focus (60). Tourgée‟s chief concern in 
Fool‟s is to analyze the problem of inter-regional (mis)understanding by attempting to 
work out the relationships among force, reason, and persuasion in getting white, 
property-holding southerners—former slaveholders
47
—to see anew.  
The novel—part historical romance, part political tract
48
—combines plot-driven, 
high-drama chapters with non-narrative elements (letters, charts, essays, and newspaper 
articles, all drawn from Tourgée‟s own experience) that meditate on the dilemma of 
promoting a progressive racial politics during Reconstruction. In Fool‟s a former Union 
colonel, Comfort Servosse, relocates to North Carolina with his family. His aim is to do 
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 In writing A Fool‟s Errand, Tourgée‟s intended audience was largely northern, 
Republican whites whom he wanted to enlighten as to why their attempts at reconciliation with 
the former Confederacy resulted in the abandonment of the cause of political justice for the 
freedpeople. Servosse‟s audience, however, is more divided than that. Though he does address 
letters to northern lawmakers, he also, for much of the book, addresses himself to former 
slaveholders in the South. Servosse‟s concern is twofold: to demonstrate to northerners that their 
approach was flawed and to persuade southern whites to reconsider their relationship to the 
blacks in their midst. “Southern whites,” of course, were not a homogenous group. For instance, 
at a meeting of the Union League Servosse meets Durfree, a white man who “belonged to a 
family of the strongest Union proclivities, who had faced far more danger in resisting and 
avoiding conscription than he would have been required to meet in the field,” and John Walters, a 
small businessman and Unionist whose staunch advocacy of the franchise for freedpeople 
provokes his irate neighbors to lynch him (121). It is not men like these, clearly, at whom 
Servosse‟s powers of persuasion are targeted, but rather the aristocratic class of whites, a 
powerful minority in the South, who used to own slaves and who, in the 1870s, vehemently and 
violently sought to prevent the legislative changes of Reconstruction from becoming a lived 
reality. 
48
 The novel‟s unconventional form has drawn critical attacks from both those who fault 
Tourgée for his “flagrantly and luxuriantly romantic plot” and those who argue, in contrast, that 
“his fictions are fundamentally political tracts, and any analysis of them must be firmly based on 
the knowledge that they are significant as social criticism and not literary art” (Becker 61, Gross 
113). For appraisals of Fool‟s that find fault with the novel on aesthetic grounds (deriding either 
its romanticism or its didactisim), see George Becker, Ted Weissbuch, Theodore Gross, Otto 
Olsen, and Gretchen Short. 
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business while pursuing racial reform and inter-regional communication in an area beset 
by the same racial and political problems that roiled communities all over the South 
during Reconstruction.
49
 Even though Tourgée‟s novel ends with a North-South marriage 
(between Colonel Servosse‟s headstrong daughter, Lily, and the son of an aristocratic 
southern family, Melville Gurney), a common trope of regional reconciliation in post-
Civil War literature, the bulk of the novel emphasizes the obstacles, mostly in the form of 
political intimidation and violence, that Servosse is up against. Sometimes the 
intimidation is physical: upon leaving a meeting at which he expresses the view that 
black suffrage is inevitable, Servosse, riding on horseback, happens upon (and thereby 
avoids) a trap laid for him by angry members of the audience. At other times, the 
intimidation is social, as when Servosse and his wife are shunned because they invite a 
group of white, northern teachers who work at Freedmen‟s Bureau schools to join them 
for Thanksgiving dinner. Later in the novel, when Servosse becomes a critic of the Klan 
and its brutality, he too is persecuted by it. The book is a story of the failure of 
Reconstruction told through the experiences of a carpetbagging family. It is also a post-
mortem of the period, analyzing the decision-making dynamics, ingrained prejudices, and 
communicative breakdowns that led to a failure to secure the rights of African Americans 
after the Civil War. 
That the novel lends itself to contradictory readings of what Tourgée concludes 
from that analysis speaks to the paradoxes generated by the collision of Tourgée‟s 
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 The novel never specifies where, exactly, the action occurs. Tourgée spent his time in 
the South in Greensboro, North Carolina, however. 
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commitment to justice with his keen sense of empathy. Empathy—identification with the 
other in order to understand his/her point of view—can, as Saidiya Hartman reminds us, 
slide easily into objectification. When a humanitarian actor identifies with the object of 
her sympathy, as for instance Harriet Beecher Stowe invites mothers to do in Uncle 
Tom‟s Cabin (“If it were your Harry, mother, or your Willie, that were going to be torn 
from you by a brutal trader, tomorrow morning . . . how fast could you walk?”), she is 
likely to erase difference, to co-opt the suffering of the other (105). Hartman calls this 
“narcissistic identification” (4). To be sure, those concerned with the interplay between 
literature, ethics, and humanitarianism would do well to remain alert to Hartman‟s 
admonition. It is an admonition Howells‟s Annie Kilburn could have benefited from. 
Annie, for a brief period of time, finds her humanitarian calling in sponsoring trips to the 
seaside for ailing children of the Hatboro‟ mill workers. When one child fails to be 
rehabilitated by the sea air and dies, Annie takes responsibility: “I‟ve killed the child!” 
(749). The child‟s death was not Annie‟s fault, which she comes to realize as the novel 
progresses. More significantly, she also comes to realize that her investment in that child 
and her empathy with the family were selfish: “I did feel remorseful toward Mrs. Savor 
for a while, but I didn‟t love her, and I knew that I only pitied myself through her” (819). 
Her outreach to and empathy with the Savor family were motivated by a need to create 
and constitute herself, the “narcissistic identification” Hartman describes.  
Tourgée‟s use of empathetic persuasion, however, is distinct from Hartman‟s 
model. For one thing, Tourgée is struggling to identify with, or understand, the point of 
view of former slaveholders. These men, while different from Tourgée/Servosse in a 
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variety of ways, are not the racial or ethnic other whose selfhood is at risk of being 
obliterated by the humanitarian actor‟s identification with them. Furthermore, both 
Tourgée and Servosse use empathy not to stand in solidarity with suffering subjects, as 
Annie tried to do with the Savor family, but to engage in dialogue with agonistic partners. 
The parallel to Howells‟s novel would be if Annie had tried to empathetically identify 
with mill owners in an attempt to persuade them to treat their workers differently. If 
empathy traditionally functions as “I am you,” as the title of Karl Morrison‟s study of 
empathy in western literature suggests, Tourgée‟s use of empathy takes the construct one 
step further: his empathy goes beyond “I am you” to “I am not you—but I could have 
been.” In other words, in seeking to understand the origins of his antagonist‟s way of 
thinking, Tourgée identifies with former slaveholding southerners to the extent that he 
can see that he very likely would have been them had he been raised in similar 
circumstances. Tourgée‟s empathy, then, relies on recognition of profound difference and 
its contingency.  
While this realization underscores commonalities between the two groups, it also 
drives home the insurmountable divide that culture and history have gouged between 
them. Anticipating by some years a public conversation among his era‟s social scientists 
about what role human beings can have in instigating change, Tourgée understood just 
how deeply culture, habit, and history shape belief and inhibit it. As William James 
would observe,  
The currents [into the brain], once in, must find a way out. In getting out they 
leave their traces in the paths which they take. The only thing they can do, in 
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short, is to deepen old paths or to make new ones; and the whole plasticity of the 
brain sums itself up in two words when we call it an organ in which currents 
pouring in from the sense organs make with extreme facility paths which do not 
easily disappear. (Psychology 112)
 
 
James extended the neurological insight that making new paths is much harder than 
following old ones to human behavior, asserting “that any sequence of mental action 
which has been frequently repeated, tends to perpetuate itself; so that we find ourselves 
automatically prompted to think, feel, or do what we have been before accustomed to 
think, feel, or do” (Psychology 116). James‟s exploration of habit lacked a systemic 
social application of his insights; it would take the combination of ideas like James‟s with 
Spencerian Social Darwinism for William Graham Sumner to articulate his sociological 
theories in Folkways (1907), which uses a line from Castiglione‟s Book of the Courtier as 
its epigraph: “Thus it is clearly seen that use, rather than reason, has power to introduce 
new things amongst us, and to do away with old things.”
50
 Pursuant to those lines from 
the Renaissance, Sumner explored the role that social norms—what he calls 
“folkways”—have in preserving the status quo, and he questioned the role reason plays in 
change, just as Tourgée did twenty-eight years earlier. Even as James and Sumner 
expostulated on the restraining power of personal habit and social norms, however, Lester 
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 Sumner wasn‟t much of a reformer. In 1894 he published an essay titled “The Absurd 
Effort to Make the World Over,” which pretty much summed up his view on humanitarian action 
and reform. Even so, his insight into the power of use over reason to change point of view has 
been rearticulated by recent philosophers. For instance, in Cosmopolitanism (especially pp. 72-8) 
Appiah argues that “the reasons we exchange in our conversations will seldom do much to 
persuade others who do not share our fundamental evaluative judgments already” (72); he puts 
the power of “a gradually acquired new way of seeing things” above the power of a well-
articulated argument (73).  
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Frank Ward decried their pessimism and caricatured the despair of Sumner and other 
laissez-faire sociologists in his essay “Mind as a Social Factor” (1884). For them, he 
wrote, “philanthropy is zeal without knowledge, while humanitarianism is fanaticism” 
(565). Ward thought otherwise. He saw a role for human creativity and compassion in 
developing institutions that would contribute to social progress, and he understood the 
impulse to do so as specifically human: “All of these altruistic sentiments [equity, 
beneficence, and benevolence] are wholly unknown, or known only in the merest 
embryo, to all animals below man, and therefore no such means of protection exist 
among them. They are strictly human, or anthropic” (570). Ward endorsed a “philosophy 
of action” in contrast to what he saw as a philosophy of apathy (573).  
While in the classrooms of Harvard, Yale, and Brown, where they taught, James, 
Sumner, and Ward developed the ideas that would form the arguments of their major 
books, Tourgée used fiction to illuminate the options for change available to two regions 
with such profoundly different notions of justice and duty. Like Ward, Tourgée endorsed 
a philosophy of action, but his novel demonstrates that Tourgée understood, as James did, 
that habit is “the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent” 
(James, Psychology 125). Tourgée‟s diagnosis—what I term his “entrenched ideas 
thesis”—anticipates James‟s by applying a similar insight to Reconstruction. The claims 
of his entrenched ideas thesis are as follows: after the Civil War, the North and the white 
South could not see eye to eye on the humanitarian issue of social, economic, and 
political justice for African Americans because they were two vastly different nations 
within a nation, and their widely divergent (though intertwined) histories made 
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communication nigh impossible. As Metta Servosse, the protagonist‟s wife, puts it: “We 
are so different, have been reared under such different influences, and have such different 
thoughts, that it does not seem as if we should ever get nearer to them” (101). While a 
popular discourse of reunion worked to dismantle this sense of two nations within a 
nation, Tourgée attempted to reinforce it, for the nation could move forward, he believed, 
only after recognizing and remedying, not denying, the divisions within. By my count, 
the basic contours of the entrenched ideas thesis are explicitly voiced nine times in the 
novel—by the narrator, by Colonel Servosse, Metta Servosse, and by various minor 
characters. At the end of the book Servosse explains his understanding of the problem of 
Reconstruction to Enos Martin. This articulation of the novel‟s argument contains most 
of the recurring premises of the thesis, and it is more or less representative of it. Servosse 
says, 
The North and the South are simply convenient names for two distinct, hostile, 
and irreconcilable ideas,—two civilizations they are sometimes called, especially 
at the South. At the North there is somewhat more of intellectual arrogance; and 
we are apt to speak of the one as civilization, and of the other as a species of 
barbarism. These two  must always be in conflict until the one prevails, and the 
other falls. To uproot the one, and plant the other in its stead, is not the work of a 
moment or a day. That was our mistake. We tried to superimpose the civilization, 
the idea of the North, upon the South at a moment‟s warning. We presumed that, 
by the suppression of rebellion, the Southern white man had become identical 
with the Caucasian of the North in thought and sentiment; and that the slave, by 
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emancipation, had become a saint and a Solomon at  once. So we tried to build up 
communities there which should be identical in thought, sentiment, growth, and 
development, with those of the North. It was A FOOL‟S ERRAND. (381)   
Drawing from this passage and others like it, three premises of Tourgée‟s argument 
become apparent. First, the North and the South are two separate civilizations; this word, 
“civilization,” is used over and over to emphasize the differences distinguishing the two 
regions. Second, individuals are shaped by the civilization, or culture,
51
 into which they 
are born, and these early influences limit their ability to empathize with others. As a 
minor character remarks to the Colonel, “You can not understand why they [southern 
“Regulators,” predecessors of the Klan] should feel so, because you were never submitted 
to the same influences” (109). And third, the thesis conveys despair at the possibility of 
change so long as dialogue between regions is forestalled by the power and practice of 
habit.  
As an example of the way Tourgée applies the claims of his thesis to the plot of 
Fool‟s, take this early scene in which the author anatomizes differences in conviction 
between southern aristocratic women and Freedmen‟s Bureau teachers: 
[The teachers], no doubt, thought they were doing God‟s service, and wondered 
why the earnest Christians who dwelt about them should regard the inhabitants of 
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 Drawing on Brad Evans‟s work in Before Cultures (2005), I would argue that Tourgée 
understands the differences between North and South to be what we would call “cultural” 
differences, even though the word he uses repeatedly to describe the gulf between North and 
South is “civilization.” As Evans argues, the term “culture” would not have been available to 
Tourgée. Using examples as various as the World Fair, Boas‟s museum exhibits, local color 
writing, and Howells‟s novels, Evans shows that before the word “culture” came into use in its 
anthropological sense (which happened around 1910), the concept of culture as a way of 
understanding and categorizing difference circulated at the end of the nineteenth century.  
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the Mission House with such open aversion and apparent hate. . . . They wondered 
at it for a time, and then blamed the good people of Verdenton, and thought ill of 
their religion; when it was not the good people who were at fault, nor their 
religion, but only the civilization of which they were the outcome. There was 
never a kindlier, more hospitable, or more religious people on the footstool, than 
those of Verdenton; only they were kind according to their notion, as everybody 
else is; hospitable according to custom, like the rest of the world; and religious 
according to education and tradition, as are other people; and the disjointure of 
opinion between them and the Yankee schoolmarms was all because the latter 
wanted to measure them by Northern ideas of these virtues, instead of accepting 
those they found there. . . . So they went on teaching, as they had been taught, 
those who had been all their lives thitherto untaught; and the others went on 
hating and defaming them because such a course was counter to their traditions, 
and those who did it were their hereditary enemies. And both, no doubt, felt that 
they were doing God‟s service with all their might. (119-120) 
Here and throughout Fool‟s, Tourgée is intent on showing how entrenched ideas breed 
“hereditary enemies” who seem to be unable to reconcile their differing points of view, or 
even, in this case, to understand them. 
 
Tourgée as Proto-Rogerian  
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Though several scholars have duly acknowledged Tourgée‟s emphasis on the 
power of entrenched ideas,
52
  the question of how the novel itself, with both its content 
and its form, attempts to overcome the obstacle that Servosse identifies in the passage 
quoted above remains to be investigated. It is here that empathy becomes essential. I 
would like to suggest that, in thrall to the three rather bleak premises of his entrenched 
ideas thesis, Tourgée uses his novel to try to work toward inter-regional dialogue he 
worries might be impossible. So, in contrast to Howells‟s novels, which stage the 
development of the humanitarian self in their pages but are not pointed entrees into a 
specific rhetorical situation, Tourgée‟s book is, in and of itself, a rhetorical humanitarian 
effort aimed at those who disagree with him. It is a response to the very particular 
problem of what to do after the failure of Reconstruction. Tourgée theorizes how inter-
regional dialogue might work in the non-narrative sections of the novel. He then carries it 
out in the romance sections. Take, for instance, the non-narrative chapter in which the 
narrator sets out to show the differences in thought and sentiment separating the North 
and the South. Using a table to assume an all-seeing, omniscient posture, the narrator 
breaks down assumptions on both sides of the Mason-Dixon, riffing one region‟s 
impressions off the other‟s: 
 ANTE BELLUM. 
 NORTHERN IDEA OF SLAVERY. 
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 John Hope Franklin, Monte Olenick, Edmund Wilson, Robert Sommer, Peter 
Caccavari‟s “A Trick of Meditation,” and Robert Myers all note that in Tourgée‟s estimation, 
“the North and South were virtually two different countries,” but none thoroughly pursues that 
observation (Wilson 540). 
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Slavery is wrong morally, politically, and economically. It is tolerated only for the 
sake of peace and quiet. The negro is a man, and has equal inherent rights with the 
white race. 
 SOUTHERN IDEA OF SLAVERY. 
The negro is fit only for slavery. It is sanctioned by the Bible, and it must be right; 
or, if not exactly right, is unavoidable, now that the race is among us. We can not 
live with them in any other condition. 
 NORTHERN IDEA OF THE SOUTHERN IDEA. 
Those Southern fellows know that slavery is wrong, and incompatible with the 
theory of our government; but it is a good thing for them. They grow fat and rich, 
and have a good time, on account of it; and no one can blame them for not 
wanting to give it up. 
 SOUTHERN IDEA OF THE NORTHERN IDEA. 
Those Yankees are jealous because we make slavery profitable, raising cotton and 
tobacco, and want to deprive us of our slaves from envy. They don‟t believe a 
word of what they say about its being wrong, except a few fanatics. The rest are 
all hypocrites. (138) 
The problem with communication between the white North and South, Tourgée asserts, is 
that while they “thought they comprehended each other‟s ideas,” “they no more 
understood or appreciated each other‟s feelings or development than John Chinaman 
comprehends the civilization of John Bull” (137).  
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The table spelling out the caricatured point of view of each region drives home 
the gulf in understanding that the entrenched ideas thesis identifies. In his analysis of the 
table, Tourgée virtually racializes the differences between the North and the South (John 
Chinaman v. John Bull)—quite the opposite of what most reunion discourse, which 
underscored regional commonalities, attempted. But, significantly, Tourgée does not stop 
with merely drawing attention to a gulf between regions; he also tries to bridge it. After 
constructing his table, the narrator acts as an arbiter between the two regions as he stands 
back to deliver what he sees as the truth of the situation by showing readers where the 
North and South fell short in their assessments of each other. In so doing he attempts a 
partiality that does not minimize the sentiments of either side: “The South, as a mass, was 
honest in its belief of the righteousness of slavery, both morally and politically. The 
North, in like manner, was equally honest in its conviction with regard to the wickedness 
of slavery, and its inconsistency with republican institutions; yet neither credited the 
other with honesty” (139-40).  
Crediting both sides with honesty is what Tourgée is after, and the method of 
communication he demonstrates and proposes is instructive. Fool‟s argues that structural 
change only works when accompanied by a change in perspective. Though Radical 
Reconstruction wrought structural, legislative, and constitutional changes on the political 
culture of the nation, the aristocratic ruling class in the South was able to resist the 
implementation and realization of those changes both during and after Reconstruction. 
And when, in 1877, the North agreed that its troops would cease interfering with affairs 
in the South and that southern self-rule would be fully restored, even the struggle to make 
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sure the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments were adhered to was abandoned. 
In Fool‟s Tourgée argues that the failure of Reconstruction was due to ignorance of just 
how great the divergence between white northern and southern points of view on the 
future of their nation and the fate of the freedmen was; the Reconstruction plan the North 
pursued “took no account of . . . the popular feeling in regard to the African population of 
that section” (133-34). The inclusion and analysis of the “northern idea/southern idea” 
table suggests that recognizing the North and South to be two separate civilizations is not 
a dead end but a starting point, an invitation to further communication and understanding.  
Servosse himself exhibits such understanding throughout Fool‟s, for even as he 
vociferously disagrees with the politics of his aristocratic neighbors, he sympathizes with 
their plight. Living in their midst for fourteen years, Tourgée attempted to see the 
hardship of the Civil War and Reconstruction from a southern point of view. A 
contemporary of Tourgée‟s, writing in the Boston Daily Advertiser, judged him 
successful in this capacity, noting that the book “shows the good as well as the bad side 
of the South . . . the almost insuperable disadvantages under which they were placed, the 
cruel necessities to which they felt themselves driven, and the masterly strength 
exhibited” (Eliot par. 6). With his lengthy description of the landscape of Reconstruction 
North Carolina in Fool‟s, Tourgée makes it clear that he feels his neighbor‟s pain. In the 
passage, the narrator mourns alongside the southerner, bemoaning the fact that “sadness 
and gloom covered the face of the land. . . . time and the scath of war had wrought ruin in 
his home” (129). In another surprising passage, the narrator compares the Ku Klux 
Klan‟s activities with John Brown‟s raid on Harper‟s Ferry; both, he writes, represent the 
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astonishing power and bravery that it takes to contemplate and enact acts of violence 
motivated by idealism. “In any case,” the narrator observes, “it [KKK raids] must be 
counted but as the desperate effort of a proud, brave, and determined people to secure and 
hold what they deemed to be their rights” (254). These white southerners saw such 
violence as necessary, Tourgée asserts, because they “felt themselves insulted and 
oppressed. No matter whether they were or not, be the fact one way or another, it does 
not affect their conduct” (253).  
Tourgée recognized that changing someone‟s point of view—which Servosse 
attempts by speaking out in his community and running for a seat at the constitutional 
convention and which Tourgée attempted throughout his career—must begin with 
empathizing with that point of view. And empathizing with someone‟s point of view rests 
on the assumption of shared humanity. One of Tourgée‟s biographers admired this 
quality in him:  
Convinced of the essential goodness of people, Tourgée sought the origins and 
esteemed the sincerity of beliefs that he himself abhorred. He presented the clash 
between North and South as a clash between good and bad values, but not as one 
between good and evil men. Honorable men on each side were following the 
dictates of a conscience imposed by their respective societies, and Tourgée, while 
urging particular values, also sought to encourage mutual tolerance and 
understanding. (Olsen 227) 
At once refusing to cede ground on the crucial issue of social justice for African 
Americans and identifying with, instead of demonizing, those who did not share his 
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views, Tourgée opens up what Kenneth Burke calls “the characteristic invitation to 
rhetoric,” where identification and division are put “ambiguously together” (25).  A 
gifted speaker and communicator, Servosse takes it upon himself to narrow the gap 
between the northern and southern perspective on African-American rights, and he 
diagnoses the South‟s obstinate resistance to change as a rhetorical problem: “You deem 
disagreement an insult, and opposition a crime” (96). According to Servosse, southerners 
reject dialogue.
53
 The question becomes, then, how to initiate it despite such resistance.  
 As a student at the University of Rochester, Tourgée studied “literature, logic, and 
rhetoric (three subjects which he enjoyed and excelled in),” and it is likely that his 
exposure to rhetorical theory shaped his convictions that appeals to right reason cannot be 
voiced apart from the circumstance of one‟s lived experience, that persuasion must 
appeal to passion, and that identification is crucial to rhetorical success (Olsen 9). The 
most widely-used rhetoric textbook in colleges up until the Civil War, Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belle Lettres (1783), was written by Hugh Blair, a figure in the Scottish 
Enlightenment.
54
 Like both Cicero and Edmund Burke, upon whose ideas he drew, Blair 
was aware of the role that engrained ideas and circumstance play in human decision-
making. Often taught alongside Blair‟s volume was George Campbell‟s Philosophy of 
Rhetoric (1776), which applied the insights of Scottish Common Sense Realism to 
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 In her recent book Fanatical Schemes (2009), Patricia Roberts-Miller analyzes pro-
slavery rhetoric in the 1830s and finds that slavers did in fact put forth “relentless efforts to 
suppress dissent” and “silence reasonable discussion of abolitionists‟ claims” (31). Tourgée‟s 
novel is set thirty to forty years after the objects of Roberts-Miller‟s analysis were written, but 
Servosse recalls the rhetorical blackout she describes when he reflects upon the violence of war 
and the difficulty of enacting Reconstruction programs of racial justice. 
54
 See Gregory Clark and Michael Halloran, p. 15, and James Berlin, p. 25.  
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rhetorical theory. Campbell insisted that appeals to the emotions are central to persuasion, 
and “this emphasis on emotion makes sympathy, the identification of speaker and auditor, 
an important part of rhetoric” (Berlin 23). Fool‟s certainly reflects the influence of Blair‟s 
and Campbell‟s emphases on the importance of emotion and circumstance to persuasion. 
Even so, some scholars who draw attention to Servosse‟s rationality seem to assert that 
Tourgée‟s protagonist finds a way to rise above the fray of cultural conflict, as Miller‟s 
reference to Servosse‟s “cool, educated reason” and “plain-spoken logic” as opposed to 
“the somewhat hysterical southern ideology of redemption” suggests (21). In fact, 
Tourgée was neither cool nor detached. As Brook Thomas demonstrates, Tourgée 
believed fierce partisanship to be the duty of the citizen (Civic Myths 161-3). The key to 
understanding Tourgée‟s take on right reason and Enlightenment rationality rests not in 
divorcing rationality from passion and emotion, but on understanding how Tourgée saw 
them to be united, just as the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment who influenced him 
did. 
 Tourgée‟s prescription for change through empathy, therefore, weds reason and 
emotion. In this it resembles twentieth-century Rogerian argument, a rhetorical approach 
developed from psychologist Carl Rogers‟s research on communication.
55
 Disagreement 
and resistance to reason, Rogers believed, comes out of a sense of threat, for threat shuts 
down discourse and keeps both speaker and listener from considering alternatives. 
Removing that sense of threat is crucial to true communication, and the way to remove it 
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 Richard E. Young, Alton L. Becker, and Kenneth L. Pike introduced Rogers‟s theories 
of communication to rhetorical theory when they included a chapter on Rogers in Rhetoric: 
Discovery and Change (1970). 
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is through empathy. The speaker, or writer, must make the listener, or reader, feel that he 
is understood and “induce him to believe that he and the writer share similar moral 
qualities” (Young et al. 275). This kind of understanding goes beyond the purely 
intellectual, entering into the territory of imagination—“seeing the world through his 
eyes,” just as Tourgée does in his North/South table or when he ventriloquizes the 
perspective of the aristocratic women who scorn the northern teachers (Young et al. 275). 
If such understanding is successful, it diminishes the offensive/defensive positions in 
argument that keep people from listening to one another. The first step in Rogerian 
argument is to get the listener or reader to feel that her point of view has been 
acknowledged and understood. The second is to delineate an area of validity, that is, a 
context in which the listener‟s beliefs are true. For instance, in the table laying out 
northern and southern views on slavery, Tourgée suggests that if one believes the Bible is 
the word of God, and if one reads the Bible as sanctioning slavery, then Christianity 
would be an area of validity, a context in which his interlocutors‟ beliefs were true. 
(Areas of validity serve as starting points that can later be revised or even dismantled as 
discussion progresses.) Such concessions help the writer or speaker begin to “either build 
or discover bridges” that create the conditions of trust necessary for real argument and 
communication (Young et al. 280). In these ways, Fool‟s is a kind of proto-Rogerian 
argument aimed at recalcitrant white southerners. If we look at the novel in this light, we 
can understand Tourgée‟s sympathy with former slaveholders and his attempt to toggle 
between northern and southern perspectives as a way of convincing his imagined 
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audience—both northern and southern readers—that he understands the context of their 
complaints. 
 
Romance, Not Realism  
Furthermore, thinking of Fool‟s as an empathetic gesture offers a new perspective 
on Tourgée‟s use of romance, a choice widely decried both when the novel was published 
and since. Tourgée was a vocal critic of literary realism. Interestingly, his critique turned 
the realists‟ own terms against them by calling into question their claims to represent 
reality. “The „realists‟ profess to be truth-tellers, but are in fact the worst of falsifiers” 
because they, in “failing to appreciate the moral grandeur of that underlying idea of 
devotion to duty,” were not reflecting “reality” (Tourgée “The South as a Field for 
Fiction” 411, “Study in Civilization” 250). They were, instead, constructing a certain 
kind of reality, one in which it is rare that “characters have any feeling beyond a self-
conscious sensibility which seems to give them a deal of trouble without ever ripening 
into motive or resulting in achievement” (Tourgée “South as a Field” 408). Tourgée made 
this observation in 1888, the year that Annie Kilburn was published. His reference to 
realist characters‟ “self-conscious sensibility” aptly describes Howells‟s striver, though 
his finding that such a sensibility “give[s] them a great deal of trouble without ever . . . 
resulting in achievement” discounts the connections between self-awareness and 
humanitarian efficacy that I have been arguing for.   
Tourgée was intent on emphasizing the discontinuities between realism and his 
own writing, whereas I have been pursuing the claim that both Howells‟s and Tourgée‟s 
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novels investigate the important overlap between selfhood and humanitarian change. 
Tourgée felt that something other than realism was called for in order to tell the “true” 
story of the South. To his mind, “southern life . . . is earnest, intense, full of action, and 
careless to a remarkable degree of the trivialities which both [Henry James and William 
Dean Howells] esteem the most important features of real life” (“South as a Field” 406). 
Everett Carter counts Tourgée among the early realists because, like John De Forest, 
Tourgée “made telling the truth, as [he] saw it, about the Civil War and its aftermath a 
central motive for [his] fiction” (77). Carter calls Fool‟s “an attempt to set the record of 
Reconstruction right,” and that it was (80). To agree with Carter on this point is not to 
concede that Tourgée was a realist, though; Tourgée very much wanted to “set the record 
of Reconstruction right,” but he was also convinced that realism was not the way to do it. 
In his mind, the realists were cynics. He described them as writers who “ridicul[e . . . ] all 
sentiment and sneer[. . . ] at every phase of the heroic” (Tourgée “Study in Civilization” 
250). Tourgée sounds a note that critic Kenneth Warren echoes and refines. Warren 
argues that realism “assisted in the creation of a climate of opinion that undermined the 
North‟s capacity to resist Southern arguments against political equality for African 
Americans during the 1880s and 1890s” in part because realists embraced an “aesthetic 
that acknowledged its inability to represent the needs of oppressed and debased peoples 
on the American scene, particularly African Americans” (13, 65). As we have seen, 
Howells was not equally adept at telling a story from the point of view of someone unlike 
him (e.g., Lemuel Barker, the farm boy) as he was at telling a story from the point of 
view of a middle-class liberal. But neither Warren nor Tourgée acknowledges the case I 
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tried to make in Chapter One, namely, that realists such as Howells made a contribution 
to humanitarian causes by telling the kind of story they were best poised to tell: the story 
of the exploration and construction of humanitarian selves. Warren‟s criticism, 
specifically, posits a connection between the genre of realism and the betrayal of political 
radicalism.  
Tourgée, in contrast, insists that politics is distinct from genre, that genre can be 
harnessed to various political ends. Therein lies his hope that novels like his might make 
a difference; he never acknowledges the possibility that novels like Annie Kilburn 
might.
56
 In his 1888 essay “The South as a Field for Fiction,” Tourgée observes that 
American literature has become “distinctly Confederate in sympathy”; the heroes that 
capture the popular imagination are those of the “War of Rebellion” (405, 407). 
Tourgée‟s observation was prescient, anticipating a subset of plantation school fiction 
that served the cause of Confederate nationalism—from Augusta Jane Evans‟s Macaria 
(1864), to Thomas Dixon‟s The Leopard‟s Spots (1902) and The Clansman (1905), up 
through Margaret Mitchell‟s Gone with the Wind (1937). Novels like these would help to 
build and promote the civil religion of the Confederacy, the story of a region wounded 
and humiliated, but still proud, noble, and brave. “The South as a Field for Fiction” 
warned the politically progressive that southern writers with values very different from 
theirs had begun to mine the South for romance and heroism. Tourgée wanted to counter 
                                                 
56
 The struggle Tourgée to which committed his professional life was not the struggle 
Howells engaged in. Though both where, in my schema, humanitarians, Tourgée took on the 
issue of racial justice full bore, whereas Howells‟s concerns were more wide-ranging (issues of 
class, labor, and, as we have seen, humanitarian selfhood). Howells deals with race specifically in 
his 1891 passing novel An Imperative Duty, but one cannot put his efforts to contend with racial 
injustice in the same category as Tourgée‟s. 
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that trend by telling stories of heroism from a different perspective. He saw the South as a 
fecund field for fiction because the battle in which he was invested—the fight for 
freedmen to secure political and social equality—was filled with as much pathos, glory, 
and heroism as the Confederate lost cause. So, the garb he gave to his progressive ideas 
was that same garb a group of southern writers gave (and would give) to their 
conservative ones. The romance of Tourgée‟s plot, with its emphasis on nobility and its 
inclusion of moonlit pursuits on horseback and other acts of daring, dresses up Tourgée‟s 
thesis in dramatic, appealing raiment. 
What if we were to view the romantic, plot-driven sections of the novel not as 
aesthetic failure but instead as rhetorical triumph, one step toward the empathy that the 
non-narrative sections argue is crucial for change? Doing so offers a new perspective on 
the novel‟s form that generates appreciation for Tourgée‟s rhetorical skill. Witting or not, 
the choice to tell the story of a carpetbagging family as romance was also the choice to 
communicate with southerners in a form in which they were already invested. With 
values like nobility, love, and bravery undergirding the plot, Tourgée‟s novel was an 
appeal to southern readers who vigorously promoted the same values, albeit toward a 
different end. Tourgée sought to channel those impulses in another direction so that they 
would bolster the goal of ensuring equal social, economic, and political rights for African 
Americans. I would like to suggest that the plot-driven sections of his novel are 
Tourgée‟s formal attempt to communicate to a southern reading audience in their own 
language, one way in which Tourgée carries out the proto-Rogerian theoretical 




Empathy and Stagnancy 
 Reviewers at the time both noted and extolled the book‟s empathetic overtures, 
recognizing the potential for positive change in the stance theorized in the polemical 
portions of the novel and borne out by the plot, which painted the South in a sympathetic 
light. One wrote, “The author possesses the ability to put himself in the place of the 
characters representing the opposing factions, and from the stand-point of each, holding 
the other to account for the wrong admitted by both to have been done”; another, “With 
personal knowledge of the evil and the good of both North and South, the author teaches 
each side much of the other‟s way of looking at things” (Philadelphia Times and New 
Haven Journal and Courier qtd. in Fool‟s 1880 3). These reviewers recognized not only 
Tourgée‟s contribution to the effort to get southerners to “look at this matter aright,” but 
also his complementary contribution: “teach[ing] each side much of the other‟s way of 
looking at things” (“From the South,” New Haven Journal and Courier). They 
recognized, in other words, that for Tourgée, in order to foster true dialogue, 
collaboration, and real progress toward justice, seeing differently had to happen both 
south and north of the Mason-Dixon.  
As we have seen, however, Tourgée recognized that in getting people to see 
things in a new way, one must contend with the power of ideas entrenched by history, 
culture, tradition, and circumstance. On the one hand Tourgée‟s insight about the power 
of entrenched ideas makes him profoundly compassionate toward those with whom he 
disagrees, for he is aware that different circumstances would have ingrained different 
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beliefs in his own moral schema. On the other, that same insight can lead to defeatist 
determinism, for if individuals are solely a product of history and culture, then beliefs 
might very well be intractable, impervious to reason. Tourgée floats this dismaying 
possibility in one of the novel‟s early scenes. In it, Squire Hyman, Servosse‟s neighbor, 
browses in the Colonel‟s library. Noticing the “abolition books” tucked away discreetly 
on the top shelf, he asks Metta whether he can borrow one. After he reads the book, 
Hyman, delighted to learn about and consider another point of view, returns to discuss it 
with Servosse. “It‟s a thousand pities we couldn‟t have talked these things over, and have 
come to the right understanding of them without this terrible war,” he declares to the 
Colonel (90). This scene prompts critic Jeffrey Miller to declare that in the novel, 
“language carries immense power to alter the world”; the Servosses‟ library “clearly” 
“has the ability to enlighten and transform as well as inform” (22). This is the hope 
Howells (as well as Appiah and Rorty) had for fiction. But just as soon as the novel holds 
out literature and the “right understanding” it can bring as remedies to the nation‟s 
problems (a solution to which Miller‟s reading draws attention), Tourgée denies that 
possibility by adding the Colonel‟s stern correction: “That was quite impossible, Squire . 
. . . We could never have agreed. I have learned enough of the former state of affairs here 
already to see that. Each party distrusted the other‟s sincerity, and despised the other‟s 
knowledge” (90). Identifying empathetically with his southern antagonists, Servosse 
argues that mutual distrust and rigid adherence to beliefs will always be impediments to 
communication and rational discourse, and though the possibility remains for an ideal 
situation that would enable both communication and rational discourse, the situation is 
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unlikely and distant because of all the history in the way. In this way empathy and the 
understanding it brings actually work to erode Tourgée‟s faith in the power of rational 
exchange, thus opening up the possibility of using force to change things, whether the 
South likes it or not. 
Indeed, both Tourgée and his protagonist expressed frustration with the North‟s 
inability to ensure the survival of Reconstruction reforms. Servosse voices this view in a 
letter to his mentor, Enos Martin. Southerners would have made better conquerors, 
Servosse believes, for they “are born rulers,” whereas the North “hesitates, palters, 
shirks” (171). “I begin seriously to fear that the North lacks virility,” Servosse writes. 
“This cowardly shirking of responsibility, this pandering to sentimental whimsicalities, 
this snuffling whine about peace and conciliation, is sheer weakness” (171). By the end 
of the novel, Servosse concludes that the universal education necessary to provide the 
groundwork for sweeping social change must be “an act of sovereignty, an exercise of 
power” (389); “the remedy . . . must be applied from the outside. The sick man can not 
cure himself” (386). Passages like these provide fodder for readings of the book‟s 
endorsement of humanitarianism by force, and these readings are borne out by some of 
Tourgée‟s own writing. In an effort to frighten his readers into adopting a program of 
racial equality, in Is Liberty Worth Preserving? (1892) Tourgée wrote that “cities may be 
burned, railroads destroyed, and civilization in all its forms [will] be forced to do penance 
for injustice and oppression” if the South does not take steps to end racial injustice (19). 
And though much of that tract is devoted to an exercise of empathy, as Tourgée attests to 
the absolute sincerity of the belief held by “the dominant party of the South” that “denial 
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of the colored citizens‟ right and suppression of free speech are necessary to preserve the 
supremacy and domination of the white race,” Tourgée‟s final judgment is clear: “Such 
sincerity counts nothing in favor of their justice or rightfulness” (24, 25). Empathy, in 
other words, has reached a dead end. Understand the opposing point of view he may, but 
such understanding “is no palliation of its wrong and no excuse for neglect of effort to 
obviate that wrong” (25). Tourgée is a cultural, not a moral, relativist. 
The three strands that make up Tourgée‟s complicated engagement with the 
question of how best to pursue racial justice after Reconstruction—force, reason, and 
empathetic persuasion—thus intertwine and overlap and knot each other up. Tourgée 
does indeed have a faith in reason and dialogue, as evidenced not only by Servosse‟s own 
rhetorical prowess but also by the very fact that Tourgée writes to change minds in the 
first place. At the same time, Tourgée is convinced that any shift in point of view must 
begin with empathetic identification, putting oneself in another‟s shoes. Doing that leads 
Tourgée to understand, viscerally, the extent to which history and culture shape belief 
(what I call the “entrenched ideas thesis”). Such a realization contributes to Tourgée‟s 
despairing that things will ever change absent the application of a sustained, forceful 
effort applied from outside. Yet Tourgée‟s sympathy with his southern neighbors makes 
him resistant to such a course; he can see from their perspective. Finally, even as Tourgée 
argues that an empathetic mode of persuasion is necessary to bring about social change, 
he also raises the possibility that seeing eye-to-eye might simply lead to a stalemate, not a 
solution. One thread loops back into another, causing Tourgée to arrive at what appears to 
be a posture much like the pessimistic cynicism he faults the realists for. 
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By the end of the novel, Servosse is able to see things as his neighbors do, which 
does not mean that he agrees with them, but simply that he understands where they‟re 
coming from. In the space of two paragraphs, the narrator states that Servosse “could well 
see,” “could see, too,” “could perceive, too,” “could well understand,” “could understand, 
too,” “began to see,” and “could understand” how southerners could hold the views they 
hold: the chapter is a veritable flurry of empathy (325). In his later days, as Servosse 
settles down in the South, “there arose a spirit of mutual forbearance” between him and 
his neighbors:  
they forbore to take offense at his views, and he forbore to express them; they 
excused his views because of his Northern birth and education, and he excused 
their acts because of their Southern nativity and training; they disregarded his 
political convictions because  a method had been discovered to prevent their 
crystallizing into results, and he refrained from urging them because to do so was 
a useless travail. (340) 
This is rhetorical stagnancy brought about by tolerance. In this scenario, people get used 
to each other, but their views do not change. They simply decline to express them 
anymore, thereby avoiding pointless disagreements. This is the state of non-argument, 
non-exchange of views—exactly the state that romances of reunion promoted. The stakes 
of the struggle have been mitigated, surrendered to the value of social cohesion. 
 The same ability that led Tourgée to understand the roots of his antagonist‟s point 
of view also led him to see just how deep-seated, and possibly intractable, that point of 
view was. Though he extolled the virtues of empathy, Tourgée also saw its limitations: 
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“The question to be asked with regard to any relation between the dominant class of a 
population to another, is not „Are they sincere in the belief in its righteousness or 
necessity?‟ but „Is it just?‟ There is no other test” (Liberty 25). In moments like these, the 
cause of justice by any means necessary—for Tourgée, that meant a program of 
nationalized education implemented by force—was more important than the cause of 
communication. Though it was read by upwards of 150,000 people, A Fool‟s Errand did 
not, of course, solve the rhetorical impasse of Reconstruction. (And though he stuck it out 
for fourteen years, Tourgée did not remain in Greensboro to attempt to empathetically 
persuade his neighbors to abandon their racism.) But reassessing the book in light of 
Rogerian argument leads us to an important question. What are the limits of empathetic 
persuasion in a situation like Reconstruction, with so much at stake and so few shared 
values? Is there a point at which Burke‟s “characteristic invitation to rhetoric” must be 
declined in favor of something else if we are truly to pursue the cause of justice? At 
times, in frustration, Tourgée thought so. Yet the fact that Tourgée continued to work for 
racial justice even after he left Greensboro indicates that he persisted in spite of his 
frustration and occasional desire to revert to force. It also speaks to the temporal 
dimensions of any project of humanitarian change: it cannot happen overnight.  
As I have pointed out, Tourgée is the odd man out in “American Callings.” 
Though he is moved by the same impulses that animate the other humanitarians in this 
project, he works in a slightly different register. In concluding this chapter I want to 
suggest that the pessimistic note at the end of A Fool‟s Errand also offers an opening 
because it indicates how the cultural work realist novels do can complement Tourgée‟s 
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political agenda. To return to the ground of Chapter One, Howells‟s “social” novels 
explore multiple dimensions of the humanitarian self. In all cases, those selves, be they 
ironists, ideologues, or strivers, share a lot in common. They are progressives. They are 
also white, and they live in the northeast. Howells is not working across a cultural 
impasse in his depiction of these characters, as Tourgée is in striving to communicate 
with white southerners whose views diverge from his in significant ways. Still, the 
project of self-refinement that Howells‟s humanitarians engage in is an important one, 
both at the level of narrative and at the level of mimesis. That is to say, Annie‟s example 
could inspire nineteenth-century readers to similar heights and depths of self-exploration 
through the humanitarian dynamic. Tourgée‟s project is in some ways more difficult. He 
hopes not only to get like-minded people to push the limits of their commitment to 
humanitarian justice, but also to work on undoing—and redoing—the self-creation that 
led to the calcification of racist, limiting beliefs in the first place. These are long-term 
goals that depend on a lot of groundwork. In order for the changes Tourgée hopes for to 
stick, the South needs more people like him. It needs more Freedmen‟s Bureau teachers 
who challenge the assumptions of conservative white women in the South, more Comfort 
Servosses who stand up to the Klan. It could probably make do with some Annie 
Kilburns, as well. Novels like Howells‟s can complement projects like Tourgée‟s because 
they have the power to alert sympathetic, but uninvolved, people to what kind of social 
justice work needs doing and provide a model for self-construction within that context. 
Meanwhile, Tourgée‟s rhetorical sally in A Fool‟s Errand provides a model for the kind 
of dialogue most likely to lead to change, even if such dialogue is only a first step.
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                                                      CHAPTER THREE 
Sentiment, Science, and the Self in Jane Addams’s Humanitarianism 
 
A curious parable concludes a chapter late in Jane Addams‟s memoir Twenty 
Years at Hull House (1910). Addams relays the story, originally told by a member of the 
Chicago Woman‟s Club, as follows: 
She said that when she was a little girl playing in her mother‟s garden, she one 
day discovered a small toad who seemed to her very forlorn and lonely, although 
as she did not in the least know how to comfort him, she reluctantly left him to his 
fate; later in the day, quite at the other end of the garden, she found a large toad, 
also apparently without family and friends. With a heart full of tender sympathy, 
she took a stick and by exercising infinite patience and some skill, she finally 
pushed the little toad through the entire length of the garden into the company of 
the big toad, when, to her inexpressible horror and surprise, the big toad opened 
his mouth and swallowed the little one. (201) 
What is the moral of this tale? One interpretation would be to read it as a critique of 
humanitarians, those individuals with hearts “full of tender sympathy.” The parable 
argues that humanitarians should stop attempting to “do good” because such well-
intended interference can result in unintended violence and calamity: frog eats frog. Read 
in this fashion, the parable anticipates censures of humanitarianism that both pre- and 
post-date Addams‟s work, from Thoreau‟s assessment of philanthropy as condescending, 
patriarchal intervention to critiques of humanitarianism articulated in postcolonial and 
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literary studies that illuminate its disciplinary dimensions.
57
 Addams, however, creatively 
misreads the parable. 
Though she does take the woman‟s tale as a warning, Addams‟s interpretation of 
the frog parable is distinct from the reading limned above. “The moral of the tale,” she 
writes, “was clearly applied to people who lived „where they did not naturally belong‟” 
(201, emphasis added). In other words, Addams felt the story “clearly” applied to her, a 
middle-class settlement resident living in a working-class corner of Chicago. The 
difference between the first reading I proposed and Addams‟s is significant. In Addams‟s 
interpretation, the sentimental humanitarian who edges the frogs closer together falls out 
of the picture. Instead of seeing herself as the little girl, Addams identifies with the 
smaller frog. She thus interprets the woman‟s story as a warning to her, yes, but not as a 
warning about the unintended effects her actions as a humanitarian might have on others, 
but as a warning about the effects her actions might have on herself. In Addams‟s 
rendition, the woman tells the story to warn her to stay in her own corner of the garden or 
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 As I indicated in the Introduction, critiques of humanitarianism writ large (reform 
work, philanthropy, charity, benevolence) abound in literary criticism. I will engage with some of 
those critiques more closely later in this chapter, but for now this footnote will indicate, 
metonymically at least, the arguments of scholars who have shown the ways in which 
humanitarian practice has become increasingly suspect in recent decades.  
Critics in postcolonial studies have argued that humanitarianism is and has been 
complicit in projects of imperialism (see Slaughter and Harlow). Others, applying 
postcolonalism‟s insights to domestic reform efforts, have demonstrated that sentimental 
humanitarianism, in addition to providing a venue for the transformation of the agent-self, has 
also functioned as a method of control over the identities of the “aided” others (see Wexler, 
Sánchez-Eppler, Stoler (ed.) and McGerr 79). A related argument critiques nineteenth-century 
women‟s reform on the grounds that its agents relied too much on sympathy and surface 
solutions, neglecting a thoroughgoing analysis of structural and systemic injustice and thus never 
embarking on truly radical projects of change (see Carlin and Berlant “The Subject of True 
Feeling”). Finally, Lauren‟s Berlant‟s abundant work on sentimentality has called into question 
many of the bromides extolling the virtues of compassion, feeling, empathy, and sympathy (see 
The Female Complaint, “The Subject of True Feeling,” and her introduction to Compassion). 
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else face being swallowed up by the neighbors among whom she lives. By responding to 
the parable in her memoir, Addams turns the warning into an affirmation of her desires: 
“I protested that was exactly what we wanted—to be swallowed and digested, to 
disappear into the bulk of the people” (201). Critics who analyze this passage have 
followed the author‟s interpretive lead, overlooking the parable‟s critique of 
humanitarianism to focus instead on Addams‟s view of humanitarian selfhood as 
communal,
58
 and in so doing, they have neglected a fascinating slippage in Addams‟s 
rendering. In her reinterpretation and appropriation of the woman‟s story, Addams 
ignores what seems an obvious parallel between herself as a reformer and the little girl 
who changes the garden‟s ecosystem. Addams does not align herself with the actor who, 
motivated by “tender sympathy,” indirectly causes the death of the very frog she tried, 
misguidedly, to help.  She instead identifies with one of the acted-upon frogs. If read in 
the context of her work at Hull House and the balance between the subjective and 
objective aims of settlements she theorized in her writing, Addams‟s telling elision of the 
interventionist little girl can be seen as her response to a critique of humanitarianism that 
would view it as a willful act of power ultimately harmful to its purported object.   
Hull House began as a cultural outpost in a poor, heavily-industrialized immigrant 
quarter on Halsted Street in Chicago‟s nineteenth ward. Middle-class white women (the 
“residents”) went there in order to live and work among the poor (the “neighbors,” 
mostly European immigrants). The residents and neighbors worked in partnership to 
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 See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Jane Addams and the Dream of American Democracy, p. 
153, and Herbert Leibowitz, “The Sheltering Self,” p. 131. 
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build and improve community by offering reading groups, civic “clubs,” continuing 
education classes, lectures, parties, theater, art exhibits, and language instruction—to 
name just a few of Hull House‟s activities. Though it never abandoned education, as it 
evolved Hull House also became a hub of political activity and social work. Doing both 
human rights and humanitarian work, the residents lobbied for legislation that would 
protect workers, organized garbage collection in the neighborhood, investigated nefarious 
industrial practices (such as sweat shop labor), and ran a postal service (so that 
immigrants would not have money stolen when they sent remissions home).  
Addams‟s coming of age as a reformer took place during what Laura Wexler calls 
“the afterglow of sentimentalization,” the decades after 1870 when the production of 
sentimental novels slowed, but the implementation of sentimental ideas in institutions 
(schools, prisons, hospitals) took hold (19). The late nineteenth century was also a period 
when reform and charity became increasingly professionalized, organized, scientific, and 
de-personalized. Yet Hull House, institution though it was, maintained a person-to-person 
intimacy that Addams defended on grounds at once scientific and subjective. In the 
summer of 1892, three years after she had co-founded Hull House with Ellen Gates Starr, 
Addams was asked to address the Ethical Culture Societies‟ summer school at Plymouth 
to discuss the settlement movement. Her address comprised two parts, one devoted to 
what she called the “subjective necessity” for social settlements, the other devoted to 
their “objective value.” The former explored the effect working in a settlement could 
have on the middle-class residents; the latter took account of the value of the settlement 
for the community. That the settlement could benefit the residents while also bettering the 
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community, that in fact the two aims were intertwined and inextricable, was always a 
major underpinning of Addams‟s commentary on settlement work. Above all, “Hull-
House was soberly opened on the theory that the dependence of classes on each other is 
reciprocal; and that . . . the social relation is essentially a reciprocal relation” wrote 
Addams in her first memoir (64).
59
  
In this chapter I will show that Addams‟s insistence upon reciprocity 
distinguishes her vision of humanitarianism‟s impact on the self from more sentimental 
discourses of reform during the period. The layered interpretations of the frog parable 
provide a metaphoric entry point for exploring this distinction. Addams‟s was not a gross 
misreading. Though she does not explicitly identify with the little girl, it would be 
straining the bounds of credulity to say that when Addams theorizes the humanitarian 
dynamic, she absolves herself of agency entirely. Rather, as my analysis of her writing 
will show, Addams‟s understanding of the humanitarian dynamic requires a kind of dual 
identity—both girl and frog, agent and object. Addams, I will argue, saw herself as part 
of a humanitarian dynamic, not above it and unaffected by it, as the little girl in the story 
is. The purpose of this chapter is to pursue the implications of her creative misreading for 
Addams‟s role in refining the narrative of self-development in a way that goes beyond the 
sentimental truisms of her day.  
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In pursuing those implications, this chapter emerges from and builds on the 
explorations of humanitarianism in Chapters One and Two. Where Chapter One 
established the centrality of the humanitarian striver type in Howells‟s social fiction, here 
I explore in greater detail exactly what value the striving he describes offers individuals 
and society. A striver herself, Addams engaged with humanitarian practice at multiple 
levels, as the frog parable suggests. She was active agent in humanitarian reform efforts 
and a person very much changed by those efforts, but she also wrote copiously to 
elucidate and refine her theories of reform. She is therefore capable of taking a step that 
neither Howells nor his character Annie Kilburn ever quite took: creating an environment 
in which she attempted to replicate, for other strivers, the challenges and insights that led 
to her deep understanding of the relationship between individual humanitarian efforts and 
progressive social change. Her method emerged out of a view of the world not unlike that 
of Albion Tourgée, who insisted upon the intractability of ideas entrenched by culture 
and history. Addams, too, was well aware of the way society molds its individuals, so she 
sought to intervene in that process by changing environments in order to realize a more 
democratic, cosmopolitan American society. My analysis of Addams‟s contribution to 
humanitarian theory begins by showing the way in which Hull House grew out of her 
experience suffering from neurasthenia (often construed as a kind of nineteenth-century 
identity crisis/depressive episode) as a young adult. Going further, I will suggest that she 
skillfully and intentionally drew on the discourse of neurasthenia to legitimize settlement 
work and young women‟s participation in it. The next section explores Addams‟s 
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conceptualization of humanitarianism as a scientific means of creating a more just, 
democratic American society.  
 
Neurasthenia and the Rhetoric of Selfishness 
In “The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements,” one of her two addresses to 
the Ethical Culture Societies in 1892, Addams made the connection between 
humanitarianism and neurasthenia explicit by proposing that labor in a settlement house 
would provide a vital outlet for and renewal of the energies of educated young women. 
My aim in this section is to explore the way neurasthenic discourse shaped Addams‟s 
understanding of humanitarian practice and to show how she successfully deployed 
elements of it as part of her public argument for settlement work.  
Neurasthenia was a major cultural phenomenon in the late nineteenth century, 
more a constellation of symptoms linked by a diagnosis than a somatic disease with a 
cause and a cure.
60
 Christened by neurologist George Beard in 1869, the condition was 
categorized by a widely varying cluster of symptoms, including, but not limited to, sick 
headache, ringing ear, atonic voice, deficient mental control, depression, bad dreams, 
insomnia, dyspepsia, “heaviness of the loin and limb,” flushing and fidgetiness, 
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 In American Nervousness, 1903 (1991), Tom Lutz views neurasthenia as a site of 
confluence of cultural, ethical, and economic discourses. He examines the way that different 
cultural producers responded to their own neurasthenic crises, arguing, for instance, that 
pragmatism evolved out of William James‟s dealings with neurasthenia, as did Theodore 
Roosevelt‟s endorsement of the “strenuous life.” Lutz mentions Addams only in passing, a 
regrettable oversight, for it is clear that she conceived of Hull House and humanitarian labor more 
generally as a cure for the sufferings of neurasthenics. Her conviction that young women could 
find themselves by working in the service of others shaped the age as much as James‟s 
pragmatism or Roosevelt‟s endorsement of the virtues of the outdoors.  
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palpitations, vague pains and flying neuralgia, spinal irritation, uterine irritability, 
impotence, and hopelessness (Sicherman 33).
61
 Tom Lutz‟s list of neurasthenics reads 
like a who‟s who of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century culture, including not 
only such well-known sufferers as Charlotte Perkins Gilman and William James, but also 
Edith Wharton, Jack London, Theodore Dreiser, George Santayana, Josiah Royce, Kate 
Chopin, Owen Wister, Frank Norris, Ambrose Bierce, Willa Cather, Charles Chesnutt, 
Mark Twain, Richard Harding Davis, W. E. B. Du Bois, William Dean Howells, Sarah 
Orne Jewett, Jacob Riis, and Charles Eliot Norton (American Nervousness 19). Who 
wasn‟t a neurasthenic? Though some, including Lutz, have argued that neurasthenia was 
a disease of the elite, F. G. Gosling has shown convincingly that although it may have 
been the well-to-do and famous who sought the most renowned specialists to treat their 
disorder, working class individuals too suffered from what was diagnosed as neurasthenia 
(15). It was, as commentators have noted, a disease ascribed to the pressures of the 
industrializing, modern United States,
62
 “with its railway, telegraph, telephone, and 
periodical press intensifying in ten thousand ways cerebral activity and worry” (Rockwell 
qtd. in Gosling 13). Striking a note of exceptionalism, many declared it a uniquely 
American disease. 
In order to get at Addams‟s complex engagement with the question of 
humanitarian selfhood, her dual identification as humanitarian actor (little girl) and object 
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 See F. G. Gosling, Before Freud (1987); Lutz, American Nervousness; and Barbara 
Sicherman, “The Uses of a Diagnosis” (1977) for histories and explications of neurasthenia. Gail 
Bederman also deals with it closely in her chapters on G. Stanley Hall and Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman in Manliness and Civilization (1995). 
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 See Gosling pp. 12-14, Lutz pp. 4-6, and Sicherman pp. 34-5. 
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(smaller frog), it is helpful to examine the effects of Addams‟s immersion in the culture 
and rhetoric of neurasthenia on two different levels. First, how might her immersion in 
the culture and rhetoric of neurasthenia have shaped her ideas about the self and identity? 
And second, how was Addams able to draw on that same neurasthenic discourse in 
framing the imperatives of her own project?  
Bound up with cultural norms as it was, neurasthenia was not experienced or 
treated the same way in all cases. It was a highly gendered disease. Neurologists believed 
that women developed neurasthenia when, exposed to the pressures of the age, they took 
on too much, particularly too much intellectual labor. One now-notorious solution, 
developed and popularized by S. Weir Mitchell (and made infamous in literary history by 
Gilman‟s “The Yellow Wallpaper”) was the “rest cure”: bed rest, milk feeding, massage, 
electric shock therapy, and a ban on intellectual intercourse. Men developed neurasthenia 
as the result of too much intellectual labor as well, but the cure for them consisted in 
getting out of doors and into the wild: the west cure.
63
  
In her memoir, Addams is characteristically terse about her experience with 
neurasthenia, noting only that she entered Dr. Mitchell‟s hospital in 1882 to treat her 
“nervous exhaustion,” a condition with which she “struggled for years” (49). (She left the 
hospital before completing the course of Mitchell‟s treatment.) She is much more 
forthcoming when recounting the period she refers to as the “snare of preparation,” the 
eight years between graduating from Rockford Seminary and founding Hull House. It 
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 See Gosling p. 46, Michael Kimmel pp. vii-viii, and Bederman p. 87 for brief 
treatments of the gendering of neurasthenia. 
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was during those eight years of travel and study in Europe and after a visit to Toynbee 
Hall, the East London settlement, that Addams conceived of her plan to establish a 
settlement house upon her return to Chicago. That is to say, hers was a plan hatched in 
the context of her experience of feeling overeducated, overprivileged, and overfed. 
Addams‟s neurasthenia led her to empathize and identify with the other young American 
women she saw in Europe. In them she observed a tendency similar to her own, an 
inclination to “feel nervously the need of putting theory into action” (“Subjective 
Necessity” 22). “You do not know what life means when all the difficulties are 
removed,” Addams pictures the comfortable girls declaring; “I am simply smothered and 
sickened with advantages. It is like eating a sweet dessert the first thing in the morning” 
(Twenty Years 52).  
When Addams made a case for the importance of social settlements before the 
Ethical Culture Societies in 1892, she drew attention to the waste that was the undirected 
energy of compassionate, worldly young people. Like the discourse surrounding 
neurasthenia, which understood the disease as being a manifestation of lack of nervous 
energy, Addams‟s claims relied on an economic understanding of energy. Where 
Mitchell argued that women could restore the energetic imbalance by resting, Addams 
drew on political and evolutionary thinkers to counter the claims of the rest cure, arguing 
instead that an individual‟s energy could be restored only by directing it outward, to 
others. She began her observations of listless American adolescence with a quotation 
from John Stuart Mill: “There is nothing after disease, indigence, and a sense of guilt so 
fatal to health and to life itself as the want of a proper outlet for active faculties” (qtd. in 
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“Subjective Necessity” 20).  Young American women are suffering not because they 
selfishly overexert themselves, as Mitchell claims, but because they lack such an outlet 
and are “being cultivated into unnourished, over-sensitive lives” (“Subjective Necessity” 
17).
64
 Drawing then on Thomas Henry Huxley‟s observations in an evolutionary context, 
Addams paraphrases the scientist, explaining that “the sense of uselessness is the severest 
shock which the human system can sustain, and that if persistently sustained, it results in 
atrophy of function. These young people have had advantages of college, of European 
travel, and of economic study, but they are sustaining this shock of inaction” (“Subjective 
Necessity” 21-22).  
With Hull House Addams hoped to provide some direction, an outlet for young 
women who, like her, and like her fictional analog Annie Kilburn, grew up with a strong 
sense of moral obligation but no idea how to channel it. Describing her plan for Hull 
House in the pages of her memoir, Addams focuses not on the effect it would have on the 
denizens of Halsted Street, but on the privileged women who would work there: “I 
gradually became convinced that it would be a good thing to rent a house in a part of the 
city where many primitive and actual needs are found, in which young women who had 
been given over too exclusively to study, might restore a balance of activity along 
traditional lines and learn of life from life itself” (59). This was the settlement‟s 
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 Though Addams often positioned cultural learning as an artificial substitute for genuine 
humanitarian action, that contrast belies the way that her education at Rockford Seminary gave 
her the training that she would need to found and run Hull House. Sarah Robbins has shown that, 
in particular, Rockford fostered an intimate, collaborative community among women that stressed 
social learning. See her essay “Rereading the History of Nineteenth-Century Women‟s Higher 
Education” (1994) for further exploration of the way Addams‟s formal education at Rockford 
shaped her work at Hull House. 
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subjective value. In Addams‟s case, neurasthenia overlapped with an identity crisis (“who 
am I and what is my role in the world?”) that she resolved with a negation of selfhood (“it 
doesn‟t matter who I am, but how I can serve others”). With this approach to service and 
the self, Addams adapted the Christian imperative that to find oneself, one must first lose 
the self—in Matthew 16:25, Christ promised that “those who lose their life for my sake 
will find it”—to a modern, secular context. Addams‟s theories of the subjective/objective 
balance in humanitarian practice replace the religious motivation indicated by the phrase 
“for my sake” with a firmly anthropocentric commitment to other people. 
Critics writing today have trivialized the quest for meaning and purpose that 
characterized Addams‟s neurasthenia even as they recognize the relationship between 
neurasthenia and self-searching. For example, James Hurt calls Addams‟s period of self-
searching, during which she traveled to Europe to find cultivation and purpose, a 
“prolonged adolescent identity crisis” (197). Louis Menand derisively describes 
Addams‟s intention that the young women grow through their work at Hull House “social 
work as therapy” (309). And Barbara Sicherman generalizes more broadly about 
neurasthenics, asserting that “for many middle-class men and women neurasthenia 
incorporated elements of today‟s fashionable identity crisis” (45). She notes that William 
James‟s neurasthenia resolved itself once he entered into professional life as a professor 
of psychology, that Addams‟s was mitigated upon the founding of Hull House, and that 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman‟s was resolved when she separated from her husband and 
pursued an independent career. Hurt‟s suggestion that Addams‟s neurasthenia and self-
searching constituted some kind of adolescent phase and Sicherman‟s intimation that 
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neurasthenia was a fashionable indulgence comparable to today‟s so-called “quarter-life 
crisis” underestimate the importance of the relationship between self-searching and 
creative, socially-productive work that is evidenced by James‟s, Gilman‟s, and Addams‟s 
life experiences, while Menand‟s quip diminishes both the need for and the impact of 
reform work. With their remarks, Hurt, Sicherman, and Menand dismally recall the 
discourse surrounding neurasthenia during the late nineteenth century, which chided 
women for their selfishness. 
I would like to propose that Addams‟s reluctance to expound upon her experience 
with neurasthenia and to theorize about the self explicitly, as well as her fantasy of 
humanitarian service as akin to digestion into a larger body (pace the frog parable), are all 
part and parcel of her assimilation of Mitchell‟s view that focus on the self causes the 
disease. In other words, though the mark that neurasthenia made upon Addams‟s thinking 
and the trajectory of her career is much greater than the brief mention of it in her memoir 
suggests, neurasthenic discourse itself circumscribed the degree of self-reflection the 
experience of the disease brought about. Reading Mitchell‟s writing on neurasthenia and 
the rest cure, one cannot help but be struck by the misogyny underlying his assessment of 
the female neurasthenic condition. His description of a cure for neurasthenia is joined by 
persistent accusations against the women he is treating. Not only did these women get 
themselves into the mess they are in by taking the selfish step of going to college, say, or 
undertaking intellectual tasks, but also they exacerbate their condition through the self-
indulgence the condition brings about. Thus, one of the hallmarks of Mitchell‟s rest cure 
was separating women from the home care they had received, not to mention the 
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affection and companionship. He saw it as necessary to wean them from the “daily drama 
of the sick-room, with its selfishness and its craving for indulgence” (Mitchell 37). For 
these women, a “state of weak health has become a long and almost, I might say, a 
cherished habit” (Mitchell 37). Mitchell relates that he has “seen a few people who were 
ennobled by long sickness, but far more often the result is to cultivate self-love and 
selfishness” (30-1). In Mitchell‟s view, selfishness was both cause and effect of 
neurasthenia, and he was there to rid them of it. Louise Knight notes that Mitchell “hoped 
to make being ill so unpleasant that his female patients would abandon what he believed 
was the cause of their disease, their selfishness. . . . The coup de grâce consisted of his 
lectures about being less selfish in the future” (120).  
On one level, Addams, a woman with more than her fair share of a self-berating 
Puritan conscience, took Mitchell to heart. According to Knight, she “saw her illness as 
he did, as a moral defeat, a sign of her inability to lead the life of sacrifice to a family that 
she had chosen and that was her duty” (120). Knight draws evidence for this conclusion 
from Addams‟s commonplace book. When reading Emerson, Addams engaged in a cycle 
of self-criticism followed by self-reproach for even focusing on the self in the first place: 
“Emerson condemns self-preoccupation, she wrote in her commonplace book; it is 
„another form . . . of selfishness.‟ „Talk too much of myself and motives, am in danger of 
self-pity‟” (qtd. in Knight 121). And in her own memoir, an exercise in self-examination 
Addams was loath to undertake, she chides her young self for her rudderlessness, 
declaring that at the end of her second European sojourn she realized that “so far from 
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following in the wake of a chariot of philanthropic fire, I had been tied to the tail of the 
veriest ox-cart of self-seeking” (60). Here, self-seeking is something shameful.  
Even as she imbibed the admonition that one avoid selfishness at all costs, 
Addams also—and here we proceed to the second level of her engagement with 
neurasthenic discourse—made savvy use of Mitchell‟s discourse by adopting the rhetoric 
of selflessness as one of the central appeals of her argument for women‟s rightful place in 
civic work. In order for the public to buy her argument, however, it is imperative that she 
first indicate that she knows what selfishness is. To that end, in Democracy and Social 
Ethics (1902) Addams revisits her wandering period and seethes with an obsession with 
not being selfish. She looks back on “self-willed childhood” as a stage one grows out of 
on her way to “family obligations”; she refers to the “selfish aims” that distract people 
from their familial and social claims; she thinks of the “self-pity” that follows in the wake 
of a recognition of selfishness (a double whammy of self-awareness); and she calls 
“individual development” “selfish” (with reference to Ibsen‟s Nora, who left her 
husband) (75-6). The shadow of Mitchell‟s derision of female selfishness falls long here, 
but Addams does not lie docile beneath it. She uses all these declamations of the bane of 
selfishness to strike out against the claim that “woman‟s public efforts are merely selfish 
and captious, and are not directed to the general good” (77). Recognizing and responding 
to the culturally dominant, gendered discourse surrounding neurasthenia, Addams makes 
a case for why doing something that might seem selfish to parents and the public—taking 
leave of one‟s familial obligations out of a calling to pursue a broader, social claim—is in 
fact selfless.  
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Even as she condemned selfishness, Addams rested her defense of Hull House 
and settlements in general on the benefit of such work for the actor. This is the argument 
she makes in “The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements.” Addams goes so far as 
to declare the unfulfilling lives of the privileged to be as impoverished as those of the 
materially poor: “this young life, so sincere in its emotion and good phrases and yet so 
undirected, seems to me as pitiful as the other great mass of destitute lives. One is 
supplementary to the other, and some method of communication can surely be devised” 
(22). This is a pretty remarkable declaration, both because of the alarming equivalence it 
places between two kinds of suffering
65
 and because of its intimation that the poor and 
destitute have as much to offer the purportedly privileged as the privileged can offer the 
poor.  
It is Addams‟s conviction that one kind of life “is supplementary to the other” that 
separates her understanding of the humanitarian dynamic from more colonialist, 
sentimental renderings. Sentimentalism and colonialism intersect when it comes to re-
forming the self through the process of reforming others: “the energies [sentimentalism] 
developed were intended as a tool for the control of others” as well as an “aid in the 
conquest of the self” (Wexler 15). In this dynamic, the colonialist agent‟s identity 
depends on her ability to transform needful “others” into replicas of her middle-class self, 
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 The implication here is that the middle-class residents suffered from neurasthenia while 
the working-class neighbors suffered from the ill effects of poverty. However, as I mentioned 
above, Gosling has shown that people in the working class suffered from neurasthenia as well. 
Addams‟s writing provides no conclusive evidence that Hull House targeted neurasthenia among 
both populations, but it is an intriguing possibility—and I thank Sarah Robbins for suggesting it 
to me—that Hull House was a venue where residents and neighbors together dealt with the 
industrially-caused symptoms of neurasthenia. 
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a critique Michael McGerr extends beyond the specific colonial setting to Progressives as 
a whole. Addams, on the other hand, sees the process of transformation through the 
humanitarian dynamic as mutually constitutive, as the next section will explore in greater 
detail. 
Addams likewise responds to the accusation of solipsism by owning up to it, to a 
degree. Expressing his notion that working for the public good is in fact a working out of 
private problems, Thoreau writes, “I believe that what so saddens the reformer is not his 
sympathy with his fellows in distress, but . . . his private ail” (51).  He then goes on to 
suggest that if that ailment is tended to, the do-gooder will “forsake his generous 
companions without apology” (51). For Thoreau, this thought experiment is evidence that 
reformers waste their time by looking outward instead of inward. Better they fix 
themselves, at which point they will have no need (or desire) to engage in the façade of 
do-gooding. By theorizing the connection between self-development and 
humanitarianism, Addams offers a response to this particular critique. Acknowledging 
that humanitarian labor is in fact often a response to a “private ail” constitutes part of her 
argument for the relevance of humanitarian practice. By wedding self-realization with the 
purpose of serving others, Addams provides a compelling rebuttal to those, like Thoreau, 
who would discredit humanitarians by pointing to the “selfish” motives behind their 
purported “selflessness.” Humanitarianism is a method for righting the self, and Addams 
does not pretend otherwise. As a humanitarian benefited by—indeed, transformed by—
her work with and on behalf of others, Addams is at once the little girl in the parable and 




Humanitarian Selves and the Evolution of a Cosmopolitan American Democracy 
In her writing Addams emphasizes the process of creating a self that comes into 
being through the relational practice of humanitarianism, a practice that occurs across 
boundaries, both class and cultural. This relational understanding of selfhood coincides 
with Addams‟s evolving definition of “cultivation,” a reorientation that marks the 
distance she traveled from searching after self-transformation in Europe to finding it on 
Halsted Street. In a curt dismissal, Tom Lutz calls Addams one of the “haughty few” 
whose neurasthenia led to a belief that it fell upon the middle class to “civilize the 
masses,” an assertion he supports by citing the fact that Hull House offered reading 
groups to study Anglo-American literature (28). Addams did indeed think immigrants 
might appreciate reading George Eliot. But this, to my mind, is evidence of Addams‟s 
democratic spirit, not of her elitism, since it confirms that she believed “„high‟ art as 
capable of meeting the needs of working-class audiences as those of the educated middle 
class” (Bufkin 35). Moreover, Addams believed that middle-class individuals could—and 
should—be recreated through contact with the working class, especially immigrants in 
the close quarters of American urban centers.  
Over and over, Addams stresses the effect that settlements had on the people in 
and around them, the way the social chemistry they fostered could give birth to new 
selves. In one of her descriptions of such instances, Addams writes about an event hosted 
by the Social Extension Committee at Hull House, a group whose job it was to give 
parties for people in the neighborhood who didn‟t appear to be socially well-connected in 
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order to “bring them in contact with a better type of Americans” ( “Objective Value” 33). 
Though this phrase would seem to indicate that the committee‟s soirees had both a 
classist and a colonialist bent, promoting the emulation by working-class immigrants of 
those “better type of Americans,” the white native-born middle and upper class, it is 
change in the other direction that Addams remarks upon at length when describing the 
group‟s successes. After an evening when the Social Extension Committee hosted a 
group of Italians, “one of the committee said to [Addams], „Do you know I am ashamed 
of the way I have always talked about “dagos,” they are quite like other people, only one 
must take a little more pains with them‟” (Twenty Years 231-2). Addams continues, 
reflecting,  
to my mind at that moment the speaker had passed from the region of the 
uncultivated person into the possibilities of the cultivated person. The former is 
bounded by a narrow outlook on life, unable to overcome differences of dress and 
habit, and his interests are slowly contracting within a circumscribed area; while 
the latter constantly tends to be more of a citizen of the world because of his 
growing understanding of all kinds of people with their varying experiences. 
(Twenty Years 232)  
Because of Hull House, an Irish-American came into contact with Italian immigrants and 
learned that “they are quite like other people.” Addams regards this encounter as 
successful not because the woman from the Social Committee was able to change the 
Italians in some way, making them more “American,” but because she was able to meet 
the Italians where they stood, as they were. The party was a success because “untiring 
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pairs of [Italians] danced the tarantella; they sang Neapolitan songs; one of them 
performed some of those wonderful sleight-of-hand tricks so often seen on the streets of 
Naples; they explained the coral finger of St. Januarius which they wore” (Twenty Years 
231). Though the Irish-American woman declared she realized the Italians were “quite 
like other people,” Addams‟s description of the scene makes clear that the humanitarian 
triumph here has to do not only with the recognition of a shared humanity but also with a 
mutual recognition of difference. Without disregarding the importance of Hull House‟s 
“objective value,” Addams also saw in settlement work a subjective value, self-
transformation of benefit to the humanitarian agent. The objective/subjective divide is 
not, therefore, as clear as her separation of them into two distinct Ethical Culture 
speeches might make it seem. The subjective facets of settlement work also had an 
objective value: transforming citizens, en masse, to create a different kind of world. Like 
Albion Tourgée, who maintained the hold of culture and circumstances on of one‟s 
beliefs, Addams possessed an intuitive grasp of the relationship between individuals and 
the societies that shaped them. Her move, then, was to change the cultural climate. 
Addams believed that by creating an environment favorable to the kind of encounter she 
relates in the passage above, settlements could cultivate many “citizen[s] of the world” 
with “growing understanding[s] of all kinds of people” (Twenty Years 232).  
The kind of growth Addams hopes for is particular, directed, and predetermined. 
In her reading of the above passage, Francesca Sawaya proposes that “the museum visitor 
and the tourist represent the exemplary forms in which understanding can be attained” 
(25). This reading, which provides evidence for Sawaya‟s larger claim that Addams‟s 
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project of reform and self-transformation is open only to those who have the luxury to 
experience European travel and museum-going in the first place, misses Addams‟s 
redefinition of “cultivation” (25). Where once cultivation meant “send[ing] our young 
people to Europe that they may lose their provincialism” and “send[ing] them to college 
that they may attain the cultural background and a larger outlook,” Hull House provided a 
new stage where cultivation could happen in a more sustained fashion (Twenty Years 
232). It is not the tourist, she who comes and goes, who represents the figure of 
cultivation, but the resident: she who lives in close contact with other people and changes 
because of that contact. In this way the settlement house resident foreshadows the Peace 
Corps Volunteer, a humanitarian adventurer who seeks out prolonged contact with 
difference. Addams does not deny that tourism and travel can be enlightening. At the 
same time, she suggests that cultivation can be found in the crowded quarters of an 
immigrant neighborhood in Chicago, just as it can in the halls of the Uffizi or Smith 
College.  
By the time Addams penned Newer Ideals of Peace in 1907, the loosening of 
prejudices described in the “dago” passage above had become the marrow of her method 
for fostering what she referred to as “cosmopolitan humanitarianism” (Newer Ideals 76). 
In order to understand the centrality of the self to that goal, it is important first to grasp 
the distinction Addams makes between humanitarianism and other manifestations of the 
reformist spirit. Addams writes that the settlement “must be grounded in a philosophy 
whose foundation is on the solidarity of the human race, a philosophy which will not 
waver when the race happens to be represented by a drunken woman or an idiot boy” 
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(Twenty Years 87). Hull House begins by embracing the privileged and the wretched 
alike, what Addams calls a “sense of humanity” (Twenty Years 84). For her, as for Walter 
Besant, whom she cites as the source of her observation, humanitarianism is to be 
distinguished from other modes of “doing good,” for the sense of humanity is “a thing 
fuller and wider” than philanthropy or benevolence (Twenty Years 84). Addams always 
bristled at the use of the word “philanthropy” to describe Hull House‟s activities:  
Working people live in the same streets with those in need of charity, but they 
themselves, so long as they have health and good wages, require and want none of 
it. . . . Hull House makes a constant effort to secure these means for its neighbors, 
but to call that effort philanthropy is to use the word unfairly and to underestimate 
the duties of good citizenship. (“Objective Value” 45) 
Addams‟s vision of humanitarianism as a replacement for philanthropy and charity, 
coupled with her emphasis on the good it does the actor, might have mollified even 
Thoreau, who, tongue in cheek, declared that philanthropy is not truly “love for one‟s 
fellow-man in the broadest sense” because it neglects the betterment of people like him: 
“I never heard of a philanthropic meeting in which it was sincerely proposed to do any 
good to me, or the like of me” (49). Addams‟s humanitarianism, however, rests on the 
belief that humanitarian practice does “do good” for the people who practice it. By way 
of that benefit, it also does good for the world. 
Addams was never blind to the problems attending charity and philanthropy. In 
“The Subtle Problems of Charity,” an essay originally published in the Atlantic in 1899 
and then incorporated into Democracy and Social Ethics (1902), Addams critiques the 
151 
 
charitable practices and blindspots of her time by assuming the point of view of a young 
woman on a “friendly visit”—a common nineteenth-century charitable practice wherein a 
philanthropic agent, the visitor, spends time with a poor family in their home in order to 
ascertain whether they are “deserving” of aid or not, to report back on the details of their 
daily lives (cleanliness, thrift, temperance), and to influence them for the better through 
her own example.
66
 Overlaying Addams‟s keen self-awareness and self-criticism onto the 
experience of a woman called by duty to tend to the less prosperous, the essay offers a 
candid appraisal of the flaws inherent in the charitable relation. Addams uses the conceit 
to reveal how charity workers are often chauvinists in their devotion to middle-class 
values, “ruthlessly forc[ing their] conventions and standards” upon the poor (“Subtle 
Problems” 73). At the same time, she demonstrates how thoughtful engagement in charity 
might enlighten the agent to the harm of forcing her values on others, regardless of fit or 
usefulness. The sensitive visitor would recognize “that she has no right to say these 
things . . . that her untrained hands are no more fitted to cope with actual conditions than 
are those of her broken-down family” (“Subtle Problems” 64). For example, reflecting on 
the disjuncture between her own view of “the imprudence of early marriage” and the 
necessities that face the family she visits, or her kneejerk reaction to saloons in contrast to 
the husband‟s memories of “all the kindness he has received there,” Addams‟s friendly 
visitor “discovers how incorrigibly bourgeois her standards have been, and it takes her 
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 See Deborah Carlin, “What Methods Have Brought Blessing,” pp. 208-210; and Robert 
Bremmer, The Discovery of Poverty in the United States, p. 52, on the friendly visit. Addams 
counters the view that only the “deserving poor” should receive charity in “The Subtle Problems 
of Charity,” especially p. 72.  
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but a little time to reach the conclusion that she cannot insist so strenuously upon the 
conventions of her own class” (“Subtle Problems” 68, 67, 68).  
Addams suspected that there was something to be gained by humanitarianism, 
even though she detested the lack of equality in a relationship where one person (the 
giver) is always construed as conferring aid upon another (the recipient) (“Subtle 
Problems” 62). This does not mean that she adopted a method of reform that “stresses 
individual agency and conscience rather than any substantial changes within the capitalist 
economic system,” a criticism present-day readers make of sentimental humanitarianism 
(Carlin 220). Addams did look forward to another kind of relation among human beings, 
a day when structural changes would make society truly democratic such that the need for 
charity would disappear. Part of her agreed with Howells‟s Reverend Peck in Annie 
Kilburn, whose criticism of charity in favor of structural change foreshadows present-day 
critiques of sentimentalism. Peck was after justice, a world where “there shall be no more 
asking and no more giving, no more gratitude and no more merit, no more charity, but 
only and evermore justice” (Howells, Annie Kilburn 804). At times Addams thought it 
“reasonable to say that nothing could be done until industrial conditions were made 
absolutely democratic,” an observation consistent with Lauren Berlant‟s observation that  
“sentimentality from the top down softens risks to the conditions of privilege by making 
obligations to action mainly ameliorative, a matter of not changing the fundamental terms 
that organize power, but of following the elevated claims of vigilant sensitivity, virtue, 
and conscience” (“Subtle Problems” 74, The Female Complaint 35). Yet ultimately 
Addams settled on a position of compromise. She believed that one needn‟t make a 
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choice between structural change and ameliorative actions and that humanitarian practice 
has a heuristic function.  
Addams writes, “while the painful condition of administering charity is the 
inevitable discomfort of a transition into a more democratic relation, the perplexing 
experiences of the actual administration have a genuine value of their own” (“Subtle 
Problems” 74). Howells turned those “perplexing experiences” into narrative with Annie 
Kilburn, a novel that shows how Annie‟s efforts to turn her philanthropic impulses into 
concrete action yield increased knowledge of both social inequities and the self. Part of 
the value of charity work, Addams believed, is precisely that: it opens the eyes of the 
middle-class agents to the gross injustices around them and to the socially-contingent 
basis of their own values. She writes, “the young charity visitor who goes from a family 
living upon a most precarious industrial level to her own home in a prosperous part of the 
city, if she is sensitive at all, is never free from the perplexities which our growing 
democracy forces upon her” (Democracy and Social Ethics, hereafter DSE, 64). The very 
“perplexities” of the humanitarian relation are educational, leading the humanitarian 
practitioner to a deeper, more incisive understanding of the tension between America‟s 
commitment to democracy and its ongoing class hierarchies. Humanitarianism, then, is 
more than ameliorative; it also wakes people up, putting them face to face with the need 
for structural change. Social reformers learn from being alongside the poor, from being a 
part of the movement, whereas she who analyzes the situation without participating in it 
“avoids the perplexity, and at the same time loses the vitality” (“Subtle Problems” 74). 
Beth Eddy reflects this sentiment of Addams‟s when explaining why she objected to the 
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word “philanthropy”: the term “failed to capture the ways in which one must enter into 
the lives of others in order to understand their worlds and to be of any genuine help at all. 
Once philanthropists started to actually live with the neighbors to whom they sought to 
extend charity, they were likely to find that they learned more and received more from 
the relationship than they brought to it” (35). Philanthropists and charity workers would 
become humanitarians. This emphasis on reciprocity, where the changes the humanitarian 
actor undergoes are as much as a step toward justice as the objective value of reform 
work, distinguishes Addams‟s proposals from traditional charity and philanthropy.  
Furthermore, Addams couches her defense of humanitarianism in scientific terms 
in a way that bolsters the credibility of her practices by wedding them to the values 
undergirding reform during the period. She argues that her practices are even more 
scientific and useful than dominant methods because they take feeling and emotion into 
account. In effect, she one-ups scientific reformers by making a case for why sentiment is 
scientific. “We sometimes say that our charity is too scientific,” Addams writes, “but we 
should say . . . that it is not scientific enough” (“Subtle Problems” 72). Using the 
metaphor of parenting approaches to a young child‟s crying at night, Addams illustrates 
what “not scientific enough” means. Though two parents, one sentimental and one 
scientific, may respond in the same way to the sound of their child‟s cries—by staying in 
the room with the child—the differing rationale behind their decision is significant. The 
scientific parent draws on rules when he decides to sit there while his child cries himself 
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to sleep; he acts “from dogmatic conviction” and is “sure he is right” (DSE 66, 67).
67
 The 
“soft-hearted” parent, in contrast, stays with the child “simply because he is sorry for him 
and wants to comfort him” (echoes of the little girl from the frog parable, with a “heart 
full of tender sympathy”) (DSE 66, Twenty Years 201). Though Addams doesn‟t exactly 
endorse the “soft-hearted” parent‟s motivation, she does criticize what she calls the 
“pseudo-scientific and stilted stage” of charity that the tough-love parent represents 
(“Subtle Problems” 73). She writes, “we have learned to condemn unthinking, ill-
regulated kind-heartedness, and we take great pride in mere repression . . . . The pseudo-
scientific spirit, or rather the undeveloped stage of our philanthropy, is perhaps most 
clearly revealed in this tendency to lay stress on negative action” (“Subtle Problems” 73-
4). Humanitarianism that subscribes to scientific methods of righting the world without 
taking into account sympathy and tenderness becomes nothing more than a rote 
application of principles. Writing during “the afterglow of sentimentalization,” Addams 
presents her case for why even the most scientific reform efforts cannot turn their back on 
the place of sympathy in promoting social change (Wexler 19). 
As an alternative to overly scientific reform efforts, then, Addams promotes a 
Deweyan conception of humanitarianism that underscores the elucidation of principles 
and theories from practice, not the other way around. Scientific reformers have learned to 
“distrust the human impulse as well the teachings of [their] own experience” to the 
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 As noted above, these passages first appeared in an essay published in the Atlantic and 
were later incorporated into Democracy and Social Ethics. “The Subtle Problems of Charity” is 
reprinted in the Jane Addams Reader, edited by Jean Bethke Elsthain, so I cite that accessible and 
standard version when I can. However, sections of the essay central to my argument here were 
edited out, which is why I alternate citations from the essay with citations from the 1920 edition 
of Democracy and Social Ethics, which reproduces Addams‟s original essay in full.  
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detriment of their goals, for in order to be vital and useful, reform cannot disregard either 
one (DSE 68). The reformist spirit, she suggests, should be pragmatic, not austerely 
principled; convictions and morals must be applied “to life itself” and “convictions shall 
not be unrelated to action” (DSE 68). If they follow this pragmatic dictum, individuals 
will become “cultivated” through their interactions with others. The reformer will have 
“socialized her virtues not only through a social aim but by a social process” (DSE 69).  
Addams saw herself as more scientific than the scientific reformers because she 
enlisted sympathy and “the human impulse” toward the greater purpose of promoting the 
evolution of a democratic society. While she viewed social progress through an 
evolutionary lens, she felt that her peers had been “singularly slow to apply this 
evolutionary principle to human affairs in general” (DSE 65). Doing so was one of 
Addams‟s major contributions to theories of reform. In her view the world wasn‟t static; 
individuals, ethics, and human relationships all evolved in response to the challenges and 
demands of the present. This forms the basis of her argument in “A Modern Lear,” an 
essay in which she explores both sides of the labor-management conflict generated by the 
Pullman Strike of 1894.
68
 Reflecting the influence of both pragmatism and evolution on 
her thinking, Addams writes, “the virtues of one generation are not sufficient for the 
next”; “a task is laid upon each generation to enlarge their [virtues‟] application, to 
ennoble their conception, and, above all, to apply and adapt them to the peculiar 
problems presented to it for solution” (“Lear” 170, 171). Ethics are not transhistorical, 
but instead are a matter of fit with a given set of circumstances. But how to arrive at that 
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 The essay was so controversial that it was not published until 1912. 
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fit? In reference to the rare individual in the industrial situation who stands up for the 
worker and exercises benevolence, Addams asserts that “progress must always come 
through the individual . . . who varies from the type and has sufficient energy to express 
this variation” (DSE 158-9). Humanitarian practice is Addams‟s proposed method for 
generating mutations to the norm so that American society will evolve toward true 
democracy and justice. 
Addams‟s emphasis on the humanitarian agent, then, is not so much solipsism as 
it is a kind of social engineering. Howells‟s Annie Kilburn spent months upon her return 
to Hatboro‟ trying one kind of reform out, and then another, in her effort to put her 
humanitarian sentiments to practical use. With Hull House, Addams sought to provide an 
outlet for exactly that sort of impulse: a specific, targeted way for young women who felt 
the calling of duty to others to put their energies to use. Less a place where middle class 
women would go to “find themselves,” Hull House functioned as a kind of humanitarian 
technology
69
 that would generate the qualities in both “residents” and “neighbors” that 
Addams found most conducive to achieving a more democratic society, and ultimately 
world peace. She had a definite outcome in mind. As William James would in “The 
Moral Equivalent of War” in 1910, Addams proposed an active, dynamic alternative to 
war.
70
 She calls for “more aggressive ideals of peace,” not “non-resistance,” which 
connotes passivity. Instead, “the words „overcoming,‟ „substituting,‟ „re-creating,‟ 
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 I thank Sabrina Starnaman for first suggesting that phrase to me. 
70
 See Carl Burgchardt, “From Hull House to the Hague,” for an analysis of Addams‟s 
pacifist rhetoric. He explores the way that Addams tried to make peace more appealing by 
redescribing it: “peace was „creative,‟ not dull, uninteresting, or passive” (396). 
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„readjusting moral values,‟ „forming new centres of spiritual energy‟ carry much more of 
the meaning implied” (Newer Ideals 3, 8). Addams‟s method of achieving peace is 
generative, creative. She emphasizes that humanitarianism and peace can be attained 
through “cosmopolitan affection,” an altered perspective, and a new kind of self, 
opportunities for which abound in the “poorer quarters of a cosmopolitan city” (Newer 
Ideals 11). Like Howells‟s Reverend Peck, ultimately Addams looked forward to a world 
beyond Hull House and its resident/neighbor distinction. The poor, she writes, note the 
“difference between the emotional kindness with which relief is given by one poor 
neighbor to another poor neighbor, and the guarded care with which relief is given by a 
charity visitor to a charity recipient” (“Subtle Problems” 64). She, along with Annie 
Kilburn, felt called to help bring that world about. She therefore conceived of her mission 
to be building a world of neighbors, where no aid would be coming from “outside.” 
Addams drew on both sentimental and scientific discourses when she charted the course 
toward the attainment of that goal, using one vocabulary to balance the other and thereby 
make a case for the centrality of the self to humanitarian endeavors. Returning now to the 
parable that opens this chapter, it ought to be clearer how Addams is at once little girl and 
frog. She viewed humanitarianism as a transformative process from which the initiating 




American Humanitarianism Goes Abroad 
 
“To the Philippine Teachers” 
O‟er boundless seas and to a foreign land 
 A chosen and devoted band you go; 
 And those of you upon whose heads the snow 
Of age has fallen labor hand in hand 
With those who still in youth‟s prime vigor stand 
 The selfsame task to carry out, to sow 
 The seeds of truth and culture; and you know 
This is a noble duty, wisely planned. 
So let no fear of failure fill your hearts, 
 Or dash your courage, or your spirits grieve; 
  And let no petty doubts becloud your brain, 
Remember, while you try to do your parts, 
 That, if one single spark of light you leave 
  Behind, your work will not have been in vain. 
E. E. Schneider (The Log of the Thomas, 1901) 
 
On July 23, 1901, a group of 500 American teachers set out from San Francisco to 
the Philippines. Dubbed the Thomasites after the ship that carried them over, they were 
160 
 
the civic arm of the American military occupation of the Philippine islands that had 
begun in 1898. The teachers hailed from all over the country. While the poem “To the 
Philippine Teachers” evokes religious calling when it describes the Thomasites as a 
“chosen and devoted band,” the motives of these men and women who followed their 
American callings in signing up for the cross-Pacific journey were various: economic, 
patriotic, personal. Like a high school yearbook, the log of the U.S.S. Thomas creates a 
sense of camaraderie among the teachers as well as a sense of purpose: “to sow / The 
seeds of truth and culture.” And like high school graduates stepping out into the world, 
the teachers optimistically anticipate both the minuteness and the significance of their 
future labors: “if one single spark of light you leave / Behind, your work will not have 
been in vain.” Sixty years later, in what has become an iconic phrase, President John 
Kennedy asked Americans to consider what they could do for their country. The Peace 
Corps was one answer. In addition to offering Americans a peaceful way to serve abroad, 
the organization held out the promise of self-transformation through the experience of 
cross-cultural humanitarian action. “You help others, but you also help yourself,” 
observed one Volunteer (United States Toughest Job). Recent PSAs represent the Peace 
Corps experience as a secular calling that beckons potential volunteers to cross the globe: 
“Life is calling. How far will you go? 
Throughout “American Callings,” the figure of the humanitarian adventurer has 
been in our peripheral vision, skirting the edges of the analysis. Howells‟s character 
Annie Kilburn, I explained, anticipates the humanitarian adventurer because of the way 
she follows her call to service away from Rome back to the United States, a place that felt 
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like a foreign country to her. Albion Tourgée followed a trajectory similar to that of 
future humanitarian adventurers when he went to live in North Carolina after the Civil 
War in that following the call of moral purpose led him to a community and a culture 
distant from his own. By promoting residence as opposed to travel as a model for 
understanding difference, Jane Addams too looked forward to humanitarian adventurers 
like Peace Corps Volunteers. This chapter will now shift the peripheral figure of the 
humanitarian adventure to the center, using the Peace Corps Volunteer as a point of 
comparison for the turn-of-the-century individuals and characters. 
 Going to the Philippines, joining the Peace Corps: humanitarian voyages both, 
both drives to leave “one single spark of light.” And in both cases, war (or the threat of it) 
created the opportunity for cross-cultural, humanitarian adventure. Cold War politics and 
Kennedy‟s perceived need for more culturally sensitive, committed civil servants led to 
the birth of the Peace Corps. From the group‟s incipience, the U.S. government made a 
concerted effort to separate PCVs from military occupation and from any kind of covert 
activity.
71
 Though they represent the United States, PCVs also have a great deal of 
autonomy as individuals. Part of their job, crystallized in the Peace Corps‟s second goal, 
“helping promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served,” 
                                                 
71
 When the Peace Corps was first founded, in 1961, the CIA seized upon the group as 
ideal for inserting their operatives into the third world under the guise of young development 
workers who were in a position of trust in their communities. Working against Kennedy‟s express 
orders, the CIA, Sargent Shriver believed, planted agents in one of the first Peace Corps training 
groups. But Kennedy and Shriver put an end to that practice immediately, knowing that any 
association with intelligence gathering would jeopardize the existence of the fledgling Peace 
Corps. See “Kennedy and the Peace Corps: Idealism on the Ground.” 
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is to represent their country by representing themselves.
72
 The Thomasites, on the other 
hand, were part of the colonial apparatus in the Philippines even though they considered 
themselves “an army, not of conquest, but of education” (Log of the “Thomas” 11). 
While the Thomasites labored to educate Philippine children and coexist in villages and 
towns, the U.S. military mounted attacks against insurgents.  
The Thomasites could not cordon themselves off from violence because their 
presence in the Philippines was intimately connected to occupation. After Dewey ousted 
the Spanish fleet from Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, debate ensued in the United States 
about what action it should take in the Philippines: to annex, or not? The McKinley 
administration had gone to war with Spain over its rule in Cuba and withdrawn, 
victoriously, after one hundred days. Withdrawal seemed less advisable in the Philippines 
because of the islands‟ strategic position amid Asian markets. The worry was that if the 
United States were to withdraw the way it had in the western hemisphere, other colonial 
powers would swoop in to replace Spain. Though little public support existed for 
annexing the Philippines and an outspoken anti-imperialist movement staunchly opposed 
it, McKinley bought the archipelago from Spain, signing the Treaty of Paris on December 
10, 1898.
73
 The U.S. then proceeded to occupy the islands under McKinley‟s doctrine of 
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 The first and third goals are: “Helping the people of interested countries in meeting 
their need for trained men and women” and “Helping promote a better understanding of other 
peoples on the part of Americans.”  
73
 Counter to the idea that anti-imperialism was a position espoused by progressive and 
liberal thinkers alone, recent historiography has emphasized the role racism played in resistance 
to annexing the Philippines (Stuart Creighton Miller 15, Love 7). Going further, Eric Love calls 
for a “new optic” that, among other things, “should recognize and set aside assumptions, implicit 
in much recent work, that any past exercise of American imperial power abroad was morally 
wrong” (12). I would like to take up his challenge of applying a new optic to the texts I examine 
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“benevolent assimilation,” a colonial program that distinguished the American soldiers 
and teachers from imperial invaders and conquerors by emphasizing uplift, tutelage, 
friendship, and altruism. Despite the mollifying language, McKinley‟s doctrine did not 
pacify the Filipinos, who had been fighting for their independence from Spain since 1896 
and did not welcome another occupying force, no matter how “benevolent.” A war 
between Filipino insurgents and the American occupiers erupted in February of 1899, 
continuing well past 1902, the year that President Roosevelt wishfully declared the 




A corps of peace workers versus teachers alongside soldiers—the differences 
seem stark. Yet we impoverish our understanding of American humanitarianism if we fail 
to examine the relationship between turn-of-the-century colonialism and mid- to late-
century international development. I say this not to move toward a reading of PCVs as 
neo-colonial (though there are those who would argue that, precisely), but to look at the 
colonial teachers in a new light by viewing them as anticipating a later form of American 
humanitarianism. This chapter, therefore, seeks to complicate understandings of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
here; looking for the humane in what has commonly been understood as the exercise of empire 
does just that. However, I want to make clear that I agree with Love when he writes,  
There is no questioning the inhumanity of the Philippine-American war, and no good can 
come of any attempt to diminish it. But historians must recognize that its catalyst, 
annexation, was an imperfect decision dictated largely by nearly impossible 
circumstances created at home by a divided and unpredictable electorate and abroad by a 
local and geopolitical situation that was volatile long before the Americans plunged the 
nation, somewhat blindly, into its maw. (14) 
74
 For a military history of the Philippine-American War, see Stuart Creighton Miller‟s 
“Benevolent Assimilation”: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (1982). For a 
social history, see Paul Kramer‟s The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and 
the Philippines (2006). 
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relationship between American colonialism and humanitarianism by tracing a through-
line in the two traditions: the preoccupation with selfhood in the humanitarian endeavor. I 
argue that the Thomasites and those who wrote about them put into prose a specifically 
American identity that could be carried, along with mosquito nets and water filters, to 
foreign climes. It was a portable identity, at once cosmopolitan and American: 
cosmopolitan in its reach and interests, yet profoundly American in the quality of its 
expression. In these ways, their writing anticipates the Peace Corps writing with which 
this dissertation opened.  
The connection to an explicitly American identity needs a little explanation, for 
rarely does patriotism figure as a PCV‟s primary motivation for joining the Peace Corps. 
Rather, the organization taps into a felt desire to do good for others, experience 
meaningful work, and have an adventure. All of this is undergirded by a cosmopolitan 
sense that one‟s duties to humanity do not stop at national borders. Likewise, the motives 
expressed by the Thomasites rarely included patriotism, and in their memoirs the 
Thomasites do not reflect on the patriotic purpose of their project. (Even the hokey poem 
from the log of the Thomas doesn‟t reference the United States.) But it is important to 
remember that the Peace Corps was a project born of Cold War politics, a profoundly 
nationalist bid for expanding influence in the developing world by improving the 
reputation of Americans abroad. Similarly, the Thomasites served a P.R. purpose as the 
kind, generous face of the American occupation. Though perhaps not intentionally, both 
the Thomasites and the PCVs furthered American global-political purposes by serving as 
role models. Later in the century, PCVs‟ self-reflective writing would be used by the U.S. 
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government to recruit new volunteers. Given this feedback loop where self-writing turns 
into government advertisement, writing by PCVs cements the ties between individual 
identity and patriotism. But writing by the Thomasites initiates them. The connection 
between PCVs and the Thomasites, then, is not just historical. It is also literary.  
 I will explore the literary-historical arc connecting the Thomasites and PCVs 
through analysis of both autobiography and imaginative fiction. A common place to 
begin investigating the American presence in the Philippines is Mark Twain‟s “To the 
Person Sitting in Darkness” (1901). Twain‟s essay reaffirms a familiar view of 
colonialism: pretty on the outside, ugly on the inside. Because I seek to complicate that 
view, I begin instead by looking at a group of humorous sketches about a bureaucrat in 
the Philippines, George Ade‟s “Stories of Benevolent Assimilation” (1899). Ade 
ridiculed the idea of assimilating Filipinos into the American body politic, and in so 
doing, he traced, in relief, the outlines of the humanitarian adventurer. Next, I will turn to 
two autobiographies written by American teachers working in the Philippines in the first 
years of the twentieth century. In reflecting on their daily labors, their larger purpose, and 
their place in both the Philippines and the United States, William Freer and Mary Fee 
provide an historical accompaniment to Ade‟s lampoon. I will read Freer and Fee‟s 
memoirs in order to show the developmental stages of the humanitarian-adventurer 
identity at the turn of the twentieth-century.
75
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 I focus on the Philippines for two reasons. First, although arguably the United States 
had been engaging in imperialism for centuries, it was partly as a result of the Spanish-American 
War (in both Cuba and the Philippines) that the United States became a world power, thus 
inaugurating the “American century.” Second, and more important to my purposes, I am 
interested in the tension between individual motives and patriotic purpose that the context of the 
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 We can trace the emergence of the modern-day humanitarian adventurer, 
exemplified by the Peace Corps Volunteer, by paying attention to a shift in the way 
selfhood gets articulated in humanitarian autobiography. The trend is a move from 
defining a self through the purpose of changing foreign others to transforming a self by 
seeking out the challenge of cross-cultural humanitarianism. To paraphrase William 
James and Richard Rorty, respectively, the Thomasites‟ theories become “unstiffened” by 
their exposure to difference, thus casting their final vocabularies in doubt. It is from this 
position of doubt and openness, that of Rorty‟s “liberal ironist,” that the identity of the 
American humanitarian adventurer takes root as it travels to foreign places. The 
difference between writing by the Thomasites and writing by PCVs has to do with 
motivation: the Thomasites experience change despite themselves, whereas the PCVs 
seek that change out. George Ade‟s “Stories of Benevolent Assimilation” provide a 
fictional window onto this shift, so I turn now to him. 
 
Reading beyond Mark Twain; Or, Why We Should Care about George Ade  
 In the archives of American literary history, Mark Twain‟s “To the Person Sitting 
in Darkness” (1901) has come to epitomize a prescient view on American imperialism at 
the turn of the twentieth century. This view recognizes that the bill of goods sold by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Philippine occupation presents. The first group of American teachers to go to the Philippines 
were responding to a call to serve their country, and so in living their identities as 
teachers/colonials/humanitarians, the Americans always had to negotiate their patriotic purpose 
on the one hand and their personal motivations on the other.  
 I should say that I do not want to argue that the memoirs I analyze in this chapter are 
necessarily representative of American teachers in general, but simply that these particular stories 
told by particular individuals do seem to anticipate a humanitarian-adventurer identity that would 
gain broader prominence in the United States as the century wore on. 
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American imperialism—in Twain‟s rendering: love, justice, gentleness, Christianity, 
protection to the weak, temperance, law and order, liberty, equality, honorable dealing, 
mercy, and education—are “merely an outside cover, gay and pretty and attractive, 
displaying the special patterns of our Civilization which we reserve for Home 
Consumption, while inside the bale is the Actual Thing that the Customer Sitting in 
Darkness buys with his blood and tears and land and liberty” (3).  The United States, in 
Twain‟s estimation, produced two products called “civilization”: one for domestic use, 
and one for export. And the export version was mighty shoddy. Twain, in other words, 
argues that humane values are the trappings, not the substance, of the American bill of 
goods; the United States cloaks imperialism in humanitarian rhetoric. This indictment of 
U.S. imperialism (more specifically, of the U.S. presence in the Philippines), has been 
seized upon by scholars as a literary-political touchstone. “To the Person Sitting in 
Darkness” is the go-to text for assessing and understanding the progressive view of 
American presence abroad at the turn of the twentieth century.
76
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 The attention given this text is well merited. Twain was the most famous and 
outspoken spokesperson for anti-imperial sentiment in the United States at the turn of the century, 
so of course “To the Person Sitting in Darkness” (and other anti-imperial writings), rightly make 
up a central part of the archive of American anti-imperialism. Also, it is partly because of its 
prescience—Twain‟s essay seems to anticipate American imperial incursions that occurred in the 
twentieth- and twenty-first centuries, including but not limited to Vietnam and Iraq— that the 
essay has become such a touchstone. Attention to Twain‟s anti-imperial writings was renewed 
largely by the late Jim Zwick, an independent scholar who compiled comprehensive websites on 
U.S. imperialism (particularly BoondocksNet.com, now defunct) and reignited interest in Twain 
and anti-imperialism through his print scholarship, including Mark Twain‟s Weapons of Satire: 
Anti-Imperialist Writings on the Philippine-American War (1992) and Confronting Imperialism: 
Essays on Mark Twain and the Anti-Imperialist League (2007). Perhaps in part due to Zwick‟s 
work on Twain, one whole volume of the Oxford Mark Twain (1996) was devoted to Twain‟s 
travel writing and anti-imperialist essays. Yet for all its pedagogical prominence, the essay has 
not often been taken up as a primary object of analysis for literary critics; it is mostly used as a 
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 Though Twain may have been the most famous man of letters to offer his view of 
American presence in the Philippines during this period, he was not alone in writing 
about the endeavor through the lens of imaginative fiction.
77
 Another was George Ade, a 
journalist from Indiana known for local color sketches about life in the Midwest. Ade 
paid close attention to American maneuvering in the Pacific, corresponding with his 
colleague and friend, journalist John McCutcheon, who was at Manila Bay when Dewey 
declared victory on May 1, 1898.
78
 Though Ade would not go to the Philippines until 
1900, McCutcheon‟s dispatches from the islands (which Ade wrote up more thoroughly 
for the Record) inspired him to employ his local color style to write a series of sketches 
depicting the encounter between Americans and Filipinos. Those sketches gave rise, a 
year later, to a musical. The Sultan of Sulu, first performed in Chicago in 1902, cheerily 
depicted the hijinks that ensue when a group of American military men and Yankee 
school marms arrive on the island of Sulu, in the Philippine archipelago, with the bizarre 
announcement that they now own the place. Although he called his musical a satire, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
reference point. For appraisals of Twain‟s essay, see Adrian Gaskins, whose essay “Let U.S. 
Prey” focuses on the use of religion in furthering imperial aims; Peter Schmidt, whose book 
Sitting in Darkness emphasizes the connections between Twain‟s critique and dependency 
models of education; and Edward Huffstetler, who assesses what he calls Twain‟s cultural 
relativism in an essay titled “Mark Twain‟s Unique brand of Cultural Relativism.”  
 
77
 Many American writers took up the Spanish-American War as a subject, including 
Stephen Crane, who reported on the conflict, and William Dean Howells, whose short story 
“Editha” (1905) depicted the clash between romantic, idealistic views of war with the decidedly 
unaesthetic reality of it.  The war also spawned a surprising number of young adult novels, most 
prominent among them Edward Stratemeyer‟s Old Glory series, which began with Under Dewey 
at Manila (1898). These books focused on adventurous young boys who head off on ships to fight 
in Cuba or the Philippines. Very few writers of literature aimed at adults, however, focused 
specifically on the American-Filipino encounter.  
 
78
 Ade and McCutcheon met as students at Purdue, and McCutcheon helped get Ade his 
first job as a reporter for the Chicago Record. McCutcheon, an editorial cartoonist at the paper, 
illustrated Ade‟s “Fables in Slang” columns. 
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reviewers acknowledged it as such, it did not arouse anywhere near the ire that Twain‟s 
essay did. Unlike Twain‟s piece, it wasn‟t taken up by the Anti-Imperialist League as 
promotional material. Instead, reviewers called The Sultan of Sulu “clever,” and it was 
met with success and applause.
79
 Ade‟s musical, unlike Twain‟s essay, did not seek to 
inspire anger, but laughter. He was having fun with the logic of imperialism. 
 Though there is no evidence that Mark Twain and George Ade ever met, they did 
read each other‟s work. For Ade, it would have been nearly impossible to escape the 
influence of Twain, and it was through their common supporter, William Dean Howells, 
that Twain learned of Ade. In a letter to Howells (dated July 22, 1908) Twain wrote, 
“Thank you once more for introducing me to the incomparable Pink Marsh [one of Ade‟s 
characters and the title of a book]. . . . my admiration of the book has overflowed all 
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 The musical was reviewed in dozens of papers across the country in 1902 and 1903, 
including but not limited to the New York Times, Kansas City Star, Idaho Daily Statesman, 
Charlotte Daily Observer, Belleville News Democrat, and the Biloxi Daily Herald. The reviews 
are remarkably similar to one another, as most of them do little more than summarize the plot, 
assess the performances and musical numbers, and attach a few adjectives to the musical. In most 
instances, the reviewers draw attention to the absurdity of the plot. This review from the New 
York Times is representative:  
The things that occurred in real life in the southern portion of our Philippine possessions, 
as told in the newspaper reports—things that are still occurring there for that matter—
furnish a groundwork for a very funny series of comic opera complications, and Mr. Ade 
has succeeded, even in his maiden effort at this sort of business, in constructing a very 
funny story of absurdities, which is seasoned with a good many very new and bright 
observations and very little slang. (“New Plays Last Night”) 
At the same time, many acknowledge that the musical was meant to be a critique: “Mr. Ade‟s plot 
is a clever satire on the logic of some recent administrative decisions,” wrote the reviewer in 
Belleville, Illinois‟s Daily News-Democrat. Interestingly, however, the reviewers never expand 
upon the substance of that critique. Instead, the assessment of Ade‟s humor that many reviewers 
provide underscores a difference between Twain and Ade that I will explore: “Mr. Ade‟s slang is 
wholly lacking in brutality and is laugh-compelling in its breezy impudence. . . . His usual note . . 
. is of good-natured raillery, as one who realizes the bitterness of things, but whose heart is 




limits, all frontiers” (Smith, Mark Twain-Howells Letters 832).
80
 Ade returned the 
compliment in a letter to a friend of his written decades later (dated April 21, 1941), 
“Regarding Mark Twain, I am disposed to pay him the same compliment that he once 
paid to one of my books in a letter to William Dean Howells. I will quote him and say 
that my admiration for Mark Twain has overflowed all limits, all frontiers. He is our great 
master humorist” (Ade, Letters 224).   
 Ade was not alone in thinking of Twain this way. Interestingly, though, William 
Dean Howells once disagreed. Howells had heralded Ade‟s writing early on, observing in 
1903 that “in Mr. George Ade the American spirit arrives. . . . It is, I think, Mr. Ade‟s 
instinct of our solidarity and the courage of his instinct which has enabled him to go 
straighter to the heart of our mystery than any former humorist” (“Certain of the Chicago 
School” 739). Though Howells does not mention Twain directly here, the pointed 
reference to humorists past seems to allude to him. He took on the Twain-Ade 
comparison head on more than a decade later in a column bemoaning what he saw as 
Mark Twain‟s shift from humor to satire. Reading Twain‟s posthumously-published The 
Mysterious Stranger (1916) makes Howells observe that the “human predicament . . . is 
such as apparently to turn our beloved humorist to a satirist without hope and without 
faith” (“Editor‟s Easy Chair” 442). Lamenting Twain‟s shift to cynicism and the 
unworthiness of most of his successors, Howells observes, “there is no one but George 
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 My thanks to Jack Brenner, whose 1966 article “Howells and Ade” led me to the 
Howells columns I cite here. His article makes the case for renewing scholarly attention in Ade. 
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Ade worthy to be named in the same breath with those master humorists [Twain and 
Artemus Wade]” (443).  
 But if Ade is Twain‟s worthy successor, he is, in Howells‟s view, also 
significantly different from him, and that difference has to do with his attitude toward the 
objects he laughs at. Howells observed that Ade is “of a candid complicity with the thing 
satirized” (“Certain of the Chicago School” 741). Ade, in other words, does not set 
himself apart from his object of ridicule but implicates himself in his satires, which, 
Howells seems to suggest, removes some of the bite from his writing. This difference 
between satire and humor is not only aesthetic. It makes a real moral difference. Howells 
writes, “Possibly we are going from bad to worse as we have always been; but we think 
we have been kept from the worst by the humorist‟s smile, not by the satirist‟s frown” 
(“Editor‟s Easy Chair” 444). In this section I intend to take seriously Howells‟s claim that 
“the humorist‟s smile” has more moral power to keep us from the worst than “the 
satirist‟s frown.” This is a possibility that many critics, by neglecting Ade and privileging 
Twain, have failed to pursue.
81
   
 My purpose here, however, is not to offer an extended comparison of the two 
humorists, but rather to use the contrast I have established between Twain‟s and Ade‟s 
tones and the critical attention each has received as a warrant for analyzing another, even 
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 It was common among imperialists and moderate Americans to bristle at Twain‟s 
accusatory tone common when “To the Person in Darkness” appeared in the North American 
Review in 1901. In an editorial from February of that year, the New York Times evinced 
disappointment in Twain for “discarding the grin of the funny man for the sour visage of the 
austere moralist” (qtd. in Powers 607). No one likes to be scolded. I hope in these pages, 
however, to make a case for assessing Ade as well as Twain that goes beyond the resistance to 
having your beloved funny man start to demand something from you. Instead, I want to suggest 
that Ade also provides a worthwhile critique.  
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less-noted body of work by Ade: his stories of benevolent assimilation.
82
 These stories, 
which would lead to the Sultan of Sulu, ran in the Chicago Record from July 8 to October 
18, 1899, to very little fanfare. They did not come across as a political statement, far less 
a screed. Much less popular than Ade‟s local color sketches, “Fables in Slang,” the 
stories flew under the radar at the time, as they do now. Not until Perry Gianakos 
collected and published them together in one volume in 1985—in the Philippines, no 
less—did they appear anywhere but in the Record.
83
 The oversight is astonishing, for I 
would argue that these stories offer a more sophisticated take on the situation in the 
Philippines than either Twain‟s essay or Ade‟s musical. They describe the attempts of an 
American bureaucrat, Washington Conner, to “assimilate” a Filipino family, the 
Kakyaks. As such they attempt to explore the process of benevolent assimilation through 
an imagined microcosm: one man, one family, one big government policy. What 
distinguishes Ade‟s stories of benevolent assimilation from his musical and from Twain‟s 
essay is their ambiguity, an unease absent from Ade‟s later musical. Washington Conner 
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 Scholarly attention to Ade has been scant, the vast majority focusing on his local color 
humor. For work that addresses Ade‟s writing on the Philippines, see Perry Gianakos‟s 
introduction to Ade‟s stories. One prominent critic who acknowledged Ade as a moralist as well 
as a humorist was H. L. Mencken, who observed, 
Here, amid a humor so grotesque that it almost tortures the midriff, there is a startlingly 
vivid and accurate evocation of the American scene. Here, under all the labored 
extravagance, there are brilliant flashlight pictures of the American people, and the 
American ways of thinking, and the whole of American Kultur. Here the veritable 
American stands forth, lacking not a waggery, a superstition, a snuggle or a wen. . . . 
Needless to say, a moralist stands behind the comedian. (qtd. in Gianakos 4) 
For biographical information on Ade, see Fred C. Kelly‟s George Ade: Warm-hearted Satirist; 
Lee Coyle‟s biography George Ade; and Ade‟s letters, edited by Terence Tobin.   
 
83
 The volume Gianakos put together is the only extant edition of the stories, and it is 
hard to come by, available in only forty-nine libraries world wide, according to the OCLC. 
(Compare that to the collected Fables in Slang, available in 487.) 
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does not—cannot—remain resolute in his purpose, and the stories demonstrate the flaws 
in that purpose. Yet they do not approach the outright condemnation of “To the Person 
Sitting in Darkness,” for when Ade laughs at Conner‟s missteps and blind spots he laughs 
at himself and his culture, too. Given this ambiguity, the stories demand more attention 
than they have received. Looking closely at Ade‟s stories can help us continue to come to 
grips with the way Americans reacted to and imagined the cultural encounter brought 
about by the Philippine-American War because it opens up a perspective heretofore 
lacking in the discussion surrounding anti-imperial American literature. Using the 
colonial encounter as a departure point, Ade‟s stories prefigure the model of the 
humanitarian adventurer. 
 Ade‟s stories bring into focus the experience of an individual American living in 
foreign circumstances with a mission to carry out. Conner, of course, is no humanitarian. 
Ade makes it clear that he is nothing more than a bureaucrat charged with goals he has 
not fully thought through. Additionally, Ade insists that the policy of benevolent 
assimilation is not humane at all. Yet even if Conner‟s motives are not humanitarian, his 
presence among the Kakyaks takes the form of the humanitarian adventurer: one 
American living among strangers, trying to carry out a mission to help foreign others. 
(The fact that the Kakyaks do not need or want Conner‟s help is one of the jokes. Ade 
and his audience are in on it, but the protagonist is not.) The method Conner uses, 
however—attempting to get others to be like him—is still dictated by the terms of the 
colonial endeavor. It goes one way.  
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 In the close reading that follows, I explore how Ade sought to expose and ridicule 
the American colonial project in the Philippines through a series of vignettes that 
culminate in the failure of the protagonist to see his mission through. The stories 
anticipate the form of the humanitarian adventurer by throwing it into relief. That is to 
say, Washington Conner‟s failure becomes the goal of future humanitarians. Conner fails 
in his own mind because the Philippines and its people change him; future humanitarian 
adventurers desire to be changed. By exposing the folly of imitation as a method of 
humanitarian change and showing the way the environment, the culture, and the people 
have an impact on Washington Conner, even greater than his impact on them, Ade 
anticipates a new form of humanitarian action. 
 
Ade’s “Stories of Benevolent Assimilation”  
 The stories begin with Washington Conner, “an agent, or a missionary you might 
say, representing the United States of America,” earnestly explaining his purpose to the 
Kakyaks (Ade, Stories 12). This sets the stage for the breakdown of Conner‟s mission 
and the very notion of benevolent assimilation while allowing in doubt and insecurity, 
which create fertile ground for growing the humanitarian-adventurer identity. Conner‟s 
project, as he understands it, depends upon a one-way relationship between him and the 
Filipino family. He gives, they receive—and change as a result. Conner explains the 
phrase “benevolent assimilation” like this:  
“A benevolent person,” said Mr. Conner, pulling reflectively at his red mustache, 
“a benevolent person is one who has the disposition to do good to others and 
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make them happy. Assimilation refers to the act of bringing to a resemblance, 
likeness or identity. The plan of benevolent assimilation, for which I am the agent, 
contemplates the instruction of you islanders in all the details of our American 
civilization. We love you; therefore we are going to put before you certain 
examples and precepts to enable you to become similar to us.” (13) 
When the family‟s skeptical mother, Mrs. Kakyak, asks Conner why they should want to 
be like him, his response sounds the note of an exasperated parent: “Because we want 
you to.” Then he explains further: “it occurs to us that we have been designated by a wise 
Providence to take charge of you simple-minded islanders and educate you. You are the 
white man‟s burden” (13). And so it goes, as far as Conner understands it.  
 Ade, however, nudges us toward a more complex understanding of the 
relationship between Conner and the Kakyaks. By framing the terms of Conner‟s project 
with references to Rudyard Kipling‟s poem “The White Man‟s Burden” (1899), Ade 
complicates Conner‟s overt statements of mission and provides a key to understanding 
the stories. When Conner tells the Kakayks that they are the white man‟s burden, the 
burden talks back. “We don‟t want to be,” replies Mr. Kakyak. “Well, you are, just the 
same,” Conner says. “You have been described to us as „half devil and half child‟” (14). 
The passive voice is important here. With it Ade indicates that Conner‟s endeavors are 
being encouraged and underwritten by another power—Kipling, representing the 
British—who has already interpreted the situation for him. At the same time, readers can 
also take their cue for understanding the stories from the poem. “The silent, sullen 
peoples / shall weigh your gods and you,” read two lines of “The White Man‟s Burden.” 
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These lines, the last two in the poem‟s penultimate stanza, flip the perspective from the 
certitude of the imperial mission to the frightening thought of being weighed and judged 
by the very peoples one has come to tame.
84
 This line never appears in the stories. 
However, the adjective “sullen” does. Conner refers to the Filipinos as “the sullen people 
of this island”; Mrs. Kakyak nods “in sullen assent” (14, 29). We can see these uses of 
the word “sullen” as an allusion to the poem, an allusion that encourages us to look at 
benevolent assimilation from the Kakyaks‟ perspective. The stories, it seems to me, 
imagine the terms of the weighing Kipling forecasts. Yet Ade can only go so far. He does 
not tell the story of benevolent assimilation from the point of view of the Filipinos, for he 
cannot. At the time the stories were written, Ade had never even been to the 
Philippines.
85
 Neither are the stories grounded in research or copious detail. Instead, Ade 
attempts to understand the Filipino point of view the only way he can: by imagining them 
to be like himself, imbuing the Kakyaks with a common-sensical Midwestern sensibility. 
Ade uses Kipling‟s poem as an interpretive frame for his stories because the text of the 
poem, like the text of the stories, imagines Conner‟s attempt to assume the white man‟s 
burden. At the same time, the subtext of both the poem and the stories is an attempt to 
listen to the silent, sullen peoples, even if the terms of that listening are not authentic. To 
be sure, Ade is limited by his perspective and his culture, which remains relentlessly 
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 In her book Shadowing the White Man‟s Burden: U.S. Imperialism and the Problem of 
the Color Line, Gretchen Murphy calls into question the certitude with which readers commonly 
interpret the poem when they read it as the imperial ur-text. She shows that it was understood as 
much more ambiguous at the time it was written and received (see Chapter One). The lines I 
discuss here are indicative of that ambiguity.  
 
85
 Ade visited the Philippines on a trip to Asia in 1900. No account of his travel there 
seems to exist. 
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American. It is a paradox of the stories that Ade attacks Washington Conner‟s attempts at 
“assimilation” by representationally assimilating the Kakyaks to a Midwestern 
sensibility.  
 That Ade doesn‟t think much of Kipling‟s take on imperial duty becomes clear 
early in the stories, for much of the first few vignettes is devoted to making fun of 
benevolent assimilation and demonstrating its flaws through the eyes of the Kakyaks and 
through Conner‟s own thoughtless remarks. Benevolent assimilation goes hand in hand 
with “civilization,” a seemingly progressive notion that gets debunked early on with this 
howler of Conner‟s: “As soon as this war is over we are going to start in and civilize all 
those who haven‟t been killed” (12). But if American colonialism is shown to be unaware 
of its own barbarity, Ade overplays the contrast between the Tagalog characters and the 
Americans. For Ade, the Kakyak family represents practical, natural living—life without 
artifice—in contrast to the “civilized,” artificial way Americans live. This contrast is 
made explicit in the following exchange between Mrs. Kakyak and Conner. Mrs. Kakyak 
begins, 
“It seems to me that this wonderful civilization, of which you are forever talking, 
consists of a huge assortment of ceremonies which are the outgrowth of artificial 
conditions and which are contrary to the natural instincts of any human being.” 
“Certainly,” replied Conner. “The purpose of civilization is to repress and 
hold down the natural instincts, so that people may be governed by rule and 
precedent. . . .  When you have become thoroughly civilized, Mrs. Kakyak, you 
will know what it is to approach a woman whom you thoroughly detest, kiss her 
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with feigned heartiness and beg of her to come and take tea with you at her first 
opportunity.” (60-1) 
Though the contrast between the natural and easy-living Kakyaks and the uptight, rule-
abiding Conner may seem overdone and artificial itself, if we see it less as a contrast 
between Tagalog and American culture and more as a contrast between political rhetoric 
and plain-living American values, it begins to make more sense. It becomes evident early 
on that Eulalie, the Kakyak teenage girl, embodies American values and virtues. Forced 
to hew to Conner‟s lessons, she reflects to herself,  
Why should not the Tagalos
86
 be permitted to seek happiness in their own way, 
without the guidance or intervention of people living thousands of miles away? . . 
. the maiden was puzzled as to the merits of his case. She tried to believe that the 
tall stranger was sincere. Certainly he had the manner of sincerity, and yet she 
fancied at times that he was merely obeying orders and trying to bolster up a 
policy that did not fit at the joints. But she was very young and quite 
unsophisticated, and perhaps her judgment need not be projected into a 
controversy which belongs to statesmen and business promoters. (31-2) 
In this and other passages, Ade accomplishes two things: he exposes the absurdity of 
American colonialism while also suggesting that a significant gap exists between 
American policy and American sagacity. Eulalie‟s desire that the Tagalogs “be permitted 
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 For some reason Ade always refers to the Tagalog people as the Tagalos. I am not sure 
whether this was an idiosyncrasy of his or whether spelling of “Tagalog” varied in the United 
States during this period. In my reading about the Philippines in National Geographics from the 
turn of the century, I haven‟t seen others follow Ade‟s style. 
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to seek happiness in their own way” echoes American founding principles. Ade does not 
play Filipino views off American views so much as play the Americans off their leaders, 
laughing at the disconnect between American ideals and American behavior. 
  Even though Ade cannot provide a real window into the Filipino perspective, 
what he does accomplish is valuable. In addition to exposing the absurdity of “benevolent 
assimilation,” another significant contribution of his stories is to lay bare the arbitrary 
quality of American customs and culture, thus opening up the possibility of cultural 
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 I echo Cornel West in asserting that a strong connection exists between American 
pragmatism and the United States‟ entrance on the world stage at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Is it a coincidence that it was in 1898, the year of the Spanish-American War, that James 
first publicly coined the term, at a lecture at Berkeley? (As Martin Kevorkian pointed out, quoting 
his colleague Coleman Hutchison, “such things may have a relation that is less than causal but 
more than casual.”) West sees John Dewey as seminal in bringing about this cosmopolitan turn in 
pragmatist thought. Though I would argue that the seeds for such internationalism were there as 
early as Emerson, West‟s observations are nonetheless very important to my argument about the 
way Ade‟s stories are shot through with insights into humanitarianism: 
The coming-of-age of American pragmatism occurs just as the United States emerges as 
a world power. There is no direct causal relation between these two phenomena, yet it 
also is no mere accident. Dewey‟s mature formulations of pragmatism were certainly 
encouraged by the entrée of America on the international stage of history. This entrée 
required not only “the end of American innocence,” i.e., an end to America‟s naïve 
optimism and uncritical penchant for romantic simplicity, or a “revolt against 
formalism,” i.e., an engagement with a dynamic reality in a functional and contextual 
manner. It also forced American intellectuals to develop a particular kind of international 
and historical consciousness, a consciousness open to other streams of thought yet rooted 
in the American experience and capable of nourishing, sustaining, and guiding America 
through its coming crises and challenges. (85) 
Where West, in his brilliant study of American pragmatism, emphasizes the role the intellectual 
elite (not only Dewey but Emerson, James, Peirce, Du Bois, and others) have had in shaping 
pragmatism, I want to suggest that we see the development of a humanitarian-adventurer identity 
as it is shaped by obscure autobiographers and forgotten writers like Ade as another cultural 
instantiation of pragmatist thought: pragmatism from the bottom up. 
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Much of the amusement generated by the stories comes from Ade‟s ability to loose 
American culture from its moorings, rendering it unstable. Such unmasking of the 
arbitrary is most evident when Conner tries to get the Kakyaks to dress like middle-class 
Americans, forcing imitation on them from the outside. His explanation of the codes of 
fashion and etiquette reveals the ultimately inexplicable nature of social custom. For 
instance, Conner tells Eulalie that she shouldn‟t let her shoulder show during the day. 
(She is wont to wear a garment that slips suggestively down one arm.) However, Conner 
adds, it is perfectly appropriate to let both shoulders show—but only at night. “In the 
evening it is more than all right—it is the only correct thing to do.” This seems illogical 
to Eulalie‟s mother. “Why should there be any difference?” she asks. “There are reasons, 
ladies,” responds the bureaucrat, “but I am not sure that they would appeal to your 
primitive understanding. Please don‟t expect me to tell you the reason for anything” (23).  
Here Conner responds to the women‟s questioning with high-handed confidence, but as 
they persist with their questions, his confidence becomes defensive. His culture, Conner 
realizes, seems absurd when it is trotted out in the Philippines, but he is the only one 
there to defend it against the scrutiny of his skeptical, would-be converts. When they 
laugh at the hat with the ostrich feather he asks Mrs. Kakyak to wear, his response turns 
from confident to authoritarian: “„If you are to become one of us you must wear this kind 
of hat,‟ said Conner, meeting her stubborn gaze” (24).  
 In these stories, cultural relativity becomes colonialism‟s weak spot. At the same 
time as Ade argues for the contingency of cultural norms, Conner‟s increasingly 
defensive response to the Kakyaks reveals the insecurity and fear at the heart of the 
181 
 
colonial endeavor. The Kakyaks, Conner finds, “were inquisitive. They asked many 
questions. They obtained a large amount of information” (36). But this information does 
not convert them to a new way of being. “The reader will therefore understand that the 
Kakyak family might be willing and anxious to learn all about Americans and still have 
little inclination to be Americans” (37). This breakdown between learning and being 
strikes fear into the heart of our bureaucrat, for he realizes that the Kakyaks are not docile 
objects to be molded according to his mission. Instead, they are capable of learning and 
assessing, judging and rejecting, continuing to be themselves while they refuse to be 
benevolently assimilated. “Mimicry is at once resemblance and menace,” Homi Bhabha 
reminds us, and here, Conner feels the menace: it comes from the Kakyaks‟ resemblance 
to Americans in ways that threaten the Americans‟ authority (86). For instance, Mr. 
Kakyak gives Conner a history lesson and draws a threatening parallel between the origin 
of the United States and the situation in turn-of-the-century Philippines:  
You see the Filipino insur—rebels, I mean—have set up the claim that they have 
the same right that the Americans claimed in 1776. They have organized a 
provisional government, just as the colonies did. They are fighting for—well, 
what they conceive to be their rights. In what respect are they different from the 
thirteen colonies that rebelled against Great Britain? (47)  
Mr. Kakyak self-edits, adapting his language to the lexicon of benevolent assimilation: 
“rebels,” suggesting disobedience to the rule of law, not “insurgents.” “Conceive to be” 
their rights, not “are.” He is savvy, skillfully communicating with Conner through the 
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American‟s language and mythology in order to resist the project of benevolent 
assimilation.  
 Ade represents the menace and uncanniness of mimicry in a scene where Conner 
demands that Mrs. Kakyak dress up in Victorian American attire. When Mrs. Kakyak 
emerges, the uneven border between mimicry and imitation, resemblance and difference, 
generates feelings of unease in Mrs. Kakyak, her daughter Eulalie, and Washington 
Conner. Colonial ambivalence is in full effect. 
After nearly a half-hour Mrs. Kakyak came forth. The huge hat toppled on her 
head. The frightful clamping of her waist seemed to cause pain, for her face bore 
an expression in which grief, humiliation, anger and apprehension were clearly 
evident. The waist, with its tight sleeves, clung to the corset in many a wrinkle. 
The skirt stood out flaringly. Mrs. Kakyak‟s bare feet showed underneath. She 
stood awkwardly with her feet wide apart and her arms thrown into angles, like a 
jointed automaton. 
“Oh mother, you‟re a sight!” said Eulalie who seemed undecided whether 
to laugh or cry. . . . “Please, Mr. Conner, don‟t be too hard on mother,” she said, 
looking up at him with pleading in her dark eyes. “Please don‟t compel her to 
wear those ridiculous garments.”  
  The missionary was embarrassed. (25) 
Bhabha‟s phrase for such awkward resemblance, “almost the same but not quite,” applies 
here (89). Mrs. Kakyak‟s forced mimicry creates “grief, humiliation, anger and 
apprehension.” It embarrasses Conner. In the context of the stories themselves, this scene 
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drives home, through the striking visual image of a “jointed automaton,” what Ade sees 
as the preposterousness of Filipinos assimilating into or imitating American cultural 
norms. That Ade‟s representation is shot through with a note of racist exoticism—when 
he puts Tagalogs in American clothes, the result is nothing but absurd—does not 
undercut the significance of the scene. Ade is indeed critical of his government‟s policy 
of benevolent assimilation, and he uses the scene with Mrs. Kakyak in Victorian clothing 
to expose one of the faultlines in that policy: the ambivalence of the colonial encounter. 
Though Washington Conner wanted assimilation, what he got was mimicry. Benevolent 
assimilation, Ade suggests, is an oxymoron.  
 However, Ade‟s stories do more than criticize, or break down, existing models of 
American presence abroad. Along the margins of the text we also see a reciprocal 
movement going on, a nudge to notice what is being built. According to the OED, in 
psychology, “assimilation,” the central imitative word of the stories and the conceptual 
true north of the McKinley policy in the Philippines, describes a “process whereby the 
individual acquires new ideas, by interpreting presented ideas and experiences in relation 
to the existing contents of his mind.” This process echoes James‟s pragmatist model of 
truth, one in which new ideas are grafted on to old ones in contrast to throwing out old 
ideas in favor of the new.
88
 Change is gradual, relativistic, and reciprocal. Ade‟s stories 
show us a connection between pragmatism and humanitarianism. When Ade lampoons 
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 As noted in the Introduction, James saw truth as instrumental. For him, ideas are true 
“just in so far as they help us get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience” 
(Pragmatism 34). No one, James believed, throws out all prior beliefs and replaces them with 
novelties. Truth is a matter of adaptation.  
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the project of benevolent assimilation, attempts to listen to what he imagines is the point 
of view of the Filipinos, and shows American culture to be contingent, it all works 
toward clearing the way toward a new understanding of the cross-cultural encounter, one 
that is reciprocal instead of one-sided. This notion of reciprocity, which we already saw 
in Jane Addams‟s theorization of the humanitarian dynamic, has become a central tenet 
of modern-day humanitarianism. 
 So, by driving home the idea that culture is contingent upon place and habit, Ade 
shows that selves are not inert. Assimilation works both ways; giver and receiver, 
instructor and pupil, are not static roles. Writing a report to his employers at the so-called 
“Bureau of Benevolent Assimilation,” the “instructor and pioneer and missionary” 
concludes that “the Kakyak family is not greatly changed from what it was when I 
arrived here, one month ago” (65, 68). The missionary, however, is changing. He has 
become “too lazy to read” (69). He gets a tan. He discards his tie “for the sake of comfort 
and because Eulalie had begged him not to be ridiculous” (69). Now Conner is the one 
changing his behavior because what he is accustomed to seems “ridiculous” in this new 
place. If Conner sees this as failure—“Instead of inducing the simple islanders to adopt 
the American costume, he had permitted Eulalie to coax him into the slovenly habits of 
her people”—Ade finds it pretty funny, writing, “Could it be possible that the great 
missionary, who had come to assimilate the Tagalos, was being assimilated by them?” 
(70). Indeed. The effect that the Philippines have on Conner make him doubt both his 
mission and his ability to carry it out. When he stumbles upon Eulalie and her insurgent 
boyfriend, Josefo, discussing their plan to resist American rule (which is, ironically, the 
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ultimate imitation; Eulalie says to Josefo, “Mr. Conner has told us that we must be as 
much like the Americans as possible. If the Americans are loyal to their government, then 
I suppose we must be loyal to ours”), Conner decides his work is done (78). He gives up. 
His explanation, offered to an old college friend, places the blame almost entirely on the 
climate: “I gave it up because I didn‟t want to be assimilated. I was wearing fewer clothes 
each week— gradually retrograding to the breechclout. The indolence of the tropics got 
into my bones, and I didn‟t so much as attempt to get it out. I found the climate very 
enervating” (81). Frightened by these changes in himself, Conner flees the Philippines, 




 Through Conner‟s failure Ade demonstrates that assimilation is not foolproof, but 
permeable, incomplete, and fractured. The desire to assimilate others can backfire into 
one being assimilated himself. Of course, assimilation never completely happened for 
Conner. He ran before it could. If assimilation is defined as “the process whereby the 
individual acquires new ideas, by interpreting presented ideas and experiences in relation 
to the existing contents of his mind,” Conner‟s experience falls short, for he is not open 
enough to the new ideas of the Kakyak family to embrace change. But Ade shows us that 
assimilation works at a cultural level almost without people noticing, turning to history to 
make his point. He does this by placing the American invasion and occupation of the 
Philippines in a series of colonial efforts. As Conner explains to the Kakyaks, “This isn‟t 
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 Although it contradicted the idea of racial fixity also prominent in the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries, Conner‟s hypothesis was not uncommon among colonials at the 
time. See Ann Stoler, Carnal Knowledge, pp. 97-8.  
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the first time that we‟ve tried this benevolent assimilation. We‟ve assimilated Indians, 
Mexicans, and Chinamen, to say nothing of several millions of negroes, and when any 
one of them hung back, I‟ll tell you, it went hard with him” (15). Ade connects 
benevolent assimilation to a history of domination and violence. Yet that domination is 
not totalizing, he reveals. 
In a suggestive episode, the Kakyaks‟ insightful questions elicit a response from 
Conner that shows just how incomplete “benevolent assimilation” really is, thus raising 
the question of who is assimilating whom, though this time at the cultural, not individual, 
level. The scene begins when one of the Kakyak brothers, Francisco, hears the American 
soldiers singing a song he finds interesting, and Conner leaps to sing it for him. “That‟s 
the most popular song in America,” Conner says (39). Unable to explain the meaning of 
the lyrics, he tells the Kakyaks, “it is one of the many coon songs which are so 
immensely popular in my country. I suppose about three percent of the population in the 
United States goes in for Wagner, Brahms, Tschaikowsky, Gounod, Verdi, and 
Mascagni; but the other ninety-seven per cent likes the coon songs” (40). “Why do you 
call them coon songs?” Mr. Kakyak asks. The following back-and-forth is worth quoting 
at length: 
“Well, „coon‟ is a familiar and slangy synonym for plantation negro, of 
whom we have several millions in our country. We get most of our songs in 
America from the illiterate type of country negro.” 
  “But I should think that in the process of assimilation the negro would be 
 compelled to take his songs from the white man,” said Mr. Kakyak. 
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Mr. Conner hesitated a moment before explaining. “The negro is not yet 
fully assimilated,” he said. “It will take time.” 
“But you say you are imitating him,” insisted Mr. Kakyak. “I thought that 
the darker race always took a secondary place and was dependent on the 
Caucasian, receiving instruction from him. That‟s what you have told us. Yet now 
you confess that you get your songs from the negro. Who was it said, „Let me 
write the songs of a country and I care not who makes the law‟?” 
“You do not understand,” replied the missionary. “We may borrow our 
popular songs from the negro, but in the important matter of handling the dollars 
we are still on  top, and will continue to remain there.” (40-1)  
Even though Conner confidently asserts that the white population is “still on top,” Ade 
also has him admit that “ninety-seven per cent” of Americans prefer African-American 
music to European. So, in addition to striking a common chord of American race 
relations,
 
Ade also shows that colonizers cannot help but be influenced by those they 
“assimilate.”
90
   
 At the end of the stories, Conner fails in the mission he set out to accomplish. He 
does not assimilate the Kakyaks. He cannot get them to be like him. Instead, he finds, to 
his great alarm, that he is becoming something like them. This recognition makes Conner 
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 The landmark work of scholarship that takes up the issue of white appropriation of 
black cultural production is Eric Lott‟s Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American 
Working Class (1995). In his introduction Lott writes, “Ultimately, I am after some sense of how 
precariously nineteenth-century white working people lived their whiteness” (4). The 
precariousness of Conner‟s cultural upper hand is what I am after in this analysis. At a time closer 
to Ade‟s, W. E. B. Du Bois wrote (in Souls of Black Folk) about the significance of black cultural 
production as a way to create history. 
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go home with his tail between his legs as the Kakyak family joins the Filipino 
insurgency. With this ending Ade demonstrates that benevolent assimilation had the 
potential to change its actors as much as its objects. What was failure for Conner in 1899 
is success for the Peace Corps Volunteer in 1963 (and 2010). If we look at Washington 
Conner as we would the negative of a photograph, we can see, in outline, the contours of 
an emerging American humanitarian identity. Where Conner comes to the Philippines to 
change others, the humanitarian adventurer would come to be changed, even as he seeks 
to help foreign others realize their own (and their community‟s own) potential. Where 
Conner preaches about his own culture, the humanitarian adventurer would be full of 
questions about the other culture. Where Conner insists upon the moral rectitude of his 
mission, the humanitarian adventurer would be full of doubt and open to the experience. 
Ade insists that the colonial encounter can alter identities, generating change (in this case, 
unwelcome change). In this he is much different from Twain, whose essay “To the 
Person Sitting in Darkness” resists the notion that the United States‟ presence in the 
Philippines is generative of anything. It is for this very reason that Ade is as instructive as 
he is: he heralds an identity to come rather than bemoaning the existing order. 
 The contrasts I am establishing here between Conner and the humanitarian-to-
come are a little too easy. If Washington Conner exists at one pole of the possible 
humanitarian adventurer identity and the ideal humanitarian is at the other, the lived 
reality is somewhere in the middle. Indeed, the identity itself would come to be 
characterized by the very tension between the ideal and the ugly, Washington Conner 
version. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, one of the characterizing tropes of the 
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humanitarian adventurer narrative and its attendant identity is its ambiguity. Ade is not so 
confident as to separate himself entirely from Conner, for he recognizes in Conner‟s 
sense of purpose and moral certitude a certain shortcoming of his own culture. Though 
the ideal may be clear, the way to get there is not.   
 Although most of his writing dealt with small-town America, Ade‟s keen 
understanding of the common folk did not go hand-in-hand with insularity. He made it a 
point to travel. As one newspaper article observed, “His theory is that anyone who wishes 
to unite with truth an understanding of the essential features of life in America should 
travel to other countries and then come back prepared to receive fresh impressions and 
make intelligent comparisons” (“George Ade, Author of „Modern Fables‟”). Ade came to 
understand his own culture better by exposing himself to another. Such worldly curiosity 
allowed Ade to write perceptively about the contingency of culture and place and 
instantiated, in literary form, the forbear of the Peace Corps Volunteer, who could be 
profitably described with Rorty‟s observations on the liberal ironist: she “spends her time 
worrying about the possibility that she has been initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to 
play the wrong language game” (75). Such worry is one of the hallmarks of the late-
twentieth-century humanitarian-adventurer narrative. 
 In the next section of this chapter I will analyze memoirs of actual American 
teachers in the Philippines during the period Ade and Twain were writing. This analysis 
will allow me to continue to trace the development of the American humanitarian-
adventurer identity in the twentieth century, showing that the most significant shift 
between the Thomasites and the PCVs had to do with self-definition: deriving identity 
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from remaking others, as Washington Conner attempted to do, shifts to remaking the self 
through the process of helping and interacting with others. The Thomasites, we shall see, 
both prefigure the PCVs and differ from them, for even though they experience change as 
a result of their experience in the Philippines, they have not yet made that change and the 
resulting cultural relativism part of their active motivation.  
 
Real-life Washington Conners 
 In her seminal study of European travel writing, Imperial Eyes, Mary Louise Pratt 
asks how diverse literary representations of travel and difference constitute a series of 
evolving ideologies that create the subject of Euroimperialism. Here I follow Pratt‟s lead, 
applying her methods to two memoirs by American teachers in order to show how they 
help constitute the identity of the American humanitarian adventurer. Mary Fee‟s A 
Woman‟s Impression of the Philippines (1910) and William Freer‟s The Philippine 
Experiences of an American Teacher: A Narrative of Work and Travel in the Philippine 
Islands (1906) are of interest not because the Fee and Freer are famous, nor because they 
were particularly gifted writers. Rather, it is because they strove to tell the story of their 
selves while they participated in a mission that would have a lasting change on the 
international posture and purpose of the United States. Alfred Kazin finds that “the 
deepest meaning of autobiography” has to do with the intersection of self and history, 
“history as our own fate” (83). Here the history of concern is the United States‟ turn-of-
the-century foray into colonialism, an event that changed the course of global politics and 
the image of the United States in the world (among many other things). It also changed 
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the lives of forgotten Americans who put their experiences on the page in order to make 
sense of them. Raymond Williams has called literary production in general “a specific 
process of self-making . . . self-composition,” an observation that is crucial to keep in 
mind as we turn to these narratives (210). Writing autobiography is not the mere practice 
of recording an already-existing self; the practice of writing actually helps to create it.
91
   
On the surface, Mary Fee‟s and William Freer‟s memoirs seem quite dissimilar. 
Freer‟s volume fits into an earlier tradition of explorer writing. Much of his book is in the 
vein of the “traveler-as-expert,” hearkening back to early National Geographic articles 
full of descriptions of different ethnic groups and detailed appraisals of the landscape.
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Freer finishes his memoir with a map of the Philippines, a glossary of Spanish and 
Tagalog terms with their translations, a list of further reading, and an index. Fee‟s has 
nothing of the sort; her writing is personal, reflective, more about her than about the 
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 Letters would also be a fascinating archive to explore. Kimberly Alidio does so in her 
article “„When I Get Home, I Want to Forget‟: Memory and Amnesia in the Occupied 
Philippines, 1901-1904.” In that piece she examines the disparity between the public and private 
selves articulated by two American teachers in the Philippines, Mary and Harry Cole. Letters the 
Coles wrote to family members describe the fears and insecurities, where letters they wrote in 
their official capacity maintain the surety of their mission.  
 Jane Hunter‟s study of women missionaries in China, The Gospel of Gentility: American 
Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-century China (1984), also draws largely on letters. Hunter‟s 
observation about why the letters are so interesting speaks to my project as well. She writes, “The 
novelty of their circumstances provoked missionary correspondents to articulate loyalties, 
prejudices, self-doubts, and cultural certainties that would likely never have been recorded, 
perhaps never even entertained, at home” (xv). To translate this observation into the terms of my 
project, the novelty of their circumstances loosened these women‟s moorings, it “unstiffened” 
their theories. It is the opportunity mission work affords these women, not the work itself, that is 
important to Hunter here: being in a foreign place allowed them to go to intellectual places they 
would never have visited before. The same is true of humanitarian adventurers.   
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 In The Blood of Government Paul Kramer discusses the emphasis on numerical and 
statistical data in studies on the Philippines and points out that some travel narratives likewise 
bore the stamp of the positivistic, science- and statistics-oriented epistemologies so popular in the 
nineteenth century. See p. 183.  
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Philippines. She describes the day she set out on her journey as “symbolic of the spirit 
which sent young America across the Pacific—hope, brilliant hope, with just a cloud of 
doubt” (15). Freer, in contrast, writes his memoir to provide evidence that colonialism 
must persist: 
The author trusts that the perusal of the following pages will result in a better 
appreciation of some desirable traits of Filipino character, in a stronger conviction 
of the un-wisdom of granting, at this time, any greater degree of self-government 
than the Filipinos already possess, and in a fuller understanding of the work that is 
being done in the public schools in the attempt to fit the people for the eventual 
exercise of complete autonomy. (vii) 
Freer does not seem to be much of a humanitarian, and by our contemporary standards, 
he is not. But while acknowledging the differences in purpose, content, and tone between 
the two memoirs, I want to assert that what they share is still more important. Both Fee 
and Freer anticipate the humanitarian-adventurer narrative that would flower in the mid- 
to late-twentieth century. Even in what appears to be a straightforward, positivistic 
account of the colonial experience (Freer‟s), moments of self- and cultural criticism crop 
up. Both Fee‟s and Freer‟s memoirs move through four discrete stages that persist in 
humanitarian-adventurer narratives written today: 1) wide-eyed enthusiasm, 2) self-
criticism, 3) increasing sophistication accompanied by self-justification, and 4) 
imperialist nostalgia. Whether these stages correspond to lived experience is not the 
point. Rather, it is as the author looks back on her experiences that she creates them. 
Written for a public audience, the stages serve two functions. They are arguments for the 
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necessity of change, the idea that alteration of the self must be a key aspect of 
humanitarian work because it has a lasting effect on the actor, priming him or her to 
become more cosmopolitan and more pragmatist. At the same time, they are rhetorical 
justifications for failure, narrative explanations for why the author could not accomplish 
all she set out to do.  
 The first stage in the evolution of the humanitarian-adventurer identity is a wide-
eyed sense of excitement the authors convey by waxing enthusiastic about the task before 
them. Such excitement gets dulled later on in the memoirs and is often contrasted to an 
increasing sense of world-weariness. Describing her departure for the Philippines, Fee 
writes, “To me the occasion was momentous. I was going to see the world, and I was one 
of an army of enthusiasts enlisted to instruct our little brown brother, and to pass the 
torch of Occidental knowledge several degrees east of the international date-line” (12). 
The humanitarian-adventurer identity owes something to both romance and to an 
American missionary tradition, as we see in this quotation.  Yet even here there is a 
before/after irony embedded in Fee‟s words. She writes from a position of wisdom, 
looking back on her earlier, naïve self, who firmly believed in ideas like “the torch of 
Occidental knowledge.” But irony gives way to full-blown earnestness once Fee gets into 
the thick of her descriptions. The author‟s penchant for the kind of adventure Tom 
Sawyer would seek out becomes apparent once she is ensconced in Capiz, the village 
where she taught: “Meanwhile we rather luxuriated in the sensations of romance inspired 
by living in a town surrounded by a hostile population and protected by soldiery. It was 
very, very new, and we made the best of it” (178). Danger is exciting—luxuriating, 
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even—to Fee. Though Freer is, on the whole, less personal and forthcoming in his 
writing, his memoir too shows the traces of the “go get „em” spirit. In a passage 
describing a boat ride between villages, he links the novelty of his own discomfort with 
the greater purpose of his mission: 
I tried to imagine that I was thoroughly uncomfortable and unhappy; but I could 
not. There was a joyousness in action, a zest in travel under those strange 
conditions, that was exhilarating; and particularly so when I remembered that I 
was having an active, even though a small share, in so magnificent an undertaking 
as the building up on an efficient school system for an unenlightened but 
receptive and capable people; and though wet and hungry I was glad I was there. 
(209-10) 
These passages bespeak the “adventurer” in “humanitarian adventurer.” The 
humanitarian adventurer is exhilarated by “zest in travel” and “strange conditions”; he is 
motivated by “magnificent . . . undertaking[s].” But as the identity evolves, this early 
stage of exhilaration gets posited as a preliminary state in the writer‟s moral and 
intellectual development. 
 A necessary step in the construction of the humanitarian-adventurer identity is the 
growth that comes from self-criticism, which is the second stage. Amid her effusions 
about setting off for the Philippines, Fee contrasts her early perspective with what she 
would later learn, noting that though details waiting to be interpreted were all around her, 
“I was not at that time sufficiently educated to read them. . . . I was delighted to be going 
away to foreign lands upon so fine a ship” (11). Delight and excitement, in other words, 
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obscure the signs that her sophisticated self would notice later. This subtle contrast 
between her initial enthusiasm and what would come later gets picked up again when she 
observes that the experience of teaching abroad gave her occasion to reflect on her own 
culture and its norms: “To an American of analytical tendencies a few years in the 
Philippines present not only an interesting study of Filipino life, but a novel 
consciousness of our own” (232). The humanitarian adventurer assumes a self-critical 
posture and shows through writing that the experience abroad has taught her lessons 
about herself and her own culture. In this Fee echoes George Ade‟s theory that one who 
really wants to understand the United States “should travel to other countries and then 
come back prepared to receive fresh impressions and make intelligent comparisons” 
(“George Ade, Author of „Modern Fables‟”). Though Freer is on the whole less reflective 
than Fee, he too comes to see his countrymen through different eyes as a result of his 
time in the Philippines. In his case, observing the relations between Americans and 
Filipinos makes him critical of what he sees as an American tendency to form quick 
racial judgments: 
There has been among some Americans here a carping and antagonistic spirit 
displayed toward Filipinos, which reflects little credit upon our national 
consistency or charity. We have a habit of uttering generalities about one race on 
the authority of a single instance; whereas, with our own, the tendency is to throw 
out of consideration those single instances in which the actual, undeniable 
practice of the American is a direct confutation of what his countrymen declare is 
the race standard. (115) 
196 
 
Though Freer stops short of cultural relativism here—remember, his declared purpose in 
writing his memoir is to convince the American public that the Filipinos are not yet fit to 
govern themselves—his choice to include the above observation shows that he 
considered being able to identify shortcomings among his own people part of the way the 
Philippines opened his eyes.  
Once the humanitarian adventurer opens herself up to the possibility of criticism, 
evolution, and change, the third stage in the development of the identity is a retreat from 
the wide-eyed stage. Previously full of hope and resolve, the humanitarian adventurer 
comes to occupy a position of sophistication from which she finds reasons for inaction. 
She makes use of what Pratt might call a “strategy of innocence,” a way in which the 
European travel writer rhetorically figures herself as an innocent observer. In the 
following passage Fee describes her response to a group of starving people in Capiz: 
I confess that in my unsophistication I went out among them consuming [sic] with 
fine altruistic zeal. A woman with a starving child in her arms begged of me in the 
plaza. Instantly my purse was out, and instantly I was mobbed by the howling, 
filthy crowd. My purse was almost torn out of my hand, my hat was knocked over 
my eyes, and a hundred eager claws tugged and pulled at my garments. I had 
fairly to fight my way out of the mob, and learned to bestow no more alms in 
public. Then I took to throwing pennies out of the window, and found as a 
consequence that there was no rest day or night from the wailing and howling in 
the street. Little by little the fountain of my philanthropy dried up, and I contented 
197 
 
myself with giving what I could to the Church to be bestowed in regular channels. 
(188)  
The rhetorical purpose of this passage is for Fee to justify why she has let up in her 
independent attempts to alleviate suffering.
93
 Fee uses this passage as an object lesson, 
tracing her evolution from possessing “fine altruistic zeal” to the moment at which “the 
fountain of [her] philanthropy dried up.” The way Fee tells the story, she had no other 
choice but to harden her heart and look away. The crowd was “howling, filthy”; the 
people, vicious and animal-like, had “a hundred eager claws” that “tugged and pulled at 
my garments.” Fee is relentless in depicting herself as helpless in the face of this kind of 
assault, and she wants readers to learn a lesson along with her: “to bestow no more alms 
in public.” Even throwing pennies out of the window, however, is a bad idea, for “there 
was no rest day or night from the wailing and howling in the street.” So, she withdraws. 
How could she do otherwise? Here and throughout her memoir, Fee paints herself as a 
seasoned, wise truth-teller: “The poor people among the Filipinos live in a poverty, a 
misery, and a happiness inconceivable to our people who have not seen it” (235). As 
witness to the events she describes, she is in a position of authority, for her knowledge is 
knowledge gleaned from experience and dependent on sight. This knowledge allows her 
to distance herself from her earlier enthusiasm and naiveté, and it authorizes some of her 
more blatantly insensitive and racist utterances. Sounding something like Howells‟s 
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 Fee‟s rhetorical response here is the obverse of liberal guilt, which Julie Ellison 
describes as “a position of wishful insufficiency relative to the genuinely radical” (345). Yet both 
Fee‟s response—“it‟s not my fault”—and liberal guilt, a cultural structure of feeling we associate 
with the late-twentieth century (even though Ellison, in her book Cato‟s Tears, shows that its 
roots go much earlier), perform similar functions. They make the white subject feel better. 
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Isabel March, who rationalized away the suffering she and Basil witnessed in New York 
City, Fee suggests that the Filipinos are not civilized enough to feel pain as an American 
would: “in spite of these ills he [the Filipino] is happy because he has not developed 
enough to achieve either self-pity or self-analysis. He bears his pain, when it comes, as a 
dumb animal does, and forgets it as quickly when it goes” (236-7). In passages like these 
Fee depicts herself as a hard-boiled woman who has come to terms with the reality of the 
circumstances surrounding her; these passages are rhetorical strategies of innocence 
because they seek to justify inaction even as they decry ignorance.  
 Fee puts strategies of innocence to use while also drawing attention to her 
privileged role in the colonial situation. In one passage Fee reflects on all the tasks that 
Basilio, her servant, did for her: checking roof leaks, fixing windows, shining floors, 
running errands, bringing her rubber boots to school for her when it rained. “And while a 
great many small coins went from me to him,” she writes, “I could never see that the pay 
was proportional to his care” (239). Fee recognizes that her servant has given her care 
that far exceeds the remuneration she tosses his way. In a self-protective gesture, though, 
she makes it clear that Basilio does not deserve credit for his generosity because he was 
only obeying orders. Fee writes, “Yet there was no difficulty in comprehending it 
[Basilio‟s generosity]. Pilar (my landlady) had told him to take care of me, and he was 
obeying orders. If she had told him to come up and bolo me [kill me with a “bolo,” a 
machete] as I slept, he would have done it unhesitatingly” (239-40). Even though 
Basilio‟s helpfulness exceeds Fee‟s remuneration, Fee robs him of all agency in the 
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exchange, for, in her view, Basilio is only following Pilar‟s instructions. This intellectual 
move saves Fee the burden of indebtedness.  
 The curious blend of anger, impotence, and vulnerability that Fee‟s writing makes 
manifest surfaces in later humanitarian-adventurer narratives as well. Where Fee is rather 
matter-of-fact about her inability to help the poor and her reliance on others, later in the 
century, such awareness often generated guilt and depression. Moritz Thomsen, author of 
Living Poor (1969), writes of “depression, a feeling of hopelessness” in large part due to 
his initial inability to speak Spanish and his lack of progress in development work in 
Ecuador (29, 26). He refers to “a time of growing depression, guilt, and restlessness” and 
“a time of vague depression, dissatisfaction, sadness, a neurotic apprehension” (120, 
138). Another example of anger and vulnerability comes from one of the most honest and 
widely-read Peace Corps narratives, George Packer‟s The Village of Waiting (1984). The 
book hums with a low-grade irritation at Togo, Packer‟s host country, and irritation at 
himself for being there. “I was well aware of my potential for irrelevance,” Packer writes. 
“In 1982 reports of drought and hunger . . . didn‟t lead me to conclude that the thing the 
continent needed most was a Renaissance studies major who could teach the relative 
pronoun” (51-2).
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 By noting his own “irrelevance,” Packer protects himself against the 
criticism of others. 
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 The Peace Corps Volunteers who served with me in Togo twenty years after Packer‟s 
tour hated the memoir, accusing Packer of being a culturally-insensitive quitter. (He left before 
his two years were out. But Packer‟s no quitter; he keeps returning to Africa in his capacity as a 
journalist and has engaged more thoroughly with Togo than any of us probably did.) In truth, I 
think his memoir frightened us. It did too good a job of depicting “the vulnerable anger that lay 
beneath the surface of even the most placid African days” (55). It showed us the Washington 
Conner sides of ourselves. 
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 The fourth and final stage in the development of the identity of the humanitarian 
adventurer is what Renato Rosaldo has termed “imperialist nostalgia”: “a particular kind 
of nostalgia, often found with imperialism, where people mourn the passing of what they 
themselves have transformed” (69). Related to Pratt‟s strategies of innocence, imperialist 
nostalgia is a posture adopted to absolve its subject of guilt and responsibility in effecting 
the changes imperialism has wrought. Fee‟s memoir is suffused by this structure of 
feeling. Near the beginning of her memoir, she reflects on the changing Philippines:   
Eight long years have slipped by since that [first] night, and in that time a passing-
bell has tolled for the Philippines which we found then. Who shall say for many a 
year whether the change be for better or for worse? But the change has come, and 
for the sake of a glamour which overlay the quaint and moribund civilization of 
the Philippines of that day I have chronicled in this volume my singularly 
unadventurous experiences. (44) 
Here Fee situates herself as a preserver, not a destroyer, of the Philippines as she found 
them. She writes about her “singularly unadventurous experiences” “for the sake of a 
glamour” that existed then, even if it has vanished. In the midst of her memoir as well, 
Fee is not free from a sense of sadness at the changes overtaking the country:  
On the walls of churches and conventos too are found pictures in oil, often 
gloomy, full of tortures and death, as Spanish paintings incline to be, yet 
essentially true art—pictures which it is to be hoped will survive the inundation of 
American commercial energy. The extract-of-beef advertisements and the varied 
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“girls” of all pursuits have found their way into the Philippines; and the Filipino, 
to our sorrow be it said, takes kindly to them. (199) 
Again Fee posits herself as the defender of the way the Philippines once were (although 
in this instance, ironically, it is the Spanish colonial presence she feels ought to be 
preserved) and places the blame for change squarely on the Filipinos themselves. If the 
Philippines become homogenized and commercialized, it is because the Filipino has 
“take[n] kindly” to “American commercial energy.” Yet even this changed Philippines is 
one that Fee longs for, and this longing positions her as a defender of the country she has 
sought to change. During her stay in the Philippines, Fee returns to Chicago for a brief 
trip, where, she asserts, she was more frightened for her life than she ever was in Capiz. 
Her Philippine homecoming is a relief:  “And through and through a grateful system I felt 
the lifting of the tremendous pressure, the agonizing strain, competition, and tumult of 
American life. Thank Heaven! there is still a mañana country—a fair, sunny land, where 
rapid transportation and sky-scrapers do not exist” (249). Yet.  
 Even Freer, otherwise so utterly convinced of his purpose, laments the changes he 
is helping to bring about: “In our tutoring of the Filipinos, let us hope that we shall not 
too completely „Americanize‟ their children,” he writes (278). And although Fee appears 
to be blissfully ignorant of her own role in presenting American culture as something 
worth imitating, she observes that imitation has had inimical effects on Filipino culture: 
“It will be some time before what real talent they [Filipinos] have will make itself felt in 
any line, because it will take a great deal of tactful handling to make them reveal their 
natural artistic trend instead of falling into imitation of Europe and America” (93).  
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Fee worries that she and others like her have done too good a job of convincing the 
Filipinos that European and American forms of art are worth imitating. Though Fee has 
contributed to the state of affairs she decries, by decrying it, she makes herself innocent 
of it.  
It is a bleak irony that recovering “native” ways of doing things would later 
become a stated mission of the Western humanitarian. Only seven years after Fee‟s 
memoir was published, volunteer teacher Catherine Spencer told the New York Times that 
she planned to help the people of Jolo revive their traditional weaving methods 
(“Forsakes Society”). And half a century after that, humanitarian adventurers would work 
against the one-way relationship their own predecessors had cultivated. One early Peace 
Corps Volunteer serving in Chile described the kind of development work he was 
engaged in like this: “we are not trying to build things, which makes the job difficult to 
evaluate, but trying to build a spirit of self-reliance and self-respect in a people who have 
never developed this and have always been done for and not given credit for being able to 
help themselves” (78).
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 Here the imperialist nostalgia Fee and Freer experienced gets 
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 In a scene from Living Poor (1969), Thomsen has a wry laugh at himself when he 
recounts an exchange with Segundo, one of the farmers in the town where he lived.  
“Do you seriously believe,” Segundo asked me, “that as a complete stranger to 
this country you can come walking in here where we have been raising chickens all our 
lives and tell us how to do it better?” 
  “Yes, exactly,” I said, “that‟s the whole idea.” 
  “Ay, caramba,” he said, shaking his head and marching out the door. (89) 
One lesson of the Peace Corps that volunteers recount in their narratives is how their experience 
helped them to unlearn the lessons of the Peace Corps. In other words, living among the poor 
teaches Volunteers to disregard whatever they may have been taught their mission was. With this 
scene, Thomsen shows readers how he learns a little humility. And yet, Thomsen goes on to 
explain how his suggestions for raising chickens did wind up working better, in the short term at 
least, than the Ecuadorians‟ methods. What are readers to take from this? 
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traduced into a new sort of humanitarian practice that focuses on sustainability and self-
reliance against an emotional and intellectual backdrop of ignorance and naiveté. This 
Volunteer‟s “teach a man to fish” approach assumes quite a bit: that the people he is 
coming to work with “have always been done for,” that they have never developed self-
respect. It casts him, the humanitarian agent, as the person who can resurrect what he 
perceives as the trampled spirit of the indigenous Chileans among whom he lives. This is, 
again, a strategy of innocence: the man seeks to take credit for the change he effects 
without taking responsibility for his role, or the role of people like him, in creating the 
situation he has traveled so far to redress. 
 The four stages of the humanitarian adventurer‟s identity (wide-eyed excitement, 
self-criticism, sophistication and hardening of the sympathies, and imperialist nostalgia) 
surface in writings by Peace Corps Volunteers and other travelers who, like these 
teachers, write in order to create and make public their renewed self-understanding. What 
is less explicit in Fee‟s and Freer‟s early-twentieth-century narratives than it is in later 
humanitarian-narratives is a pointed emphasis on self-transformation. Though both Fee 
and Freer are aware of the risk posed to Filipino culture by imparting American ideals 
through tutelage, imitation, and rote education, neither teacher dwells at any length on the 
change they themselves experienced as a result of their time in the Philippine islands. 
Yes, their memoirs chronicle a kind of evolution. Yet neither writer sought that evolution 
out, making it the express purpose of their voyage. They experienced change despite 
themselves. Washington Conner went to the Philippines charged with the task of 
benevolent assimilation, and he left the Philippines because he feared being assimilated 
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by them. The real-life Washington Conners expressed no such fear. Fee and Freer went to 
the Philippines as part of “a chosen and devoted band” who sought “to sow / The seeds of 
truth and culture,” as E. E. Schneider, who penned the poem “To the Philippine 
Teachers” for the log of the U.S.S. Thomas in 1901, put it. The poem also exhorted the 
teachers to “let no fear of failure fill your hearts, / Or dash your courage, or your spirits 
grieve; / And let no petty doubts becloud your brain” (60). The rhetorical identity of the 
humanitarian adventure is predicated on change and evolution of the adventurer self, yet 
self-transformation is not the outcome Fee and Freer desire. Their mission—about which 
they had very few “petty doubts”—is directed outward.  
 So if the Thomasites are precursors of the PCVs, they are also distinct from them, 
perhaps because the notion of self-transformation as a desirable end had not yet entered 
the national imaginary. Yet it is clear that Fee and Freer saw themselves as distinct from 
other Americans, and saw that distinction as significant. Across all four stages of the 
humanitarian-adventurer identity, the teachers establish a contrast between those with 
enough vim and vigor to live up to their role, and those without it. In other words, they 
contrast the new selves they have become with Westerners who are too weak or soft to 
fully participate in the task before them. In Freer‟s memoir, this takes the form of a 
contrast between Americans living in Manila and those, like him, who live in the 
provinces. In the seemingly obligatory chapter about how hard it is to do things like cook 
and wash one‟s food in the Philippines (the “I‟m so hard core” chapter, as I think of it), 
Freer describes his method of showering before taking a jibe at city-living Americans: 
“Of course, Americans residing in Manila know nothing of such methods as these, but we 
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of the provinces think they do not know much about the Philippines anyway” (45). His 
comment anticipates the metaphor at the heart of William J. Lederer and Eugene 
Burdick‟s best-selling novel The Ugly American (1958). In that book, which criticized 
American foreign policy in Southeast Asia on the grounds that the culturally-insensitive 
Foreign Service Officers there were doing a terrible job representing the United States,  
there are (“ugly”) Americans who get things done, and then there are Americans who 
hunker down in the capital and go to cocktail parties.
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 Lederer and Burdick argued that 
the U.S. government should do more to support and foster the ugly Americans. With his 
comment about Americans in Manila who know nothing about the Philippines, Freer, 
humanitarian adventurer that he is, establishes himself as an ugly American. For Fee, the 
contrast takes the form of a tougher-than-thou look at women (and, incidentally, men) 
who simply are not cut out for the role she has adapted to: 
The Philippines are no place for women or men who cannot thrive and be happy 
on plain food, plenty of work, and isolation. Nor is there any sadder lot than that 
of the American married woman who is unemployed. Her housekeeping takes 
very little time, for the cheapness of native servants obviates the necessity of all 
labor but that of supervision. There is nowhere to go, nothing to do, nothing to 
read, nothing to talk about. She has nothing to do but to lie in a steamer chair and 
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 In the brief campaign speech at the University of Michigan in which Senator Kennedy 
first called on young Americans to serve their country abroad (this was in 1960, before the 
genesis of the Peace Corps and just before the election), he echoed Lederer and Burdick‟s 
arguments, describing certain Foreign Service Officers he had seen abroad as being “unconscious 
of the fact that their role was not tennis and cocktails” (“Kennedy and the Peace Corps”). 
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to think of home. Most women break down under it very quickly; they lose 
appetite and flesh and grow fretful or melancholy. (246) 
Interestingly, the kind of ennui Fee describes here is exacerbated by the colonial 
situation. It is because the women Fee singles out can rely on servants that they find 
themselves without a task, without a purpose. Here we see the traces of a missionary-like 
pride in Fee‟s abstemiousness and drive. 
 The zeal for adventure along with the distinction between the teachers and their 
city-bound compatriots are central to the teachers‟ professional identities. These traits 
help make Freer and Fee, two teachers living in villages, cultural diplomats. Because of 
their energy, their enthusiasm for adverse circumstances, and their sense of mission, these 
self-selected humanitarian adventurers are more than just teachers; they are role models. 
The U.S. government itself shares this insight, as a passage Freer cites from “Report of 
the Census of the Philippine Islands” (vol. iii, pp. 644-5) makes clear:  
Socially, and in intellectual influence, he [the teacher] is the successor of the man 
who for centuries was the controlling influence in these primitive communities of 
the Philippines [the Spanish friar]. He has been the quiet mediator of modern 
ideas, and far transcended the role of a mere pedagogue. He has won the affection 
and respect of the Filipino people as, from the nature of their callings, the soldier 
and the merchant could not do. If the children of the Philippines had learned 
nothing from books, the personal influence of the American teacher would still 
have justified his employment. (qtd. in Freer 99-100) 
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The census report does not spell out what kind of “personal influence” the teacher 
possesses or how he or she could wield such influence, apart from mediating “modern 
ideas.” This passage promotes colonialism, describing a transfer of power and influence 
from one colonial arbiter to another. At the same time, in it I also see the roots of the 
Peace Corps‟s second goal,“Helping promote a better understanding of Americans on the 
part of the peoples served” (in other words, making people like us better). Just as 
Kennedy would argue for the Peace Corps‟s value in a Cold War context because of the 
good-will diplomacy the volunteers could generate by making friendships with people in 
the host countries, at the turn of the century, the U.S. government saw its teachers in a 
similar light. Freer understood himself to be fulfilling a purpose that went beyond his 
professional role in the classroom. That role included influencing individual Filipinos in a 
way that only he, because of his contact with them, was capable of. It also included 
generating good will among the Filipinos for Americans. As a teacher setting out to the 
Philippines seven years later observed,  
Do you know . . . the Moros of Jolo have so far come into contact with hardly any 
other Americans than soldiers? As far as we shall be able, we are going to try to 
show them that Americans possess other traits than an ability to fight, and this we 
hope to make the women and children realize when we have succeeded in 
cultivating their friendship. . . . At the start we can hardly hope to attempt more 
than to get acquainted and show the people that we are seeking only to do them 
good.” (“Forsakes Society”) 
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She continues, “When it comes to results, we cannot expect to accomplish more than the 
blazing of a trail for others.”  
This is good-will diplomacy in its infancy, and it did blaze a trail. Half a century 
later, Peace Corps Volunteers would set out to the developing world in order to, in the 
words of one early volunteer, “prove to the rest of the world that all Americans are not 
rich or imperialistic or snobs” (Luce 5). And by all appearances, it has worked. As the 
Peace Corps Country Director in Chile observed in the early 60s, “Our volunteers have 
made literally thousands of friends who now know and appreciate Americans as they 
never had a chance to do before” (Luce 130-1). The humanitarian adventurer defines 
herself against “other” Americans and holds her own behavior up as a model of the best 
of her country. Improving the United States‟ status in the eyes of the world was, and is, 
one of the missions of the humanitarian adventurer. Freer understood it to be his, 
dedicating his memoir “to those Americans, who, by noble example, by benevolent 
ministration and by unselfish labor under trying conditions, are teaching the best 
Americanism to the Filipinos” (v). Both Thomasite writing and Peace Corps writing 
establishes a link between selfhood and nation without explicitly defining that self as 
patriotic or nationally-identified. The usefulness of the humanitarian-adventurer identity 
comes from its flexibility.  
  Writing by humanitarian adventurers at the turn of the century anticipates, if not 
influences, the form the humanitarian identity would take at the end of the twentieth 
century. With that relationship acknowledged, I want to be clear: no one humanitarian 
adventurer is like any other. Every story is unique. Some present-day writers share more 
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in common with Freer than they do with Fee; they write ethnographies that become 
autobiographies, self-knowing through telling the story of another people and place. 
Others are, like Fee, more self-reflective. Some Peace Corps writers take a page from 
Twain‟s book. Their experiences abroad make them look so critically at their own 
country that they cannot bear to return. This is what happened to Moritz Thomsen, who 
died in Ecuador in 1991, more than two decades after finishing his Peace Corps service. 
And others, like Ade, poke rueful fun at themselves and their host countries. It is 
important to remember, too, that these writers are not always a particularly likeable 
group. Their self-congratulation (and self-indulgence, and self-satisfaction) can be pretty 
tough to take. However, they do share something important in common: an ability to 
balance their identities as Americans with their identities as cosmopolitan humanitarians, 
people who reach beyond borders to effect positive change in the world.  
Such a balance is specific to the humanitarian-adventurer identity I have explored 
in this chapter. Americans who decide to serve their country by serving international 
others are a specific bunch, distinct in motive from other Americans living abroad (e.g., 
conscientious objectors, solo travelers, human rights observers, NGO workers, corporate 
employees, missionaries). They work to promote the image of the United States through 
their humanitarian labors. I have attempted to show the way Americans humanitarian 
adventurers dwell in a place of openness, responsiveness, and doubt. That place, too, is 
where pragmatism lives. Cornel West states that he is “convinced that a thorough 
reexamination of American pragmatism . . . may be a first step toward fundamental 
change and transformation in America and the world” (8). A tall order. Yet it is my hope 
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that reading literature about humanitarian selfhood as an instantiation of pragmatic 
thought can help critics of programs like the Peace Corps recognize the cultural openness 
and relativism inherent in it. I also hope that the connection might help us recognize the 
promise in pragmatism, considered by many to be a politically impotent philosophical 
stance.  
* 
Self-transformation brought about by cross-cultural humanitarianism is the 
phenomenon I have been tracing in “American Callings.” For Howells it meant 
attempting to use his fiction to increase empathy between one class and another, 
struggling to give a more textured rendering to the ideas of Christian socialism he found 
so compelling. In Tourgée‟s case, becoming aware of the historically-contingent nature 
of the self meant that he could understand the point of view of his antagonist and use 
persuasion to try to lay the rhetorical groundwork for genuine humanitarian change. 
Addams saw self-transformation on both sides of the humanitarian dynamic as building a 
foundation for a more just, more equitable American democracy. And where Ade poked 
fun at his character Washington Conner for naively believing that he could (and should) 
“benevolently assimilate” the Kakyaks, Mary Fee and George Freer came to question 
American culture and their own privileged status in the Philippines even from within the 
colonial apparatus. Without disregarding the critiques made of humanitarian practice—
the fact that it is predicated on inequality, that it can be hierarchical, that it often 
accompanies imperialism or serves as a cloak for imperialist motives—I have argued for 
the ethical value of a dynamic that encourages self-awareness and cultural awareness 
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alike. This is not to say that we as Americans ought to give up on working toward more 
vigorous, visionary, revolutionary interventions in the status quo. There will always be a 
need for such strong positions, for changes to rather than within the system. But those 
who advocate for revolutionary change as the only means of arriving at a more just, more 
equitable society, dismissing humanitarian efforts as quiescent, accommodationist, 
surface solutions—good, sure, but not good enough—do so at a great cost. One kind of 
change can‟t happen without the other. The reflection brought about by humanitarian 
practice encourages attention to the place self and society intersect. Humanitarianism 
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